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Foreword
The essays in this issue of  the Jindal Journal of  Public Policy published by 
the Jindal School of  Government and Public Policy cover a wide range of  
empirical and theoretical public policy concerns in countries with different 
political regimes. Drawing on research from Asian and Latin American 
contexts, these essays engage with the themes of  federalism in China, the 
role of  international institutions in alleviating poverty, local government 
taxation reforms, and the position of  women in conflict afflicted zone. 
The essays published in this issue are selected from papers presented at an 
international conference on “Federalisms and Localisms” and the public 
lectures organized by the Jindal School of  Government and Public Policy. 
The opening essay by Michael Davis deliberates on the characteristics of  
Chinese federalism and the lessons that the country can learn from its 
neighbor – the large multinational state, India. Davis argues for a dual 
model - federalism for the Chinese mainland and confederation for the 
peripheral communities for maintaining the territorial integrity of  the 
country. Public dissatisfaction over State policies nationwide and especially 
among ethnic groups, who occupy at least a third of  Chinese territory pose 
a threat to maintaining territorial integrity of  China. Although the country 
has thus far been able to keep their peripheral communities under control 
largely through the use of  force, as succinctly argued by Davis, it would be 
difficult to adopt such a repressive posture. He concludes that a confederal 
arrangement for China’s peripheral communities would provide a reliable 
umbrella under which these communities could be brought together in the 
“state-nation” vision. The viability of  such an arrangement hinges on the 
presence of  a strong judiciary for third-party dispute resolution and for 
implementing confederal agreements. 
The rule of  law is critical to the vibrancy and stability of  any democratic 
polity, which in the Indian context is enshrined in the Article 21 of  the 
Indian Constitution.  Public perception about the prevalence of  law or 
its status affects the stability of  governments. Although the ideal of  rule 
of  law is associated with modernity, in ancient societies as highlighted in 
the second essay by Moro, law was fundamental to their existence. The 
history of  the Indian legal system dates back to 2700 years ago and was 
constituted of  diverse sources of  law and sophisticated interpretative 
tradition. However, very little is known about its functioning.  He argues 
for blurring the disciplinary boundaries of  legal education and policy 
studies to strengthen the pedagogy of  legal training in India. 
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Achieving horizontal and vertical equity in tax regimes is a key challenge 
confronting policy makers worldwide. Poorer citizens in many contexts 
end up paying a higher proportion of  their income in taxes as compared to 
their wealthier counterparts. Moving away from the Asian sub-continent, 
Aaron Schneider deliberates on this paradox of  increased state revenues 
and the prevalence of  vertical and horizontal inequity in taxation structure 
drawing on the Brazilian experience. After a concerted effort starting 
from the mid-nineties, the Brazilian government managed to reform its 
taxation policy and increase the tax revenues. Schneider traces the manner 
in which different social groups were incorporated in the reformed tax 
regime and the political moment that favored the reform agenda.  A key 
factor favoring the reforms agenda was the support extended by a cross-
coalition of  popular sector and middle class groups to a high capacity tax 
regime.  Whilst tax reforms enabled the Brazilian government to generate 
more revenue, it was not able to overcome the institutional legacies of  
previous patterns of  incorporation. Consequently, as has been eloquently 
elaborated by Schneider, the economic and political elites are able to 
preserve elements of  particularism and progressivity in the tax system.
Poverty and inequality, as Tilly argued has remained durable over the years, 
despite various forms of  intervention by diverse range of  international 
and national level institutions. The Millennium Development Goal 
(MDG) articulated by the United Nations is one among the long list 
of  development agendas aimed at reducing poverty and inequality. By 
now, there is a consensus that the MDG though useful in drawing the 
attention of  Governments to reduce poverty, will not be able to achieve its 
target.   Exploring the development challenges confronting government 
in the post 2015 era, Naresh Singh argues the need for better governance 
and the importance of  integrating human rights agenda and Sustainable 
Development Initiative. As underscored in his essay, a strong political 
mobilization of  popular groups to pressurize leaders and policy makers 
is imperative to realize the goal of  poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. The essay concludes with outlining an agenda for schools 
of  public policy and government in terms of  addressing inclusive 
development.
The essay by Suraj Kumar traces the trajectory and outcomes as well as 
their limitations or constraints of  two major interventions viz., the State 
Human Development Reports (SHDRs) and the Development Policy 
Loans (DPL) promoted by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank in the Indian context. Both interventions 
focused on reforming governance mechanisms and thereby address issues 
of  poverty and inequality. Arguing that the persistence of  poverty in the 
Indian context is more due to internal inequality and poor implementation 
of  policies, the essay points to the urgency of  reforming internal distribution 
and implementation capacity of  the State rather than relying on Overseas 
Development Aid and other concessional aid flows. Further, the essay 
underscores the importance of  reform initiatives in India to move beyond 
the “prayer and petition” approach gain political leverage and engage with 
a much larger audience, including with crowds. In this light, it is critical 
to harness political will through institutions of  parliamentary democracy 
in India. However, the pubic disenchantment with political processes 
complicates the introduction of  reforms, especially, at a time when the 
youth are becoming demographically more significant but increasingly 
alienated from mainstream parliamentary politics. Sustained engagement 
with the Governments at the National and the Regional level is critical to 
harness political will for enacting governance reform in India.
Sukriti Chauhan draws our attention to the plight of  women in conflict 
zones. Her essay attempts to archive the unheard voices of  women in 
conflict zones. Despite our clamor of  modernity, society and law continue 
to discriminate women and subordinate them to men. She argues that 
violence against women in such contexts tend to be dismissed as a natural 
consequence of  war and often leading to immunity for those perpetrating 
crimes against women. Pointing to the multidimensional impact of  violence 
on women in terms of  physical and emotional suffering inflicted on the 
individual concerned, their families and community, Chauhan pleads for a 
reconceptualization of  the paradigm of  human rights. 
Finally, the public policy concerns discussed in this issue demand not only 
a shift in the way we run our institutions, implement laws or policies, but as 
several authors have pointed out require new ways of  thinking about who 
we are and what  kind of  a society we want to be. Disciplinary training and 
ways of  thinking about policy issues have contributed to our disconnected 
approach to complex problems, ignoring their connectedness. Perhaps a 
small step forward is to move out of  our disciplinary boundaries and begin 
to think and work in trans-disciplinary ways.  
Bhuvaneswari Raman, Associate Professor
Jindal School of  Government and Public Policy
C. Raj Kumar, Professor and Vice Chancellor
O.P. Jindal Global University
Sudarshan Ramaswamy, Professor and Dean
Jindal School of  Government and Public Policy
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FEDERALISM AND DEMOCRATIC 
REFORM IN CHINA WITH 
LESSONS FROM INDIA
Michael C. Davis*
The Chinese political fabric appears to be under great stress, with 
reports of  nearly 200,000 “mass incidents” every year, especially 
from workers with labor disputes and ordinary people whose 
property is often seized by corrupt officials. Such incidents are fuelled 
by public dissatisfaction nationwide as well as the disenchantment 
of  Chinese State policies among ethnic groups, who occupy at least 
a third of  Chinese territory. China has so far been able to keep its 
peripheral communities under control (or in the case of  Taiwan, to 
ensure a degree of  restraint) through its clear willingness to use force, 
which has aggravated the unease. A democratic China, however, 
would find it difficult to adopt such a repressive posture. Drawing on 
Linz and Stepan and Yadav’s theoretical and empirical elaboration, 
the article examines the characteristics of  Chinese federalism and 
the lessons that can be learnt from a large multinational state like 
India.  The article suggests a dual mechanism of  federalism on the 
Chinese mainland and confederation with peripheral communities 
for addressing China’s territorial and political development. A 
confederal arrangement for China’s peripheral communities would 
provide a reliable umbrella of  national laws and institutions under 
which these communities could be brought together in the “state-
nation” vision. The viability of  such an arrangement hinges on the 
presence of  a strong judiciary for third-party dispute resolution and 
for implementing confederal agreements
INTRODUCTION 
When I first wrote about the case for Chinese federalism over a decade ago, 
I worried that China’s political reform process was being held hostage to the 
Communist Party’s (CCP) repressive efforts to secure China’s periphery(Davis 
1999).  While CCP’s political paranoia extended to the population at large, 
it was especially driven by a myth of  a unified state deeply embedded in the 
CCP psyche. This myth held that if  the center relaxed its grip, China would 
*Faculty of  Law, University of  Hong Kong 
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descend into a chaos riven with separatism at the periphery. That sentiment 
remains. Measured by the level of  political reform over the past decade, 
which has been next to nothing, there would be no need to update this 
argument. Measured, however, by the growing demands of  a restless public 
and the concern of  China’s neighbors over China’s increasingly nationalistic 
foreign policy posture, renewed reflection on this concern is warranted.
The Chinese political fabric appears to be under great stress, with reports 
of  nearly 200,000 “mass incidents” every year, especially from workers 
with labor disputes and ordinary people whose property is often seized 
by corrupt officials. Massive levels of  corruption have fueled public 
dissatisfaction nationwide, while ethnic national groups on the periphery, 
who are the primary occupants of  at least a third of  current Chinese 
territory, have become increasingly disenchanted by repressive CCP 
policies. In some ways the CCP has become a victim of  its own success, 
as it becomes apparent that the CCP lacks the political and institutional 
tools to manage and meet the expectations of  an increasingly complex 
and diverse society. These domestic developments, along with increasingly 
critical global responses to the rise of  a powerful authoritarian regime, 
have met with government fury and increased repression, causing only 
further unease. One area of  great concern has been political reform, as 
authoritarianism and reduced liberties and rights become less tolerable in 
an economically emerging society.
Recent theorizing of  federalism in a multinational democratic state by 
Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yadav (2010) encourages further reflection on 
lessons that may inform the political reform process in a large multinational 
state such as China. As early as 1996, Stepan and Linz had advanced a 
theory for federalism in a multinational state where they first introduced 
the notion of  a “state-nation,” though with little elaboration (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996).1  That Linz and Stepan, along with eminent Indian scholar 
Yadav, have taken up the theoretical and empirical elaboration of  this 
concept makes further reflection in respect of  multinational China timely. 
The opportunity to reflect on lessons China might learn from Indian 
experience is of  particular interest in the present venue.
I will address these issues in three parts in the sections that follow: first, a 
theory of  federalism in a multinational and multicultural democratic state, 
1 Juan J. Linz and A.Stepan, 1996..“Stateness, Nationalism, and Democratization,” in Juan J. 
Linz and A. Stepan, Problems of  Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South 
America, and Post-Communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, (see page 34, 
as well as Figure 2.1).
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relying on a parsimonious account of  the argument advanced by Stepan, 
Linz and Yadav (2010) derived from the Indian model (Stepan, Linz & 
Yadav 2010);2 second, the historical Chinese experience with and resistance 
to federalism; and, third, how this multinational state federal theory might 
be applied in China to address current problems and democratic reform. 
Given the parsimony expected here the aim will be to lay out the basic 
argument, leaving plenty of  room for later refining this multinational 
federal model in the Chinese context.
FEDERALISM IN A MULTINATIONAL DEMOCRATIC 
STATE: LESSONS FROM INDIA
In considering the roles of  federalism may play in developing democracy in 
a multinational state, seminal theories derived from the Indian experience 
offer a good starting point. India’s founders appeared early on to 
understand the challenges of  forming and holding together a multinational 
state. The Nehru Report approved by the All Parties Conference in 1928 
foreshadowed the broadly inclusive “state-nation” vision discussed by 
Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010). The 1950 Indian Constitution envisioned 
a multicultural, multinational, federal and consociational India with a 
dozen (now 22) major languages and every major world religion. India 
offers several features of  interest to a multinational state contemplating 
constitutional reform, including an asymmetric “holding together” 
federalism, a new secularism that was rather extraordinary for an intensely 
religious community, the rule of  law, and parliamentary government. 
Under this model as it evolved ethnic or linguistic communities could 
have a state of  their own (1957) while special deals co-opted most tribal 
communities into the system. As Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010) describe 
it, this spawned centric-regional parties, at first aligned under the Indian 
National Congress, but today pretty much essential for any ruling coalition. 
The model featured a strong central government. A powerful Supreme 
Court retained original jurisdiction in almost all matters, today facilitating 
a rash of  much discussed public interest litigation. Though India has no 
officially declared religion there is a system of  personal laws with wide 
state sponsorship and official respect for all religions.
2 This theory is elaborated with considerable empirical support in the book-length account. 
Alfred Stepan, Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav, Crafting State-Nations: India and Other Multi-
national Democracies, Washington: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. The present analysis 
will rely on key theoretical aspects as most easily accessible in the 2010 article. Alfred Stepan, 
Juan J. Linz and Yogendra Yadav, “The Rise of  ‘State-Nations,” Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 21/3, 
2010, pp. 50-68.
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This Indian model has encouraged a state support system that would be 
the envy of  many multinational states struggling with secessionism or 
insurgency. To be sure, at its founding India lost territories dominated 
by Muslim communities to the northwest that became Pakistan and the 
northeast, the present day Bangladesh.  The struggles over the autonomy 
of  Jammu and Kashmir continue.  However, India has been able to hold 
the loyalty of  a large rather diverse collection of  nationalities. Stepan, 
Linz and Yadav (2010) describe wide positive identification with the state, 
with multiple and complimentary political identities in 35 states and union 
territories. Even at present, the provision in the constitutional framework 
to form new states has engendered several pending claims for regional 
autonomy within India. There appears to be reasonable constitutional, 
legal and administrative institutional trust and wide support for democratic 
institutions.3Though the conditions addressed and precise solutions derived 
are unique to India, this state-nation model is certainly of  comparative 
interest in a world riven by ethnic national conflicts.
Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010) identify three broad categories of  states:1) 
state-nations that are robustly multinational, with strong territorially-based 
cultural diversity whose units advance claims of  independence in the name 
of  nationalism and self-determination—includes India, Spain, Canada, 
Belgium; 2) nation-states with non-territorially-based cultural diversity 
without independence movements—includes federal Switzerland and the 
US; and 3) unitary nation-states that are culturally homogeneous—Japan, 
Portugal, Sweden. They note that France may have shifted to unitary 
nation state status through forced assimilation.
China, akin to France, may be attempting forced assimilation. Such 
would mark a shift from a state-nation to a unitary nation-state. That 
China is a multinational state is often not appreciated, although this was 
acknowledged by the CCP during its founding phase. While 90 percent of  
China’s 1.3 billion people are officially designated as ethnic Han Chinese, 
nearly half  of  its current territory is primarily occupied by other ethnic 
national groups. While China has designated 55 “national minorities” 
only the large border nationalities, including the Tibetans, Uyghur and 
Mongols have historically been viewed as a security concern by the Central 
Government. As noted by Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010), a number of  
strategies with increasing intensity may be employed to encourage or force 
assimilation on such ethnic nationalities: 1) arousing special cultural identity 
or allegiance among residents; 2) encouraging voluntary assimilation into 
3 Stepan, Linz and Yadav note that, despite poverty and great diversity, there appears to be 
“great pride” in the state of  India (67%) and strong support for democracy (87 percent).
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the nation-state’s identity; 3) asserting various forms of  social pressure 
and coercion to achieve this; 4) imposing coercion that might in extreme 
cases involve ethnic cleansing. Forcing such nation-state identity usually 
favors one socio-cultural group, typically the dominant nationality inside 
the multinational state. The “state-nation” thesis effectively promotes a 
gentler more consensual approach to build a voluntary less-conflictual 
community of  nations in a multi-national state. As discussed by Stepan 
et al (2010), this approach may favor multiple and complementary identities, 
asymmetric territorial arrangements, individual and collective rights, 
political integration without cultural assimilation, positive identification 
with the state, high institutional trust and democracy.
THE CHINESE EXPERIENCE: RESISTING FEDERALISM
China presents an opaque and complex picture to the outside world. What 
is less understood overseas is China’s growing diversification consequent 
on both its existing multinational character and its economic success in 
recent years. It has produced massive inequalities across the country and a 
marked tension in the relationships between the Beijing government and its 
assertive peripheral and regional communities.  By contrast to the assumed 
trajectory of  political reform accompanying dramatic economic growth, 
China has appeared to defy gravity, pushing ahead with a communist regime 
attempting to manage dramatic free market reform. The authoritarian, 
ostensibly unitary regime employs repressive tactics to control the restless 
ethnic national communities along the western region of  the country and 
to centralize political control. This has important implications for the 
prospect of  political liberalization and democratization in China.
The unitary territorial identity of  China has been elevated to the level of  
a cultural myth.  This myth appears to explain more about the historical 
imperatives of  maintaining authoritarian central control than it does about 
Chinese culture. In ancient times, much of  what is now Chinese territory in 
Central Asia and elsewhere on the periphery was made up of  independent 
or tributary states or protectorates, where central control from the Chinese 
imperial capital was generally minimal or nonexistent (Crossly 1999). Over 
several thousand years of  war and conflict, peripheral communities, as 
well as forces emerging from the Chinese heartland, would frequently 
compete with the imperial regime at the center for control. This either 
produced a new alien power at the center, as it did for two of  China’s 
last three dynasties, or it would split China into competing kingdoms.  As 
many of  these regimes were characterized by autocratic or authoritarian 
rule, the myth of  a unitary state under strong central leadership emerged. 
According to this myth, a regime that relinquished strong central control 
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would be perceived as weak and have its territory seized or its government 
toppled by its opponents.
In the communist period, the unitary myth was reinforced by the Marxist-
Leninist commitment to dictatorship and democratic centralism. This 
has generally meant centralizing State control with little regard to basic 
liberties and human rights. The denial of  such rights constitutes one of  
the tactics of  forced assimilation for the ethnic minorities at the periphery 
as described by Stepan et al (2010). In the recent decades of  the reform 
era, the historical commitment to a unitary system has posed problems for 
advocates of  political reform.
The heavy-handed tactics employed by the Chinese state to maintain 
its unitary system have also presented problems for its foreign partners. 
Besides China expanding its territorial claims in the first decades of  the 
21st Century, its authoritarian regime and the tactics deployed have become 
a security concern for its neighbors. Such harsh crackdowns and repressive 
policies are frequently difficult to ignore. These concerns point to the need 
for democratic political reform.
The present analysis suggests the merits of  federalism on the Chinese 
mainland and confederation with peripheral communities as a dual 
mechanism for addressing China’s territorial and political development. It 
will be useful here to define confederation and federation in this paper. The 
term “confederation” will be understood simply to signify a higher degree 
of  subunit independence with a more enforceable status. Confederation often 
reflects a “coming together” by agreement, though it can also be employed 
to allow existing units greater autonomy. The units may have a substantial 
international status or the right to opt out. Federalism, on the other hand, 
often aims at holding together and is understood to include a lesser degree 
of  local autonomy and a stronger center with broader authority. In the 
United States, federalism was born of  an earlier confederation and evolved 
over time from a states-rights orientation to a substantial level of  central 
power. In a federal system, the right to opt out may be excluded and the 
units may be allowed little or no role in international relations.
Beijing has recently adopted policies that move in contradictory directions. 
On the one hand, it has sought to maintain the myth of  a unitary political 
system.  On the other hand, it has pursued policies favoring multiple legal 
jurisdictions with the peripheral communities and decentralized decision 
making in the mainland. Such decentralization has often failed to include 
umbrella institutions to promote integration and unity. Four prominent 
factors exert pressure on China to restructure itself: 1) the tensions over 
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economic/political reform and the structure of  China’s political territory, 
as reflected in the debate over regionalism on the mainland; 2) the failure 
of  national minority autonomy policies and the problem of  restless ethnic 
national communities in Tibet, Xinjiang and to some extent Inner Mongolia; 
3)the tensions and contradictions evident in the central government’s 
attempts to contain democracy in Hong Kong; and 4) Taiwan’s reluctance 
to take unification seriously in the absence of  democratic reform on the 
mainland and a more reliable political formula. These issues are addressed 
briefly in the following subsections before considering solutions in the 
parts that follow.
Regionalism on the Mainland
Regionalism on the Chinese mainland is one of  the forces propelling 
China towards political reform. The diverse social and economic interests 
created by economic liberalization encourage a search for formal channels 
of  interest representation and conflict resolution. The democratization, 
human rights and rule of  law reforms that this implies may ultimately 
be the primary force that encourages federalism.  As a result of  China’s 
economic reform policies, the economy very early on decentralized rapidly, 
but constitutional structural change from the start lagged behind (Waldron 
1995 & Gerald Segal 1994). Economists have noted that decentralization 
and regionalism in the reform era quickly produced a form of  economic 
federalism in mainland China (Huang 1996).4 With the central government 
increasingly overburdened, regional initiatives were necessary to guide the 
economic development process. Steven Solnick (1996) highlighted this 
phenomenon early on, pointing out that in China’s developing market 
system; the initial decentralization of  the economy involved the transfer 
of  control from central planners to local officials, creating a class of  
local cadre-entrepreneurs (Solnick 1996). By making it lucrative for these 
officials to remain in their posts, China at least initially avoided the large-
scale theft of  state property by local officials, which took place in Russia.
By the early 1990s, state owned enterprises (SOEs) largely controlled 
by local officials dominated the Chinese economy. The late 1990s saw 
attempts to recentralize by converting SOEs into private stock companies 
often in joint ventures with foreign firms. But during the most recent 
decade the SOEs have again come to dominate the economy. The mixing 
of  government and business has encouraged corruption in the form of  
4 Yasheng Huang has noted: “Political scientists tend to be legalistically oriented and define 
federalism as a system in which divisions of  responsibilities and power are specified consti-
tutionally. Economists define federalism in terms of  administrative levels at which allocative 
decisions are made.” Yasheng Huang, “Central-Local Relations in China During the Reform 
Era: The Economic and Institutional Dimensions,” World Development 24 (April 1996): 655.
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back room dealing, out of  control lending and legal breakdown (Nathan 
1996). By-products of  this have included regional protectionism, land 
confiscation by greedy local officials, labor abuse, weak social networks due 
to wide-scale labor migration, environmental problems and poor public 
accountability. These problems have encouraged frequent protest at the 
local level. Harsh political control has been the only tool the center retains.
Mutually reinforcing factors encourage corruption. The judiciary is often 
corrupted and captured by regional forces in a system that presumes 
legislative supervision and CCP oversight of  the courts (Minzner 2013). 
Various fiscal and tax problems reflect a central-local competition for revenue. 
The reform of  the SOE system has been seriously burdened by enterprise-
based housing and retirement systems rooted in the Marxist past, making it 
difficult to allow unproductive SOEs to fail. Accordingly, regional and local 
governments continue to be confronted with the seemingly contradictory 
tasks of  managing and regulating state enterprises. In the context of  these 
difficulties, people will demand greater accountability from local, regional, 
and national governments, and this requires political reform (Pei 2006).
Economic federalism has not been accompanied by the related formal 
constitutional changes (Nathan 2013).  The lack of  democratic institutions 
that can involve the populace in the search for solutions has been the 
most serious failing. Beijing has instituted village-level elections, which 
sometimes encourage genuine choice, but people have not been granted 
freedom of  association, and strong opposition voices are still not tolerated. 
Popular elections are not tolerated above the village level. The persistent 
demands of  economically successful regions in China’s heartland for more 
reliable local and national governance pose yet another challenge to China’s 
insistence on a unitary and authoritarian system.
National Minorities on the Periphery
The brief  overview in this paper can only highlight the current posture of  
an otherwise deeply embedded historical relationship between China and 
its border nationalities. China’s autonomy policies applied to designated 
national minority areas throughout the country are promulgated in the 
current 1982 PRC Constitution (PRC Constitution 1982)5 and in the Law 
on Regional National Autonomy (LRNA) passed in 1984, as revised in 
2001.6 Article 4 of  PRC Constitution provides that, “Regional autonomy 
5 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 89 and 112-122. http://english.peopledaily.com.
cn/constitution/constitution.html
6 Law of  the People’s Republic of  China on Regional National Autonomy (hereinafter 
LRNA), 1984, revised 2001. http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/13/con-
tent_1207139.ht
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is practiced in areas where people of  minority nationalities live in 
concentrated communities.”  Under LRNA, Article 15 autonomous areas 
carry out their role “under the unified leadership of  the State Council 
and shall be subordinate to it.” The LRNA promises national minority 
autonomy in respect of  language, education, political representation, 
administrative appointments, local economic and financial policies, and 
the use of  local natural resources. Effective practice of  such promised 
autonomy is seriously underdeveloped. These laws are narrowly applied 
and tend to allow a much higher degree of  direct Central control and 
interference over these areas than in other non-autonomous areas. They 
contrast sharply with the more flexible approach under PRC Constitution 
Article 31 discussed below, as applied in Hong Kong and Macau.
The 1982 PRC Constitution, passed during China’s liberalizing phase, 
appears to promise enhanced local autonomy. Along with the LRNA, 
it includes the power, subject to higher approval, to enact “regulations 
on the exercise of  autonomy (zizhitiaoli) and other separate regulations 
(danxingtiaoli) in light of  the political, economic and cultural 
characteristics.”7 “Regulations on the exercise of  autonomy” have the 
status of  a sub-constitution or basic law and it is expected that one such 
regulation will be enacted in each autonomous area. The required higher 
approval must typically come from the next higher level of  government, for 
autonomous regions from the Central Government and for autonomous 
prefectures and counties from the provincial government. None of  
the PRC’s five autonomous regions - Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, 
Guangxi, and Ningxia, have received approval for such basic regulation 
on the exercise of  autonomy. The one attempt at enacting such regulation 
in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) went through 15 drafts and 
was eventually abandoned before being submitted to the State Council 
(Yash Ghai and Woodman 2009). Various autonomous prefectures 
and counties have received approval from provincial governments for 
basic autonomy laws that largely track the LRNA content. Autonomous 
regions and other areas have enacted many “separate regulations” on 
subjects such as language, marriage, family planning, and the like. A third 
category would be ordinary laws unrelated to autonomy, which do not 
require such higher approval.8
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) control over the legislative drafting 
process is an even more daunting challenge to autonomy. Chunli Xia 
7 PRC Constitution (1982), supra note 45, Article 116; LRNA, supra note 47, Article 19. Such provision is 
repeated in Article 66 of  the Legislative Law.
8 Organic Law of  the People’s Republic of  China, Article 7 and the Legislative Law, Article 63). 
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describes the complex ways by which CCP oversees the legislative drafting 
process at every stage of  the enactment process (Oliveira & Cardinal 
2009). Given the center’s control over the CCP, this leaves little room for 
local legislative initiative.
A number of  structural and conceptual impediments further limit autonomy. 
First, the replication of  the national political structures in national minority 
areas makes such areas highly susceptible to top-down central administrative 
control. For Tibetans, the indigenous form of  government promised in 
the 1951 Seventeen-point Agreement has not survived.9 Today only Hong 
Kong and Macau possess such distinctive local self-rule. Second, Marxist 
ideology denies the essential character of  China’s policies, identifying the 
1950s occupation of  the Tibetan and Uyghur areas as “liberation” and the 
institution of  CCP rule as “democratic reform.”10 Under such united front 
policy autonomy was merely a temporary solution on the path to ultimate 
assimilation.11 The 17-point agreement in the Tibetan case shows that the 
CCP envisioned that local governments would carry out such “reform” 
voluntarily. Failing that, after the Dalai Lama fled in 1959 such a top-down 
repressive system was imposed.
Such imposition has left a dire track record over the years. The Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) was an especially severe period of  hardline class 
struggle and massive cultural destruction across China. In the recent 
decade, the Uyghur areas of  Xinjiang have witnessed Chinese accusations 
of  terrorism, restrictions on the practice of  Muslim faith and high levels 
of  security. Tibet has witnessed a policy of  cracking down on political 
support for the Dalai Lama, including so-called “patriotic education” 
and greater emphasis on economic development under which Chinese 
immigration has been favored (Smith 2004).12  The Mongols have been 
reduced to a minority of  about 17 percent in their areas. Major popular 
dissent and rebellion famously arose across these regions in 1959, 1989, 
2008 and 2009.  Increased tensions in Tibet, most recently evident in a 
rash of  120 self-immolations bear out the continued Tibetan frustration 
9 Agreement of  the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of  Tibet on Measures for the 
Peaceful Liberation of  Tibet, 23 May 1951, available at http://www.tibet.net/en/diir/pubs/phri/17point/data/
app1.html
10  China is said to have “liberated” the exploited classes under a Chinese “internal multinational system,” in a 
“common program” of  local autonomous rule. Common Program of  the Chinese Peoples Political Consulta-
tive Committee (1949). 
11  Warren W. Smith, China’s Tibet, supra note 2, at 233. Chinese officials cite advanced technology and modern 
communications to justify direct rule. Interview with Liu Hongji, supra note 17.
12  Warren W. Smith, “China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy”, East-West Center Washington Working Papers, 
No. 2, October 2004.
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with Chinese policies (Jacobs 2012).13 Rather than relax controls and seek 
accommodation with these communities the Chinese government tends to 
harden its stance over time. This was most recently evident in the March 
2012 Chinese government’s decision to put Tibetan monasteries under 
direct Chinese government rule in the place of  the nominal independence 
that previously prevailed (Chi-yuk Choi 2012).14 Uyghurs have encountered 
bouts of  official violence against alleged terrorist, recently including a gun 
battle where 21 people died.
Autonomy Issues in Hong Kong
Many of  the tensions between an authoritarian center and a liberalizing 
region have been most visible in the evolving efforts to establish the 
promised high degree of  autonomy in Hong Kong. As the prototypical 
example of  China’s “one country, two systems” formula in practice, Hong 
Kong’s experience has wider implications. The 1984 Sino-British Joint 
Declaration (SBJD) promises Hong Kong self-rule and a high degree of  
autonomy, along with the essential elements of  liberal constitutionalism: 
democracy, human rights, and the rule of  law.  It further provides that the 
legislature is to be chosen by elections, and the chief  executive by elections 
or consultations held locally.  Approximately sixteen liberal human rights 
are promised, fully or half  relating in one way or the other to freedom 
of  expression.  All of  these commitments are stipulated for inclusion in 
the Hong Kong Basic Law (HKBL), a requirement that was more or less 
complied with when the HKBL was promulgated by China’s National 
People’s Congress (NPC) in April 1990, though some areas of  ambiguity 
remain. Though the NPC Standing Committee (NPCSC) has a free 
standing power of  interpretation of  the HKBL, the HKBL concurrently 
assigns broad powers of  interpretation within the scope of  autonomy to 
the Hong Kong courts. Both the SBJD and HKBL promises Hong Kong 
the right to conduct its own “external affairs” in regard to commerce, 
culture, sports, the arts, science, and related areas. China retains power 
over Hong Kong’s defense and “foreign affairs.”
Hong Kong has labored since the handover to PRC, under the risk of  
Central Government interference. Such interference was to a certain degree 
invited by some areas of  ambiguity in the HKBL text in combination with 
13 Andrew Jacobs, “Tibetan Self-Immolations Rise as China Tightens its Grip,” New York 
Times, March 22, 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/in-self-
immolations-signs-of-new-turmoil-in-tibet.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=tha22_20120323; 
LobsangSangay, “For Tibetans No Other way to Protest,” The Washington Post, July 13, 2012.
14  Human Rights Watch, “China: Tibetan Monasteries Placed Under Direct Rule Decision 
Ends Long-Standing Policy Allowing Nominal Self-Rule of  Monasteries,” (New York: March 
16, 2012); Chi-yuk Choi, “Stay loyal, troops in Tibet told,” SCMP, July 17, 2012.
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the NPCSC’s freestanding power of  interpretation. Moreover, the Central 
Government has been reluctant to allow the full development of  Hong 
Kong’s democratic self-rule. In applying the HKBL, the Hong Kong Court 
of  Final Appeal (CFA) quickly embraced constitutional judicial review of  
legislative and administrative acts broadly within the scope of  Hong Kong’s 
autonomy. However, the broad concurrent power of  interpretation retained 
for the NPCSC has left Hong Kong and its courts under the shadow of  
Central Government interference in sensitive areas such as democratic 
development and the rule of  law.15  The Hong Kong CFA has valiantly 
defended its jurisdiction and the rule of  law in the years since the handover. 
However, the Hong Kong government’s occasional request to refer matters 
to the NPCSC for interpretation and the few NPCSC interpretations issued 
in regard to legal disputes and democratic development have put Hong 
Kong’s rule of  law and autonomy under strain. In the face of  incomplete 
democratic development, local politicians beholden to Beijing have likewise 
occasionally invited Central Government interference in Hong Kong affairs.
Despite such shortcomings, the welcoming of  Hong Kong back into 
the Chinese fold under the “one country, two systems” formula has 
fundamentally altered the nature of  the Chinese state. In essence, Beijing 
has recognized the international legitimacy for two territorial governments 
in China, thereby diminishing the unitary character of  the Chinese state. A 
regional government has been elevated to a quasi-federate status by being 
given a legal expectation of  compliance with the guarantees provided 
in the SBJD. This quasi-federate status embodies a much lower level of  
integration than normally obtains in either unitary or federal systems--in 
effect, recognizing two constituent legal systems. In spite of  such strong 
commitments, the interpretative weaknesses and the partial development 
of  democratic self-rule noted above have, in effect, left this quasi-federate 
autonomy arrangement with no institutional umbrella to legally enforce 
compliance with the commitments made.
15 The Hong Kong Court of  Final Appeal (CFA), in a landmark decision, right after the hando-
ver upheld a generous approach to Basic Law human rights guarantees and asserted the power 
to review local laws and even examine NPC acts for compliance with Basic Law requirements. 
Ng Ka Ling v. The Director of  Immigration, Final Appeal No. 14 of  1998, 29 January 1999. Beijing, 
however, was angry at the Court’s attempt to “put itself  above the NPC” and threatened to 
have the NPC “rectify” the judgment. The Hong Kong government filed an extraordinary 
motion to “clarify” the judgment on this point. On February 26, the Court granted the motion 
and restated that it was not putting itself  above the NPC and that the NPC was free to “do any 
act which was in accordance with the Basic Law.” At the same time, given that the CFA has 
refused to refer the case to the NPCSC for an interpretation of  the right of  abode issue that 
was before the court, the Hong Kong government directly took the case to the NPCSC for an 
interpretation. The resultant interpretation overruled the CFA interpretation.
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The liberal democratic commitments in the Joint Declaration, along with 
Hong Kong’s democratic capacity for popular challenges to policy decisions 
emanating from the central government, has been perceived as politically 
threatening by the authoritarian center in Beijing. Chinese leaders have 
sought to contain this threat at every turn.  This was evident at the very 
beginning in the HKBL text and continuing efforts at democratic reform. 
The Basic Law, while conforming to most of  the requirements of  the SBJD, 
reflects China’s very conservative posture toward democracy.  It provides 
for Beijing’s appointment of  the chief  executive based on the selection 
of  a very pro-Beijing oriented Election Committee currently made up of  
1200 members chosen mostly by various functional sectors. The HKBL 
Article 45 proclaims the ultimate aim is election of  the Chief  Executive 
by “universal suffrage” upon nomination by a broadly representative 
Nominating Committee. The Central Government has indicated that such 
universal suffrage can be initiated in 2017 but has also suggested that the 
Nominating Committee may vet the candidates to eliminate those from 
the democratic camp.
Half  of  the Legislative Council is likewise made up of  functional 
constituencies and a similar promise of  universal suffrage looms as a 
possibility after universal suffrage is achieved for the Chief  Executive.16 
Again, skeptics harbor doubts about the abolition of  the functional 
constituencies, which have largely been a base of  support for the Beijing 
appointed Hong Kong Government. HKBL Article 74 further limits the 
powers of  the elected Legislative Council. In effect, only the government 
can propose legislation, at least where expenditure or government policy 
is involved. Even when legislative amendments to government bills are 
proposed, under HKBL Annex II, Article II, they must be passed in a split 
voting system by a majority of  the now 35 functional-sector legislators and 
by the half  that are directly elected.
China’s containment policy has been especially directed against the 
prodemocracy camp in Hong Kong. Before the June 1997 handover, 
popularly elected democrats were excluded from nearly all of  China’s 
appointed transition bodies. At the handover, these “pan-democrats” were 
dismissed and refused to join the appointed Provisional Legislature. They 
quickly regained their seats in the next Legislative Council election and 
have generally amassed just under 60 percent of  the popular vote for the 
16 Such commitment to allow fulfilling of  the universal suffrage requirement was made in a 
December 29, 2007 NPCSC interpretation. Decision of  the Standing Committee of  the Na-
tional People’s Congress of  December 29, 2007. http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr07-08/english/
panels/ca/papers/ca0121-ppr071229-e.pdf
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directly elected seats in the elections since. However, as noted, Beijing 
remains weary of  the pan-democratic politicians and seems bent on 
containing their role in any future elected government under the promised 
universal suffrage. If  the Hong Kong Government’s proposal for universal 
suffrage seeks a model to exclude such candidates from the pan-democratic 
camp then they will surely use their power under the 2/3 legislative vote 
of  approval requirement to veto any electoral change, leaving the system 
frozen in place as it now is. China has warned that Hong Kong must 
not be a base of  subversion, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen-related 
demonstrations in Hong Kong (where a million demonstrators led by the 
prodemocracy leaders took to the streets). At that time, leaders of  Hong 
Kong’s prodemocracy movement were specifically accused of  subversion. 
Their behavior since has certainly lacked any subversive tendencies but 
Beijing appears to lack trust regarding their intentions.
At the heart of  all the policies towards Hong Kong is the principle of  
maintaining the current mainland system, both as an authoritarian regime 
and as a unitary state. Accordingly, Taiwan sees Hong Kong as an example 
of  the sort of  tension that would be likely if  it entered into any relationship 
with the mainland. If  reforms are not pursued on the mainland, however, 
tensions between an authoritarian center and a liberalizing region will only 
increase as democratization slowly moves forward in Hong Kong.
Taiwan
If  unification with Hong Kong has created difficulties for Beijing, unification 
with Taiwan would stretch the mainland’s authoritarian unitary system to 
the breaking point. To date, Taiwan has responded coldly to China’s offer 
of  unification on the “one country, two systems” model. Although both 
sides favor improved legal arrangements for their blossoming trade and 
other private-sector relationships, neither side has made any commitments 
that would substantially meet the other’s concerns when it comes to 
unification (Henckaerts 1996).17
The mainland authorities insist on Taiwan’s submission to one China, 
dominated by the current government in Beijing. They seek to impose this 
view on China’s foreign partners, as was evident when then US President 
Bill Clinton was pressed to articulate, a U.S. policy of  “three nos” during his 
1998 visit to China.  These include no support for Taiwan’s independence, no 
17 The mainland and Taiwan white papers on cross-strait relations published as early as 1993 
and 1994 set forth the basic positions of  the respective sides. These positions remain largely 
intact. See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ed., The International Status of  Taiwan in the New World 
Order, Legal and Political Considerations (London: Kluwer Law International, 1996) (white 
papers at 267 and 279).
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support for Taiwan’s entrance into state-based international organizations, 
and no “two-China” policy. Beijing is willing to concede a slightly higher 
degree of  autonomy for Taiwan than for Hong Kong, allowing the former 
local military defense and “certain rights in foreign affairs,” in addition 
to local self-rule and control over external affairs. . But Beijing has been 
extremely reluctant to allow Taiwan the security of  substantial autonomy 
in international affairs, seeking to block nearly every effort Taiwan makes 
to gain bilateral or multilateral recognition.
In any case, Taiwan has shown no confidence in the “one country, two 
systems” formula. It has pursued a policy of  democratic reform and 
consolidation at home, while seeking to enhance its international status 
through practical diplomacy. In negotiations with Beijing, it has limited 
its overtures largely to trade and various private exchange arrangements, 
insisting that democratic reform on the mainland precede further steps 
toward unification. Surveys in Taiwan generally show popular support for 
the status quo, being obviously the least risky position to take. Even the 
current Republic of  China Government, under the leadership of  a more 
Beijing-friendly Nationalist Party has so far refused any negotiations on 
political status. Any movement in that direction would surely cost them 
the next election.
The mainland’s proposals offer Taiwan little incentive to respond favorably 
to unification. People on Taiwan undoubtedly feel a historical affinity with 
Chinese civilization, but they view the current regime on the mainland with 
trepidation. While the benefits of  more secure trade with the mainland 
and the promise of  noninterference in Taiwan’s external trade relations 
are attractive, they are clearly not sufficient to persuade an economically 
successful democratic community to surrender its independence to an 
authoritarian power. Any successful unification arrangement must give 
Taiwan confidence about its status in a reconstructed Chinese state. Some 
flexibility on Beijing’s part as to what unification means seems imperative.
TOWARD A CHINESE FEDERAL AND CONFEDERAL 
MODEL
China is clearly a multi-national state with all the stresses and strains 
envisioned by Stepan, Linz and Yadav (2010) reflected in their “state-
nation” model. At the same time, it does not meet the prerequisite of  their 
proposal, that it be a democracy. China seems to be at a political reform 
impasse. On the one hand, the CCP’s reluctance to embrace substantial 
democratic reform seems driven in part by fear of  losing control both 
over the increasingly diverse economic forces in China proper and over the 
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restless periphery. On the other hand, any effort at substantial democratic 
political reform to address this growing economic diversity and China’s 
multinational character would almost certainly require a non-unitary 
federal model on the Chinese mainland and a degree of  asymmetry with 
respect to contentious peripheral regions.
What would federalism mean in China? While one can easily construct 
ideal types of  federal and confederal structures that constitution drafters 
might hope to achieve, it is much more difficult to imagine a path of  
orderly change that reformers might follow in their effort to democratize 
and federalize China. In their earlier writings, Linz (1997) and Stepan 
(1997, 2001) identified the chief  functions of  federalism as either “coming 
together” or “holding together” (Juan Linz 1997 and Juan Linz 2001).   In 
the proposal made above for a mix of  federalism (for the core of  the 
Chinese mainland) and confederation (to bring in peripheral communities 
such as Hong Kong, Tibet and Taiwan), one can detect stronger elements 
of  “holding together” in the first two and “coming together” in the latter. 
But these are not the only goals that federalism might serve.  Chinese 
reformers are attracted by federalism because it is directly related to 
democracy. As Linz (1997) and Stepan (1997) note, it is not meaningful to 
speak of  federalism under authoritarian or other dictatorial systems. Such 
systems tend to be incompatible with the local or regional self-rule upon 
which federalism depends. At the same time, merely launching national 
elections without meaningful democracy at the regional level, as occurred 
in Russia, may also lead to a failed federalism.
Federalism in China Proper
When Beijing is ready to take democratization on the mainland seriously, 
federalism may facilitate that process. As Stepan and Linz emphasize, the 
largest democracies in nearly every part of  the world are federal. Logically, 
the notion of  popular control suggests units of  government small enough 
to allow voters to influence the decisions that affect their daily lives.18
As suggested in the discussion of  federal theory above, federal institutions 
for the mainland portion of  a democratizing China should ensure that 
politicians have reasons to be committed to the autonomy of  their regional 
units while also being solicitous of  the interests of  the broader political 
community. Such dual loyalty has long been emphasized as an overriding 
concern for a federal model (Ordeshook and Shvetsova 1997). Various 
18  Larry Diamond notes that decentralization may enhance the efficacy, quality, and legitimacy 
of  democracy. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press,( forthcoming), ch. 4.
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institutional models are employed for this purpose. A fairly standard 
legislative configuration for a federal system involves a bicameral legislature, 
with one assembly composed of  legislators representing the units equally 
and the other directly elected on the basis of  population. Alternatively, 
a unicameral legislature may include some members who represent the 
units directly. The existence of  substantial numbers of  local and regional 
elected offices affords a ladder to political advancement at the national 
level, thereby encouraging among politicians loyalty to both the unit and 
the nation.
In a standard symmetrical federal system, as might be employed on the 
Chinese mainland, most powers are reserved for the regional governments. 
The federal government should be particularly concerned with the 
provision of  public goods (defense, a unified monetary system, and 
the like) and with the regulation of  policy areas where the interests of  
individual regions may be contrary to the larger good of  the federation 
as a whole, or where the interests of  units are better served by a national 
policy. In China’s case, one such issue might be the development and 
evolution of  a national retirement or social security system to alleviate the 
enormous burdens in this area alternatively borne either by SOEs or local 
government. The central government would also be expected to provide 
a regulatory framework for commerce among individual units and with 
outsiders. These are areas where the absence of  a federal legal and political 
structure in China has resulted in fiscal difficulties, regional protectionism, 
suppression of  minorities, corruption, lack of  economic reliability for 
outside investors and lenders, and the suppression of  information vital to 
corrective actions.
Independent federal courts are also important in addressing these concerns. 
China now just has an inclusive national court system. Federal courts, if  
not under the thumb of  regional officials, can help to integrate the system 
and to implement federal guarantees by reviewing regional and national 
laws and official actions for conformity to federal constitutional and other 
legal requirements. In a civil-law country such as China, a separate federal 
constitutional court may be needed to adjudicate questions of  constitutional 
rights and to police jurisdictional boundaries. Local provincial courts can 
be employed to foster a commitment to local jurisdiction and laws, within 
appropriate constitutional constraints.
If  reformers in China wish to get to federalism in an orderly fashion without 
a major crisis, then the current economic reforms, decentralization, and 
moderate political and legal reforms may point the way forward. Now largely 
missing, democratization should clearly be part of  this trajectory. China has 
Federalism and Democratic Reform in China with Lessons from India 21
already instituted village elections, with limited choice, but occasional talk 
of  expanding such franchise to the country and provincial levels has been 
largely stalled. In the absence of  associational freedoms, the village level 
elections have offered little substantive choice. Accordingly, more than just 
elevating such elections to a higher level would be required. As it now 
stands, there is a great deal of  room for interference on the part of  the 
political elite, and multiparty contestation is forbidden. Surveys have long 
shown that 60 to 70 percent of  local officials in less developed provinces 
have a “tense” or “relatively tense” relationship with the public (Pei 1998). 
The numerous reported mass actions surely bear out the persistence of  
this problem. China would be well advised to grant broader freedom of  
association and to encourage the formation of  genuine opposition parties. 
Unfortunately, an earlier attempt to register an opposition party, the China 
Democracy Party, met with rejection and arrests.
Under this scenario of  gradual reform, the National People’s Congress 
(NPC) might initially be retained as the national legislature and the body 
out of  which the national government can be formed, though its size 
should be reduced well below its current membership of  nearly 3,000 
members and CCP control over its agenda would have to be phased out. 
Under the present system, the NPC is formally chosen from a limited 
number of  candidates per the number of  seats (110 for 100 seats) by 
people’s assemblies at lower levels of  government in a multi-tiered 
pyramid-like structure. Presently, CCP control at the top may dictate 
electoral outcomes but this could be reformed to allow genuine bottom-
up choice. If  democracy with direct competitive elections were instituted 
at the provincial level and the provincial assemblies genuinely chose the 
national legislature, there would be an incentive for parties to organize on 
a national level or to form political alliances in order to acquire influence 
in the national body.
China has made other institutional moves that could provide the software to 
pave the way towards a federal democracy.  It earlier signed the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), though it has yet to ratify 
this covenant.  Several other international human rights treaties have been 
signed and ratified, though the state of  implementation leaves much to 
be desired. A genuine commitment to implement the ICCPR and other 
human rights treaties would affirm in principle the national commitment 
to basic rights and freedoms that would be required for any democratic 
reform to take hold. In recent years, proposals for a constitutional court 
have also been advanced by scholars, though this too has been condemned 
by the CCP leadership. A national court system already exists, and it could 
be restructured to create separate federal courts and local provincial 
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courts. If  Beijing were merely to carry out these steps in an orderly fashion 
and begin to cut back the special status of  the Chinese Communist Party, 
it could arrive at a position just short of  formal federal democracy on 
the mainland before any major constitutional revision were undertaken. 
China’s new President, Xi Jinping, has offered ambiguous commitments in 
this regard, reflecting a conflict in his policies between according primacy 
to the constitution and the party.
With a national democratically elected body and minimal legal institutions 
in place, there would be time to consider formal constitutional steps toward 
federalism. These might include -calling of  a constitutional convention, 
instituting bicameralism, reforming the legal and judicial systems, reducing 
the size of  the NPC, and adopting alternative methods for forming future 
governments. Similarly, elected provincial assemblies could take the 
necessary steps to reconstitute provincial governments. This would be a 
sensible orderly route toward ultimate democratization on the mainland.
Towards A Confederal Solution for the Periphery?
A confederal arrangement for China’s peripheral communities would 
provide a reliable umbrella of  national laws and institutions under which 
these communities could be brought together in the “state-nation” vision 
discussed above. Such an arrangement would involve many of  the same 
types of  institutions envisioned in the proposed federal structure for the 
mainland, but a more limited role for the central government must be 
accepted. The key question, once again, is how to get there. In offering 
Taiwan the same arrangement that it granted Hong Kong, plus substantial 
rights in the area of  self-defense and foreign affairs, Beijing has moved 
toward an asymmetrical confederal formula--though not far enough to 
attract Taiwan.
Beijing’s policies still fail to offer an overarching institutional structure for 
unification that would be acceptable to a multinational democratic state. 
It insists on political domination of  the peripheral communities by an 
authoritarian center. In response to Beijing’s overtures, Taiwan has stressed 
the need for democratization on the mainland and a more egalitarian and 
consensual cross-strait relationship. China’s willingness to concede to 
Taiwan a high degree of  autonomy, combined with this seeming impasse 
over democratization and the consensual character of  any settlement, led 
some Chinese democratic theorists in the past to raise the possibility of  
confederation (Jiaqi 1995).
What would a confederation arrangement mean for China? Confederation 
is commonly achieved through the coming together of  territorial 
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communities by consensual agreement or the relaxing of  central control over 
an existing unit. The purposes of  confederation usually include commerce 
and trade, and may also extend to security, defense, public health, human 
rights, and monetary issues. Decisions in the early phase usually require 
the unanimous agreement of  the confederal partners, though, as time goes 
on and trust is built, this may be reduced to a supermajority requirement 
for more routine matters. The operative body for securing such consent 
may initially be a representative council. While a directly elected legislative 
assembly or parliament may be employed in an advisory capacity, the 
representative council is unlikely to concede its final authority in the early 
period. These representative bodies are usually served by some executive 
authority or secretariat to provide administrative services in drafting and 
implementation.19
Scholars have especially emphasized the importance of  a judicial organ 
for third-party dispute resolution and for implementing confederal 
agreements. A confederal judicial body can encourage the penetration of  
confederation law--both treaty and secondary law--into the domestic law 
of  the subunits and produce a spillover effect from the narrowly economic 
into other areas of  law and politics (Burley & Mattli 1993). This reduces 
the politicization of  many issues and allows for incremental change. The 
European Court of  Justice (ECJ) offers a good model. By ordering the 
direct application of  community laws in national courts and accepting 
referrals for preliminary rulings, the ECJ has encouraged the development 
of  confederation jurisprudence and has helped to constitutionalize and 
integrate the European system. To ensure that members of  the court do 
not favor any one state, the ECJ employs a system providing for secrecy of  
deliberations and does not issue dissenting opinions.
In China’s case, some form of  confederal arrangement linking the mainland 
with peripheral communities could contribute to the rationalization 
of  its internal order. China has so far been able to keep its peripheral 
communities under control (or in the case of  Taiwan, to ensure a degree 
of  restraint) through its clear willingness to use force. A democratic 
China, however, would find it difficult to adopt such a menacing posture. 
In a sense, then, democratization is now a hostage to the perceived need 
for forcibly controlling the periphery. As discussed by Stepan, Linz and 
Yadav (2010), highlighted above, this dilemma can be resolved only by 
coming up with a more consensual unifying arrangement as an alternative 
to authoritarianism and force. The key here is that the periphery (initially 
19  The most noteworthy and successful recent example of  a confederation in practice is the 
European Union, though its multi-state characteristic is not essential.
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Taiwan, and later possibly an autonomous Tibet, Hong Kong and Macau) 
would not be submitting to Beijing but joining in a partnership--in effect, 
creating a Chinese political community. In this regard, a workable solution 
with regard to Tibet may serve as a model to address the Uyghur issue 
in Xinjiang. China sometimes argues that there would be chaos if  all 55 
national minorities sought special status, but really only two or three 
“national minorities” are seeking such genuine autonomy.20 The claim 
about 55 is a red herring.
Given the great difference both in size and socioeconomic conditions 
between the mainland and Taiwan, an initial arrangement might confine 
itself  to specifying and policing trade and investment rights. As the 
mainland democratizes and liberalizes its system and experiences further 
economic development, the jurisdiction of  the confederation judicial body 
might expand to new subject areas by consensus. At first the only official 
institutions might be a joint council, an executive authority, and a judicial 
body. The council would ensure that all decisions were made by unanimous 
consent, and the staff  of  the authority could produce any regulatory 
material and reports requested. The authority could also investigate 
official complaints from confederation members before any submission 
to the judicial organ, which would adjudicate these official complaints 
and any private complaints referred from the subunit courts. The latter 
could be referred for preliminary rulings on confederation requirements 
and jurisdictional conflicts. If  the confederation requirements are directly 
enforceable by individuals in the courts, then the confederation judicial 
body may contribute to the development of  the rule of  law in China’s 
confederal units by offering authoritative interpretations of  rights and of  
jurisdictional and choice-of-law requirements in individual cases. Keeping 
their deliberations secret and not issuing dissenting opinions would also 
help to insulate confederation judges from political pressure. If  these 
arrangements succeeded in satisfying both the center and Taiwan, they 
could be considered as a basis for ensuring autonomy in other peripheral 
communities in an asymmetric form to meet the justified needs of  these 
communities.
Any confederation arrangement could also include an external dimension. 
The twentieth century has witnessed a dramatic evolution in the role of  
the state and in the structures and rights of  international participation. 
Traditional nineteenth-century views of  sovereign exclusivity have been 
20 One may suspect that the CCP created a symmetry of  national minority status for 55 ethnic 
groups to water down the status of  the contentious claims of  genuine nationalities on its bor-
der regions in Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia.
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replaced by an increasing emphasis on sovereignty as international 
participation. Since the end of  World War II, there has been a dramatic 
increase in the number of  sovereign states, ranging from mammoth 
countries like China and India to island states with a few thousand citizens. 
The growth of  the international order has reduced the prerogatives of  
states, and their zone of  exclusively internal affairs has contracted. At the 
same time, a number of  territorial communities not formally recognized 
as states, including Palestine, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, have come to enjoy 
considerable international status. Moreover, rights to autonomy and local 
self-rule within states have become matters of  international concern.
Beijing’s official view on the nature of  the state and on the boundaries 
between its exclusive prerogatives and the international order stands in 
stark contrast to this emerging twentieth-century practice. Applying a 
nineteenth-century view of  sovereignty, the Chinese government is prone 
to respond to its critics by declaring that its human rights practices and 
its treatment of  domestic autonomous communities are internal affairs. 
Nevertheless, in practice, it shows evidence of  greater flexibility. China 
has signed various international human rights treaties and has entered into 
dialogue with other countries regarding human rights. It has also, in effect, 
internationalized its relationship with Hong Kong by grounding it on an 
international agreement upon which it invites its international partners to 
rely. Beijing should recognize that affording an autonomous constituent 
community a substantial degree of  international participation would help 
to gain its trust in any agreed arrangement. For a confederal Taiwan, in the 
spirit of  asymmetry this might even include participatory rights normally 
enjoyed by the states. Taiwan’s leaders will be reluctant to agree to anything 
less.
The emergence of  what has been called “non-territorial global functional 
space” raises a whole range of  new possibilities in international affairs 
(Ruggie 1993). This space includes activities concerned with commerce, 
the environment, science, human rights, the arts, flows of  information, and 
civil society more generally. The ability of  states to attract and regulate such 
activities depends on the reliability of  their institutions. In its unification 
formula, China offers its local partner the power to conduct “external 
affairs” in this non-state global channel. Taiwan already operates very 
effectively in this space. For this reason, China’s ability to isolate Taiwan is 
limited. To attract Taiwan towards unification, Beijing must recognize this 
international reality.
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UNIFYING A BINARY ONTOLOGY 
OF LAW AND POLICY
Dr. Nikhil Moro*
The Constitution of  India is the instrument by which Indians 
subjected their individual will to modernity’s ideal of  subjecting 
individual will to social control. However, the history of  Indian 
legal systems dating back to 2700 years ago show that pre-
modern legal systems is constituted of   diverse sources of  law and 
sophisticated interpretive traditions. While historical evidence 
shows that law was fundamental to ancient societies, they shed 
little light on the prevalence or status of  rule of  law.  The rule 
of  law is critical to democratic aspiration for it presupposes due 
process, which is enshrined in Article 21 of  the Constitution.  
Its translation in practice has been marginally successful.  Public 
perception of  the government has been as one of  a crumbling 
institution.  The article argues for incorporating policy education 
in legal curriculum to foster a political culture that can appreciate 
and commit to the interconnections between law and policy 
formulation and its implementation. 
If  modernity means to subject the individual will to social control through 
instrument of  law, then Indians achieved it in the Constitution of  India, 
which limited the state ordinarily to “the Government and Parliament of  
India and the Government and the Legislature of  each of  the States and all 
local or other authorities within the territory of  India or under the control 
of  the Government of  India.”1 
The constitution, however, was not the first instrument of  modernity:  The 
history of  Indian legal systems has been tracked back some 2,700 years 
to the pre-Mauryan period enabled by the Dharma Sutras (5th through 
3rd cent. BC) and the Arthashastra (4th cent. BC). The Gazetteer of  India 
edited by Pran Nath Chopra (2003) recorded, “The customs and practices 
of  regions and villages, of  castes and families, and of  functional groups 
are clearly recognized as authoritative sources of  law in the Dharma Sutras 
*Based on JSGP Open Lecture, at the time a public policy scholar of  The Hindu Centre for 
Politics and Public Policy, Chennai
1 Indian Constitution, part III, article 12.
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(Chopra 2003).” The Arthasastra listed “sacred canons, current law, usage 
and reason,”2 all subject to syllogistic reasoning, as sources of  law. Later, 
debates about proper limits on libertarian freedom are reported to have 
occurred in Ashoka’s period around 250 BC. 
Evidently, the ancient legal systems included not only diverse sources 
of  law but also sophisticated interpretive traditions. Nevertheless, while 
the historical evidence indicated that law was fundamental to the ancient 
societies, which consequently were modern for it, it shed little light on the 
prevalence or status of  rule of  law.
The rule of  law is critical to democratic aspiration for it presupposes due 
process, which the Supreme Court of  India has found in the intent of  
Article 21 and in the basic structure of  the constitution (Pramodh 2007).3 
The rule of  law, as opposed to rules by man, “divine will,” or brutality, 
is simply understood in the 17th-century English church historian 
Thomas Fuller’s cry, “Be you ever so high, the law is above you.”4  For 
example, Constitutional Article 14 forbids the Indian state from denying 
any individual “equality before the law or the equal protection of  the 
laws”(language partly taken from the 14th Amendment of  the U.S. 
constitution.5) The rule of  law exists in an egalitarian utopia of  seven 
necessary presumptions: the law is legitimately produced, necessarily 
enforced, equally obeyed regardless of  an individual’s political or financial 
status, prospectively applied, independently adjudicated, easily accessible, 
and written in language that is clear and determinate.
2 Ibid.
3 The supreme court ruled in Mithun v. State of  Punjab, (1983) 2 SCR 690, “It is now too late in 
the day to contend that it is for the legislature to prescribe the procedure and for the Court to 
follow it, that it is for the legislature to provide the punishment and for the courts to impose 
it . . . the last word on the question of  justice does not rest with the legislature. It is for the 
courts to decide whether the procedure prescribed by a law for depriving a person of  his life 
or liberty is fair, just and reasonable” (at 698-699.) In addition, “It is also significant to note 
that [due process] falls within the protection of  the concept of  ‘basic structure,’ putting its 
abridgement beyond the legislature’s competence.” Pramodh Saxena, International Journal of  
Refugee Law (2007), 19, 2: 246.
4 As quoted by Alfred “Tom” Denning, or Lord Denning, the distinguished English jurist and 
Master of  the Rolls 1962-1982, in Gouriet v. Union of  Post Office Workers (1977) 1 All ER 696 
at 716j-717h. Lord Denning admonished belligerent trade union workers in these words: “To 
every subject in this land, no matter how powerful, I would use Thomas Fuller’s words over 
300 years ago: ‘Be you ever so high, the law is above you’.” 
5 The legal scholar Robert B. Charles finds “no other nation has had a polity more receptive to 
the fundamental rights enshrined in the American Constitution, nor a judiciary more conscien-
tious in its attempt to guard those rights, than India.” See, “American influence on the Indian 
Constitution: Focus on equal protection of  the laws,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review, 17 
(1986), 193-204, at 193. 
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How successful has republican India been in achieving the rule of  law? Only 
marginally successful, suggests anecdotal evidence in news-media reports. 
Public dissatisfaction with government bungling, bribery and pandering 
is overwhelming; public perception of  crumbling public institutions is 
widespread. 
In addition, the poor state of  legal literacy and education in India is 
not scalable; it is, on the other hand, anachronistic to any aspiration of  
the rule of  law. While Indian legal systems are of  hoary heritage, the 
evidence of  formal legal education is much newer. Even in the late 19th 
century, India had a handful of  law colleges in Ernakulum, Allahabad, 
Mumbai, Madras, Meerut and Bareilly. The best Indian law graduates 
were perceived to necessarily pass from exalted English universities such 
as Oxford and Cambridge. Today, more than 60,000 law students graduate 
in India every year; the profession in India has approximately 1.2 million 
lawyers.6 Expectations of  quality, not to mention the aspirations of  rule 
of  law, continue to falter in Indian institutions of  legal education. An 
effective route towards achieving if  not realizing the rule of  law would 
take a system of  legal and policy education that enables the political 
culture to appreciate-and commit to- law and policy formulation, 
application and criticism. 
As Indian democratic aspirations mature, the law, in all its majesty, has 
never been more relevant to delimiting Indian society. However, legal and 
policy education, although increasingly accessible since the late 1980s, is 
seriously inadequate. Its positivistic focus is diminishing expectations of  
any syncretic ontology.  Disciplines coalesce as boundaries disappear, 
but the legal academy appears to lag more than it leads. Two reasons can 
explain the crunch: A de-emphasis of  policy studies in legal curricula 
and a severe neglect of  research. Legal departments and universities 
ought to emphasize research in instruction and implicate the rule of  law, 
both through a simple structural innovation:  Including policy studies in 
undergraduate legal curricula and offering incentives for faculty members 
to routinely offer their subject expertise to the institutions of  state. 
After all, knowledge that is not disseminated runs a risk of  atrophy; to 
argue otherwise is not inspirational, it is cynical. Among current Indian 
colleges, two of  every three were set up in the last three decades. In 
January of  2013, the Bar Council of  India recognized 709 law colleges 
6  “Vision Statement 2011-2013,” Bar Council of  India. http://www.barcouncilofindia.
org/about/about-the-bar-council-of-india/vision-statement-2011-13/ (accessed 28 January 
2014)
Unifying a Binary Ontology of  Law and Policy 31
or departments, in addition to 13 national “law universities.”7 The first 
law university – dedicated to legal education -- was opened in Bangalore 
twenty-seven years ago. The council, established by the Advocates Act 
of  1961, is the statutory regulator of  Indian lawyers and their profession 
but it is also charged with prescribing the norms of  legal education (per 
section 7 of  the act), accrediting law programs (section 10), and defining 
rules of  admission and graduation (section 49).8 
Offering law students and professors strong incentives for policy research 
while using the existing infrastructure of  legal programs would represent 
an academic imperative to not only strengthen rule of  law and include 
public policy in political discourse, but also implicate law students in policy 
appreciation. It is high time the bar council led the academy to enabling 
a new republic of  the mind by advancing fundamental knowledge about 
basic constitutional structure and enabling new vistas of  democratic 
aspiration.
Even as Indian legal education becomes more accessible, poor quality 
persists as its abiding shame.  Static curricula, an overemphasis of  
problem-solving skills at an expense of  theorizing, inaccessible primary 
sources such as acts of  legislature and Shepardized cases,9 and the systematic 
ignorance if  not de-emphasis on policy studies are all self-defeating. So are 
unmotivated professors and pedagogic emphases on litigation, business, 
and rote learning. Even in the national legal universities, there is little if  
any systematic expectation of  faculty research; the typical law professor’s 
workload reflects little peer-reviewed publishing in national venues 
of  erudite exchange. Legal scholars tend to have routine access to few 
secondary sources such as law reviews. Fresh insights, new knowledge, 
and currency of  case law seem elusive. Not surprisingly, sixty-four years 
after the republic was born, Indian jurists, including many appellate judges, 
seem to prefer citing non-native precedent.  
Indian law graduates, it seems, are too often unable to demonstrate 
cognitive skills of  logical reasoning, critical thinking, pattern recognition, 
problem solving, vocabulary, and writing. They are too often inadequately 
7 See, “List of  law colleges,” http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/
List-of-Law-Colleges-2013-as-on-1st-Jan.-2013.pdf  (accessed 28 January 2014)
8 See, Advocates Act, 1961, http://www.barcouncilofindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/
Advocates-Act1961.pdf  (accessed 28 January 2014)
9 “How to Shepardize.” LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/infopro/training/reference/
shepards/shepardscompgd.pdf  (accessed 28 January 2014)
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aware of  Indian philosophy (including the dialectic of  Dharma10 available 
in Upanishadic, (Ranade 1926)11 and later literature), social anthropology, 
and intellectual history, all of  which are critical to comprehending any 
Indian-legal epistemology. Too many law graduates, it appears, struggle 
to distinguish facts from law or a legal question from a political one. 
True, none of  these concerns has been measured for its impact on public 
confidence in lawyers, but it is safe to state that, consequently, many Indian 
law graduates fail to evoke high expectations of  either intellectual heft or 
just passion.  Many law graduates would only inadequately value vetted 
evidence and rigorous reasoning, even though they would readily indulge 
self-righteous opinion. 
The problems highlight a key inadequacy in Indian legal curricula: A 
systematic de-emphasis on public-policy studies. Law is fundamental to 
modern society, but so is policy. If  law is defined as a code of  conduct 
established and enforced by duly constituted authority-such as a 
legislature-for the society, then policy is understood in formulating and 
applying executive-branch decisions, consistent with the law, to manage 
public resources. Sources of  law include constitutions, acts of  legislature, 
international treaties, rules of  quasi-judicial agencies, equity rulings, and 
common-law precedents. Sources of  public policy, on the other hand, 
include decisions and orders of  the cabinet and its bureaucracy and 
10 Dharma held multifaceted meanings in Vedic and later Smriti and Buddhist narratives, in-
cluding law, righteousness, ethical decision-making, duty, custom, morality, and the Buddha’s 
teaching. See generally, Alf  Hiltebeitel. Dharma: Its Early History in Law, Religion, and Narra-
tive (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); M. Rama Jois, a former chief  justice of  the 
Punjab and Haryana High Court, found in Mahabharata and other mostly Smriti texts that 
Dharma necessarily encompassed attributes of  individuals that would sustain society, maintain 
social order, ensure others’ well-being, and enable inclusive progress of  humanity. In Jois’ dis-
cussion, Dharma was more consistent with social responsibility than with self-fulfilment. E.g., 
see, Legal and Constitutional History of  India (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co., 2010), 
3-9. For Jois’ separate discussion of  Dharma as protections of  civil rights, see Be Immortal 
(Bangalore, India: Canara Press, 2013), 48-65. Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, among others, has 
found Dharma to emphasise a rule of  law in that the sovereign was necessarily subordinate 
to Dharma. S. Radhakrishnan, ed. The Principal Upanisads (London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1968); An exclusive church, holy book, and hagiography – all necessary presumptions of  later 
Semitic religion – had no equivalence or parallel in Dharma. See generally, Will Durant. Our 
Oriental Heritage, 11 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1942), I; Per T.V. Subba Rao, visiting 
professor, National Law School of  India University, Dharma is “a guide to life . . . whatever 
brings society together is Dharma, what divides is Adharma.” Lecture to Indian Police Service 
probationers attended by author. Bangalore, 17 June 2013.
11 The eminent Sanksritist Ramachandra Dattatreya Ranade states “the Upanishads occupy a 
unique place in the development of  Indian thought. All the later systems of  Indian philoso-
phy . . . have been rooted in the Upanishads.” R.D. Ranade, A Constructive Survey of  Upanishadic 
Philosophy (Poona, India: Oriental, 1926), ch. II, 3.
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independent administrative agencies. Without public policy to enlighten it, 
clearly, much law would remain locked in books. 
International broadcast law, developed by treaty through the Geneva-based 
International Telecommunications Union of  which (in its predecessor) 
India has been a continuous member since the British Raj starting 1858, 
offers an illustration of  the symbiotic relationship between law and policy. 
The law declares the electromagnetic spectrum as a public resource, but 
policy allows the executive branch, through either the wireless planning 
& coordination wing of  the Indian ministry of  communications and 
information technology or the statutory autonomous regulator, the 
Telecom Regulatory Authority of  India, to administer the legal intent. The 
Indian department of  telecommunications, part of  the ministry, allocates 
use of  the spectrum; typically, frequencies between 9 kHz and 3000 GHz 
are assigned for purposes including mobile telephony, broadcast television, 
and satellite radio.  In the United States, has Congress declared, through 
the Radio Act of  1927- later replaced by the Communications Act of  
1934- the electromagnetic spectrum to be a public resource owned not 
by government, broadcasters or advertisers but by the American people. 
Licensees, consequently, would use the spectrum necessarily in the public 
interest. In addition, because the electromagnetic spectrum was scarce, 
intrusive, and failed to recognize civic-national boundaries, the Supreme 
Court of  the United States has upheld its regulation in ways that could not 
be similarly justified for print, cable or Internet; the spectrum thus is the 
most regulated of  all media. In its fiduciary responsibility, the American 
state, through its hyperactive Federal Communications Commission, 
allocates licenses for use of  that public resource for specific purposes: 3 to 
30 Hz for submarine communication, 30-300 MHz for FM broadcasting, 
300-3000 MHz for microwave ovens, 30-300 GHz for remote sensing, etc. 
The FCC, through eloquent rulemaking and policy, also regulates broadcast 
content for hoaxes, lotteries and indecency. It makes and enforces the limits 
on ownership of  media properties and enforces statutory requirements of  
the “equal time rule,” the V-chip, and “safe harbor” hours.12  
As the broadcast-regulation example illustrates, the law can lay out a 
determinate framework of  sanctions; policy would then enable the executive 
to enforce the legal intent by an astute management of  public resources. 
Because law enforcement and policy formulation and enforcement are all 
executive prerogatives, the cabinet and its bureaucrats tend to enjoy wide-
ranging powers unrivalled in the legislative and judicial branches.  
12 For an overview of  broadcast regulation in the United States, see “The public and broad-
casting,” http://www.fcc.gov/guides/public-and-broadcasting-july-2008 (accessed 28 January 
2014)
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There is a strong case to be made that legal curricula ought to reflect that 
growing reality of  executive power. Generally, policy has been like the 
errand boy who runs around the office all day but is systematically ignored 
when it is time for a meeting. Including its studies and method in legal 
curricula, as some fine law programs in the United States have done, would 
empower future lawyers with a head start to celebrate rule of  law and legal 
literacy. At the Harvard Law School, for example, 23 research programs 
and centers provide connective tissue between the theory and practice: 
the Spring 2014 catalogue includes courses titled Communications and 
Internet Law and Policy (taught by Professor Yochai Benkler), Climate 
Energy Law and Politics (Jody Freeman), Behavioral Economics and Public 
Policy (Cass Sunstein), and Corporate and Capital Markets Law and Policy 
(Lucian Bebchuk), among dozens of  others.13 Indian legal departments 
could emulate such law-policy interactions to develop their own tandem 
functions with agencies and governments to expand dialogue and link 
legislators with bureaucrats. In celebrating the vitality of  policy studies, they 
would lead an interdisciplinary, lateral influence on democratic processes. 
Legal departments that incorporate policy studies would complement a 
small number of  independent policy-incubator institutions such as the 
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, the Centre for Policy Studies, 
Chennai, and more recently, The Hindu Centre for Politics and Public 
Policy, also Chennai. 
Having argued in favor of  including policy studies in legal curricula, I will 
now attempt to lay out a normative draft of  mission, agenda and strategic 
plan as a starting point of  possible directions for a new undergraduate 
legal curriculum.
The mission of  the new policy-inclusive curriculum ought to be necessarily 
pursuit of  research leading to new knowledge, fresh insights, or practical 
recommendations in (1) reconceptualising the purpose of  Indian democracy; 
(2) strengthening democratic processes; and (3) restoring confidence in 
public institutions. Its agenda would advance the mission via pursuit of  two 
goals: (1) Producing scholarship of  high quality; and (2) Disseminating that 
scholarship widely. The cognate and intertwined goals would be addressed 
in such a way that achieving the one does not impede pursuit of  the other. 
In other words, the goals are not exclusive of  each other.
Goal 1 simply means publishing in peer-reviewed journals. In research, 
the significant measure of  quality is to pass rigorous and blind scrutiny 
13 See, generally, “Harvard Law School: Course catalog,” http://www.law.harvard.edu/aca-
demics/curriculum/catalog/ (accessed 28 January 2014)
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by disciplinary experts. Papers produced at the resurgent Indian legal 
departments would be disseminated only upon passing peer review. That, 
in turn, would singularly build the reputation of  the respective legal 
department as a place for serious research. Consequently, Goal 1 would be 
pursued in any of  three ways. Scholars and faculty members would: 
• Submit completed papers to a peer-reviewed journal of  choice. For 
example, the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, requires its 
scholars to submit to peer-reviewed journals. The peer-review process 
can take many weeks before any acceptance decision is conveyed to 
the author. Papers not accepted would be revised and resubmitted to 
that journal or another until published.
• Submit completed papers to a prospective in-house, peer-reviewed 
journal, which, whether online or offline, open-source or subscription, 
would be located at the legal department. An example is the Centre for 
Policy Studies, Chennai, practice of  publishing its scholars’ work under 
its own auspices. So does the Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 
which also owns Brookings Institution Press. Edited by an eminent 
academic and aided by an honorary editorial board, the proposed 
journal would adopt a peer-review process no less rigorous than that of  
eminent journals in political science and public policy.  If  not accepted, 
the paper would be published in an outside peer-reviewed journal or 
developed into a monograph (see below).
• Submit completed papers in the form of  35,000 to 50,000-word 
monographs (60 to 90 Word pages, single spaced, with footnotes and 
one-inch margins) to the department chair who would then initiate 
a process of  blind peer review leading to possible publication under 
the auspices of  the department. The monograph could be published 
in any medium: newsprint, online, or more creatively, cable or film 
(the last two requiring an additional narrative script) and in any form: 
traditional paper, interactive Web site, or audiovisual artifact.
In sum, publishing peer-reviewed research by any of  the above means 
would be the legal department’s measure of  producing “scholarship of  
high quality.”  Consequently, an awareness of  quality would be a norm in 
every decision in the department’s research agenda.
Goal 2, which is to disseminate the scholarship widely, would be pursued 
in any of  six ways:
• Present completed papers (prior to taking any step under Goal 1) or 
working papers at conferences or professional meetings. A working 
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paper would be defined as an original report of  a partially completed 
research project including a literature review, statements of  problem 
and method, and preliminary or anticipated findings.
 n	 Prioritize international, national or local gatherings of  scholars, 
journalists and policy leaders. Possible presentation venues 
would include the Indian Political Science Association, Forum 
on Contemporary Theory, South Asian Centre for Policy Studies, 
International Communication Association, and other scholarly 
meetings in politics, policy, communication and media.
• Present working papers at monthly colloquia
	 n	Students, faculty, scholars or fellows would lead, at their respective 
legal department or university, monthly colloquia to which local 
officials, legislators, scholars and journalists are invited. The 
colloquia would serve as bouncing boards for ideas, but they would 
also help assess current issues in public affairs and solicit feedback 
about ongoing projects
•  Present working papers in a monthly lecture series
 n		Students, faculty, scholars or fellows would offer a monthly lecture or 
seminar for the general public, with an invited local expert officiating 
as a moderator or chief  critic. Special invitees would include local 
officials, legislators, scholars and journalists. The monthly lectures, 
in addition to helping participants brainstorm, would enhance the 
accessibility of  the program for various outside constituencies
 n		If  a student, faculty member, scholar or fellow was not available 
to offer a lecture, then an outside expert would deliver an invited 
lecture, with a faculty member officiating as chief  critic
• Publish an annual anthology of  extended abstracts or working papers
	 n	Titled, say, Abstracts from the Mysore Department of  Law, the publication 
would be sold to local and state libraries
•	 Republish	papers	 in	an	annual	 edited	volume,	online	or	offline	 --	
open	source	if	offline,	with	copyright	release	duly	obtained	--	titled,	
say,	the	Annals of Mysore Department of Law or The Mysore Journal 
of Politics and Public Policy;	and
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•	 Announce	 ongoing	 projects,	 preliminary	 results,	 and	 published	
papers	 regularly	 via	 media	 conferences	 or	 releases	 and	 on	 a	
department	Web	site.
A five-year strategic plan for the resurgent legal department would be as 
follows.
Year 1:
1. Publish at least four peer-reviewed articles or four monographs, or a 
combination of  the two, as described in Goal 1.
2. Complete at least 12 activities as described in Goal 2.
Year 2 onward:
1. Publish at least 12 peer-reviewed articles or six monographs, or a 
combination of  the two, as described in Goal 1.
2. Complete at least 18 activities as described in Goal 2.
3. Make the national press at least twice for published research or other 
activities
4. Influence policy, in its formulation or execution, at the national level in 
at least two measurable executive or legislative actions attributable to 
research produced at the program and at the state level in two separate 
actions.
To conclude, it seems clear that Indian legal programs tend to be well-
positioned to strengthen traditional pedagogy. First, they ought to discount 
the space for exclusive ontological binaries by restoring to legal education 
policy studies. In doing so, they would recognize a syncretic unity in the 
disciplines and, consequently-second-raise the bar for useful research. 
Expanding legal curricula into the rule of  law would not only elevate the 
political discourse, it would, in addition, revive the best traditions in Indian 
legal systems and embolden Indian aspirations of  modernity.
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF TAX: PATTERNS OF 
INCORPORATION AND POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL
Aaron Schneider*
In Brazil, a cross-class coalition of  popular sector and middle-
class groups have won incorporation and provided support to a 
high-capacity tax regime. A cross-class alliance was produced 
by specific strategies and sequences as groups clamored for access 
and brought down the military regime in the 1980s. The group 
consolidated their alliance in opposition to neoliberal stabilization 
in the 1990s and institutionalized their participation in politics in 
the neo-developmentalist strategies of  the 2000s. This trajectory 
of  incorporation provided support for an ambitious effort to raise 
tax capacity, but it could not overcome the institutional legacies 
of  previous patterns of  incorporation that permitted economic 
and political elites to preserve elements of  particularism and 
regressivity in the tax system.
INTRODUCTION
The Brazilian government collects a remarkable 36% of  GDP in 
revenues, well above the Latin American average of  approximately 22% 
and comfortably in the middle of  rates collected in much wealthier 
countries. This was not always the case, and the last two decades have 
seen a significant tax effort that increased revenues by almost a third. 
In addition to its overall size, another notable characteristic of  Brazil’s 
impressive revenue increase is that it has particularly expanded social 
contributions, levied tax on various bases and generally attributed to 
spending in the social sector. Further, there is a decreasing but still heavy 
reliance on indirect taxes. One result of  the particularities of  the tax 
architecture is that there are ongoing problems of  vertical inequity, as 
poorer citizens end up paying more of  their incomes in tax than wealthier 
*Faculty, University of  Denver. Aaron.schneider@du.edu
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ones. In addition, there are stubborn problems of  horizontal inequity 
across jurisdictions, as tax contributions vary depending on where payers 
transact. 
To make sense of  this peculiar combination of  revenue capacity and 
vertical and horizontal inequity, the current project traces the evolution of  
political incorporation of  key social groups. These social groups included 
middle sector, social movement, and working class actors. They mobilized 
and legitimated through the struggle to remove the military regime that left 
power in the 1980s, consolidated their position and linked to political actors 
in struggles over neoliberal stabilization during the 1990s, and incorporated 
in the post-neoliberal 2000s through intermediary organizations, policies, 
and state institutions.
The incorporation of  this social coalition supported the expansion of  
tax capacity, but it was unable to address core problems of  vertical and 
horizontal inequity. These shortcomings can be traced to institutional 
legacies of  efforts to incorporate other groups, namely executive-
legislative relations and federal arrangements that privilege regional 
elites.
The current paper begins with an overview of  the Brazilian tax structure, 
emphasizing impressive increases in the amounts collected and ongoing 
problems of  equity in the system. The next three sections trace the 
transformation, consolidation, and incorporation of  middle class and 
popular actors; and the final section considers the institutions and 
political practices that protect the interests of  economic and political 
elites. 
BRAZILIAN TAX 
After a concerted effort from the mid-1990s to the present, Brazilian 
taxes are among the highest in the developing world1. From 1994 to 
2008, tax revenue increased steadily, with notable reforms to the tax 
system driven by an increase in income taxes and the implementation 
of  numerous contributions linked to social spending outlays. These 
increases more than compensated for decreases in tariffs as Brazil 
liberalized international trade. 
From 1994 to 2010, taxes increased from 28.4 percent to 34.6 percent, 
an increase of  almost one quarter. These revenues were necessary as the 
1 Calculations by the IMF (2011) and Pessino and Fenochietto (2010) estimate Brazil taxes 
98% of  what would be possible given its level of  development and other characteristics. 
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country faced fiscal insolvency during the 1980s and had to muster revenues 
to combat inflation, and needed further income to support expanded social 
spending mandated in the 1988 Constitution and responding to demand 
pent up during the 20 year military regime that left power in 1985. 
Source: Ministerio de Fazenda, Receita Federal
A glimpse at the distribution of  taxes and their attribution to different levels 
of  government highlights two patterns. First, the tax system is complex, 
made more so with a large number of  contributions tied to specific social 
spending outlays. These are mostly collected by the federal level (social 
security, labor, health, welfare), and some use payroll as a base while others 
calculate contributions on the basis of  gross receipts. The single largest tax 
is a tax on the circulation of  goods and services attributed to the states, 
accounting for 7.3 percent of  GDP. 
With the most important tax on consumption controlled by state 
governments, the federal government was forced to exchange trade taxes 
lowered by liberalization for income taxes. This replacement was reasonably 
effective, as federal taxes stood at 7.97 percent of  GDP in 1994 and 7.67 
percent in 2010. The effort to raise income taxes showed especially in an 
increase in direct taxes in the 2000s. By 2009, direct taxes were almost 60 
percent of  the total, up from barely 44 percent in 2000. As a percentage 
of  GDP, this represented an increase from 13.59 percent to 17.83 percent 
(Afonso, et al, 2013). 
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Source: http://brasildadosefatos.com.br, from Min. Fazenda, Receita Federal
To increase revenues further, the federal government made marked use of  
contributions, which increased from 8.95% percent of  GDP in 1994 to 
12.94% of  GDP in 2010. Federal contributions include social security, a 
social security contribution on business receipts (COFINS), a contribution 
to unemployment benefits for dismissed workers (FGTS), a health 
contribution on receipts (CSS), a welfare contribution on receipts (PIS), a 
public sector social security contribution (CPSS), a contribution on profits 
towards social security (CSL), a contribution on fuel towards education and 
health (CIDE), and for a time there was a contribution towards education 
and health on financial transactions (CPMF).2
Contributions hold several attractions as sources of  revenue. First, 
while other federal taxes are shared with state and local governments, 
contributions are not3.  Second, while contributions are putatively reserved 
for specific outlays, they are frequently available for other uses, either 
2 At the state level, there was a social security program on salaries (SSS).
3 In fact, for temporary periods that were repeatedly renewed, 20% of  all federal revenues 
were separated from the pool of  shared taxes and made available only to the federal govern-
ment, first through the Social Emergency Fund and later through Disconnection of  Receipts 
(Mendes, 2013). 
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because the outlays would occur long in the future (as in social security) or 
because the outlays were not particularly well monitored. A complication 
of  contributions, as well as other indirect taxes, is that they tend to be 
regressive, but their most important characteristic is that they carry the 
political legitimacy of  a promise. The government commits to increasing 
social spending that primarily benefits middle class and popular sector 
groups in exchange for increased revenues.4
One way to explore the equity impact of  changes to the tax system is in 
terms of  the relative burden on income groups. 
Table 1: Family Income and Tax in 1996 and 2004
Family 
Income
Direct % 
Income 
1996
Direct 
%Income 
2004
Indirect %
Income 
1996
Indirect %
Income 
2004
Tax %
Income 
1996
Tax %
Income 
2004
Tax 
Increase
<2SM 1.7 3.1 26.5 45.8 28.2 48.8 20.6
2 to 3 2.6 3.5 20 34.5 22.6 38 15.4
3 to 5 3.1 3.7 16.3 30.2 19.4 33.9 14.5
5 to 6 4 4.1 14 27.9 18 32 14
6 to 8 4.2 5.2 13.8 26.5 18 31.7 13.7
8 to 10 4.1 5.9 12 25.7 16.1 31.7 15.6
10 to 15 4.6 6.8 10.5 23.7 15.1 30.5 15.4
15 to 20 5.5 6.9 9.4 21.6 14.9 28.4 13.5
20 to 30 5.7 8.6 9.1 20.1 14.8 28.7 13.9
>30 10.6 9.9 7.3 16.4 17.9 26.3 8.4
Source: Afonso, 2013, Zockun, et al, 2007
Table 1 is drawn from a study that uses household surveys to calculate 
the incidence of  tax, and displays the change from 1996 to 2004 in direct, 
indirect, and overall taxes.  First, the change from 1996 to 2004 shows 
an increasing burden for all deciles. People pay more of  their incomes in 
tax. Second, the increase is steadily greater for poorer deciles than it is for 
richer deciles (except a portion of  the upper middle class), and the increase 
weighs heavier on the poor. Still, though they appear to have become less 
progressive over time, the burden of  direct taxes continues to increase 
with wealth. 
As a result of  these shifts in tax structure, the federal government continued 
to collect the bulk of  revenues, close to 70 percent of  the total. Of  these 
revenues, it could decentralize resources to municipalities without losing 
4 Taxes on consumption still account for about half  of  all taxes (DIEESE, 2009).
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too much of  the resources available. Municipalities significantly increased 
their share of  receipts available after transfers from 10.7 percent in 1988 to 
18.3 percent in 2010. This increase came only partly at the expense of  the 
federal government, which dropped from 62.5 percent of  available receipts 
to 57 percent, with the rest coming out of  the share of  state governments, 
which fell from 26.8 to 24.7 percent of  available receipts.
Figure 1:  Share of  Tax Revenues Accrued to Federal, 
State and Municipal Governments
Source: Afonso et al, 2013 
In the absence of  fiscal space at the state level, and with the elimination of  
their other developmental tools, such as state enterprises and banks, they 
were forced to privatize; state governments engaged in a practice labeled 
“fiscal war” in the popular Brazilian press. Fiscal war among the states is 
the competitive offer of  tax incentives to businesses that transact in their 
state, as well as efforts to pressure the federal government to alter the tax 
rates paid in one state or another. This introduces horizontal inequities 
as taxpayers operating in one state face different tax rates from those 
operating in another.5As an illustration of  the confusing array of  tax rules, 
the table below displays some of  the main benefits conceded by different 
states.
5 To add to confusion in the cases of  goods sold across state borders, the rate depends on 
where the good originated and where it is sold. For example, goods originating in SP face a 
rate of  18 percent if  sold in SP, 12 percent if  sold in RJ, MG, PR, SC, or RS,  and seven percent 
if  sold in all others.
The Political Economy of  Tax: Patterns of  Incorporation 45
Table 2:  Benefits Conceded by State
State Abbreviation Main Benefit Conceded
AL Eliminate tax debts with bonds
AM 6% credit on imports
BA Tax holiday on ICMS
CE 90% financing on ICMS without adjustment
DF Presumed credit of  24% on distribution costs
ES Financing of  ICMS without adjustment by FUNDAP
GO Financing of  ICMS and presumed credit of  5%
MG Financing of  ICMS with need-based increase
MS Presumed credit up to 100% on ICMS owed
MT Presumed credit of  up to 50% on ICMS owed
PE Presumed credit by PRODEPE
PR Suspend ICMS on imports
RJ Reduced base for calculation for ICMS
RN Presumed credit of  50% of  ICMS owed
RO Presumed credit of  95% of  ICMS owed
RS Presumed credit of  75% of  ICMS owed
SC Financing of  ICMS without adjustment
SP Reduced base for calculation of  ICMS for industry
Source: Folha de São Paulo from Sec. Fazenda São Paulo
The tax system in Brazil is impressive in the gains it has produced in terms 
of  revenue. In an incredibly short period, the country has increased its tax 
effort, and this has supported both a fiscal adjustment and social spending 
increase. Yet, these are desirable uses for tax revenue in many contexts 
in which such impressive revenue increases have not occurred. The need 
for more revenue also does not explain why revenue was raised in the 
particular way it was raised, leaving untouched and even worsened a tax 
structure with serious problems of  inequity. That inequity is apparent 
both in vertical terms, in the larger burden paid by poorer sections, and 
in horizontal terms, as taxpayers face different rates depending on where 
they transact. The sections below trace the combination of  tax capacity 
increase and stubbornness of  inequity to the patterns of  incorporation of  
key social groups.
INCORPORATION
Incorporation is the way social actors are recognized as legitimate 
participants in the democratic process and claimants on government 
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resources and authority. One way of  thinking about incorporation is in 
terms of  citizenship, in the sense of  the rights and responsibilities entailed 
by membership in a political community. Citizenship regimes have been 
disaggregated into civil, political, and social rights guaranteed by the state 
and exercised by individuals and groups, “citizenship regimes define 
who has political membership, which rights they possess, and how interest 
intermediation with the state is structured” (Yashar, 2004: 6). According 
to T.H. Marshall’s (1950) narrative of  citizenship rights in England, there 
was a progressive deepening of  citizenship first in the civil sphere (habeus 
corpus, private property protections, access to justice), then in the political 
sphere (voting rights, freedom of  assembly, protections of  speech), and 
finally in the social sphere (education, health, pensions). Each deepening 
of  citizenship involved struggle, and began first with extension to social 
and economic elites such as nobles and landowners and was gradually 
extended to middle and working classes.6
The concept of  incorporation recognizes the political dynamic of  evolving 
citizenship as “the first sustained and at least partially successful attempt by 
the state to legitimate and shape an institutionalized” movement (Collier 
and Collier, 1991: 783). Excluded social actors mobilize to establish 
themselves and their demands as legitimate, engaging existing members of  
the polity and established institutions. When successful, these movements 
secure mechanisms of  incorporation from the state, including policies, 
institutions, and intermediary organizations, and they confirm membership 
in a political community, establish relationships between state and society, 
and shape ensuing political dynamics. 
For two reasons, the key social actors of  importance in exploring 
contemporary incorporation in Brazil are popular sector and middle class 
actors. The first reason is that these are the actors who have traditionally 
been excluded, and their mobilization for incorporation drove the 
deterioration and replacement of  previous citizenship regimes. Second, in 
Brazil, the mobilization and incorporation of  these groups has coincided 
with and been accelerated by neoliberal reforms that sought to insert 
national economic actors more deeply into international processes and 
introduce market forces into areas where they had been absent.
The way in which popular sector and middle class actors are incorporated 
has important long-term impacts on politics and policy. Popular sectors 
include working classes, both formal and informal sector, whose demands 
6 Marshall was well aware that this progression could follow very different orders, paces, and 
degrees of  universality (1950). 
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for incorporation include protection from patterns of  exploitation 
exacerbated by integration in global production processes. Other popular 
sectors, frequently organized on a territorial basis by neighborhood or 
community, mobilize around non-market provision of  public goods, 
such as health, education, housing, public services, and environmental 
protection. Other actors mobilize around the democratization of  daily life 
to address ways in which citizenship has been truncated on the basis of  
race, gender, sector, or other identities.
Middle classes include the professionals, public sector and services sector 
workers identified by patterns of  urbanization, education, income, and 
consumption. They fit in a peculiar position in struggles for incorporation 
around neoliberalism, as some portions of  the middle class lose access 
to state employment, subsidized consumption, and benefits, while others 
capitalize on human capital to participate in newly emerging transnational 
activities. 
The alliances struck and cleavages articulated in the pattern of  incorporation 
have a critical impact on future citizenship regimes and patterns of  politics. 
In Brazil, middle class and popular sector actors have struck a cross-
class alliance in pursuit of  incorporation. Mechanisms to incorporate 
these groups now coexist with the legacies of  previous institutions that 
incorporated groups such as regional elites. The result in public finance is 
support for expanded capacity but stubborn elements of  particularism and 
regressivity in the tax system.
INCORPORATION OF POPULAR SECTORS, SOCIAL MOVE-
MENTS AND MIDDLE CLASSES
To explore patterns of  incorporation, the sections below are organized 
around three recent historical periods defined by patterns of  cleavage 
and alliance among key social groups as they mobilize, consolidate, and 
institutionalize their access to politics.
The first period is the struggle for democratization of  the 1970s and 
1980s, important in constituting key working class and popular social 
actors, and defining an initial partisan cleavage between pro-democracy 
and pro-military forces. The 1990s reoriented partisan cleavages around 
economic stabilization, in which aspects of  neoliberal adjustment expelled 
some groups from the mechanisms by which they had previously been 
incorporated, and the governing party adopted a governance strategy 
that accommodated political and economic elite allies through a pattern 
referred to as “presidential coalitionism” (Abranches 1988). Meanwhile, the 
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Workers’ Party (PT) in opposition solidified its bonds to sectors opposed 
to neoliberalism and prepared for an eventual rise to national prominence 
by experimenting with potentially radical participatory mechanisms of  
policymaking at the local level. The PT held national power during the 
final period since 2002, and there was a further reorientation of  partisan 
cleavages around the PT strategy of  neo-developmentalist growth. The 
period expanded the reincorporation of  working class, social movement, 
and middle sectors through partisan and state institutions, though it 
inherited from previous periods patterns of  coalitional presidentialism 
that accommodated political and economic elites. 
PERIOD 1: THE DEMOCRATIZATION CLEAVAGE 
The military leaders who governed Brazil from 1964 to 1985 brutalized 
opponents and carefully manipulated political institutions to reinforce 
military control. The limited space available for partisan and civic 
organizing allowed democracy advocates to constitute themselves as 
legitimate political actors, helped them learn strategies of  organization and 
collaboration, and established political party vehicles and patterns of  party 
system cleavage defined by the struggle for democratic transition. The 
period established the antecedent conditions for subsequent struggles of  
exclusion and incorporation; the old regime broke down; new social actors 
established themselves; and, intermediary associations such as political 
parties began to structure political conflict. 
Middle class sectors, including public sector workers and private urban 
professionals, had been among the original supporters of  the military 
regime, responding to the inflationary spirals of  post-World War II boom-
bust growth, perceptions of  corruption among the political elite, and the 
increasing political polarization of  the period (Skidmore, 1988). These 
sectors had already been incorporated through the state institutions and 
party organs of  the post-World War II import substitution industrialization 
drive, but their support to the military faded as persecution intensified 
through Institutional Act 5 (AI5) of  1968, which particularly targeted 
opponents among the political elites, activist students, intellectuals, peasant 
and worker leaders, and others defined as threats (Stepan, 1988). 
While high rates of  growth assuaged some, worsening human rights 
violations and economic crisis in the 1970s and especially the 1980s turned 
many against the regime (Hagopian and Mainwaring, 1987). The first signs 
of  declining support appeared in 1973 elections that were interpreted 
as a resounding defeat for the military; urban professionals and public 
sector workers increasingly joined active movements for democratization. 
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The struggle for democracy brought them together with a wide range of  
social movements, understood as those subaltern movements addressing 
citizenship and quality of  life issues for excluded groups, including 
movements for human rights, Afro-Brazilian rights, women’s rights, 
environmental protection, neighborhood services, and public health 
movements, among others (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Alvarez, 1997). 
Working classes also mobilized in opposition to the regime, as they bore 
the brunt of  both military repression and regressive growth strategies. 
Urban formal sector workers had been previously incorporated by the 
unions and labor institutions of  the corporatist system set up during the 
Depression-era Estado Novo (Collier and Collier, 1991: 369- 370)7. Yet, as 
the military regime required larger concentrations of  capital for industrial 
deepening, these same corporatist institutions came to be used primarily as 
mechanisms to repress worker organizing, depress wages, and concentrate 
profits (Leff, 1982; Evans, 1979). 
Gradually, urban formal sector workers created a space for autonomous 
organizing and struggle. They targeted efforts to keep wage adjustments 
in line with inflation, organized on the shop-floor to avoid the reactionary 
control of  sector-wide unions, and expanded their workplace organizing 
to include community demands for public services. The articulation of  
such demands and organizational efforts eventually birthed a New Union 
Movement, capable of  securing workplace representation, producing new 
leaders, and joining urban worker struggle to movements by other classes 
and sectors within a broader struggle for democratization (Seidman, 1994). 
Strike waves in the late 1970s were especially vigorous in the manufacturing 
belt around São Paulo, where an alternative national federation of  unions, 
Unitary Worker Central (CUT), formed in 19838.
These popular and middle sector movements constituted themselves as 
legitimate social actors and increasingly learned to operate in tandem. The 
struggle for democratization offered a unified target in the form of  the 
military regime, and strikes and protests accelerated in the course of  the 
7 These were eventually channeled, imperfectly, through the party system in the populist Brazil-
ian Workers’ Party in the post-World War II period (Schmitter, 1971).
8 The rural poor also felt the weight of  the military regime. Never included in the same incen-
tives and constraints that characterized urban corporatist mechanisms of  incorporation, the 
rural landless population swelled in number and suffered particularly from political repres-
sion and biased growth strategies. Rural workers resisted, and with the help especially of  the 
progressive Catholic Church (Houtzager, 2000), developed a rural landless worker movement 
with a series of  occupations in 1979, becoming one of  the largest social movements in Latin 
America, the Landless Worker Movement (MST) (Woolford, 2010).
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1970s. The gradual opening of  electoral competition after 1973 oriented at 
least part of  the democratization struggle into the party system. 
A main cleavage divided parties according to their support or opposition 
to the military regime, in which the main aggregator of  opposition was 
the Democratic Movement of  Brazil (MDB, later PMDB). Elections were 
opened sequentially for Congress, Senate, local and state executive, managing 
the transition through the electoral system as a top-down and gradual one 
(Kinzo, 1993)9 . The table below is adapted from Lavarreda (1991) to array 
the parties in lighter shades according to their relative opposition to the 
military regime and trace as much as possible their historical evolution. 
The table displays the vote percentage and in parentheses the number 
of  seats. Of  particular note is that changes to electoral laws largely had 
the effects intended by the military – fragmenting and underrepresenting 
opposition parties. 
Table 3: Party Vote Percent and Seats by Election
Opposition %
(Seats)
Regime %
(Seats)
MDB ARENA
1974 48
(161)
52
(203)
1978 49.6
(191)
50.4
(231)
PT PDT PMDB PTB PDS
1982 3.5
(8)
5.8
(23)
43
(200)
4.4
(13)
43.2
(235)
PT PCdoB PCB PSB PDT PMDB PSC PTB PDC PL PFL PDS
1986 6.9 
(16)
.6 
(3)
.9 
(3)
1.0 
(1)
6.5 
(24)
47.8 
(260)
0.4 (1) 4.5 
(17)
1.2 
(5)
2.8 
(6)
17.7 
(118)
7.9 
(33)
Adapted from Lavareda (1991)
After electoral rules allowed the emergence of  additional parties, the 
Workers’ Party (PT) formed in 1980, offering an organizational and 
ideological vehicle of  coordination for the urban and rural working classes, 
and their social movement and middle sector allies, including the political 
Left of  various Marxist hues and ex-guerrillas. The PT was a new kind 
of  partisan organization in Brazil, considered an “anomaly” compared to 
previous political formations, as it emerged from a “solid base in labor and 
social movements,” with much of  “its leadership drawn from the labor 
movement” (Keck, 1992:3).From the 1982 PT newspaper supplement 
entitled, the “PT and the Economy,” the party established its roots in a 
9 Brazil is taken as the prototypical “conservative” transition to democracy (Power, 1996: 57). 
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worker and civil society alliance to advance socialism, “Socialism will be the 
result of  worker struggle alongside other oppressed groups – women, Afro-Brazilians, 
indigenous, handicapped, elderly, gays – all fighting and winning against oppression and 
exploitation (Jornal dos Trabalhadores, 1982:10).
As a party that emerged “from the bottom up” (Nylen, 1997: 9) with “extra-
parliamentary” origins (Meneguello, 1989: 33), the PT was committed to the 
autonomy of  its movement and union allies. There was a “formal separation” 
between the party and civil society organizations, avoiding the subordination 
that characterized the traditional Brazilian Left and its relationship between 
populist parties and labor movements (Keck, 1992: 68-69, 184-185). 
Internally, the party maintained a vibrant internal debate that encouraged 
the emergence and competition of  more than 30 factions, and chief  among 
them was the Articulação, led by autoworker Luis Ignacio “Lula” da Silva, 
and including a number of  Catholic and labor activists (Keck, 1992: 114). 
The struggle over democratization produced the antecedent conditions 
for subsequent struggles over incorporation. The old regime broke down; 
various social forces constituted themselves as legitimate political actors; 
and intermediary institutions such as political parties emerged to channel 
these actors into the political sphere. Though they failed to achieve direct 
elections in 1985, they forced the military to accept the candidate of  the 
PMDB and leave power (Stepan, 1988), followed by a Constituent Assembly 
in 1988 that enshrined rights as many social movement demands,10 and by 
1989 the Workers’ Party candidate, Lula, made it to the second round of  
the presidential elections before falling to Fernando Collor. 
PERIOD 2: THE NEOLIBERAL CLEAVAGE 
Before he was removed for corruption 1992, Collor began the liberalization 
of  trade and deregulation of  the Brazilian economy that would be 
accelerated under Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s PSDB-led government 
from 1994 to 2002. While Brazil experienced more gradual and less 
complete liberalization during this period than some other countries in Latin 
America, the 1990s represent a critical juncture for the country, especially in 
terms of  the patterns of  political cleavage among important social groups 
and the institutional response this provoked in the party system and in 
state institutions. During the decade, the party system reoriented around 
a primary cleavage of  support or opposition to the national strategy of  
10 The 1988 Constitution enshrined a host of  social rights and institutional reforms that rep-
resented both the vested interests of  previously incorporated sectors and the claims of  social 
movements that channeled their demands through the Constituent Assembly (Figueiredo and 
Limongi, 1999).
Jindal Journal of  Public Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 152
liberalization (Roman, 2012; Hagopian, Gervasoni, and Moraes, 2009), and 
governance settled into an elite-level pattern of  “presidential coalitionism” 
(Abranches, 1988; Figueiredo, 2007). The Workers’ Party preserved its 
core bases of  support by remaining in opposition to neoliberalism at the 
national level and experimenting with participatory institutions in the local 
jurisdictions where it won office.
The priority of  the Cardoso period was stabilization of  the currency. As 
finance minister in 1994, Cardoso had introduced the Real Plan that included 
a new currency and the end to stubborn inflation. To sustain stability, the Plan 
also called for ongoing policies of  fiscal discipline, deregulation, and trade 
liberalization, and the government removed interventions in the economy 
such as subsidies and price controls. The strategy was at first heterodox, 
with an overvalued Real fixed within a currency band, that the government 
sustained by pursuing foreign inflows through privatization and high interest 
rates (Giambiagi, Reis, and Urani, 20004). When this strategy collapsed after 
the Asian and Russian crises of  1998, the Cardoso government switched to 
a more orthodox inflation-targeting regime achieved through high interest 
rates and fiscal surplus targets (Serrano, 2010).
As a complement to this strategy of  stabilization, the government 
also sought to “improve competitiveness” through liberalized trade, 
privatizing public enterprises, and the pursuit of  foreign investment 
(Amaral, Kingstone, and Krieckhaus, 2008: 141-2). While the end of  
inflation coincided with a moderate recovery during Cardoso’s first 
term, the second term was characterized by economic slowdown and de-
industrialization provoked by a loss of  ground to imports, overvalued 
currency, and a lack of  attention to industrial policy (Ross Schneider, 
2004). The policies associated with this version of  stabilization shifted 
the nature of  political alignments in society and the nature of  engagement 
with the state (Stokes, 2001). Continued liberalization of  trade and prices 
allowed portions of  poor and middle classes to consume again after facing 
runaway prices and limited supply during 1980s cycles of  hyperinflation 
and low growth (Baker, 2009: 229-254). Also, the 1988 Constitution had 
expanded welfare state policies, decentralized power and resources, and 
increased public participation in social policy (Draibe, 2003:69), and the 
Cardoso government took the first steps in implementing mandates for 
universal provision in health and education, expanded funding for housing 
and sanitation, and implemented targeted income-transfer programs11. At 
least temporarily, the new consumers and those benefiting from elements 
of  social protection lined up behind the PSDB, providing convincing 
electoral victories to Cardoso (Power, 2008; Roma, 2002). 
11 Fund for the Maintenance and Support of  Basic Education (Fundef) and Unified Health 
System (SUS) and conditional cash transfer BolsaEscola (Melo, 2008). 
The Political Economy of  Tax: Patterns of  Incorporation 53
Yet, despite these significant achievements, neoliberal stabilization caused 
hardship and stimulated opposition among key social groups. Social 
movements opposed Cardoso effort to curtail the powers of  states and 
municipalities (Arretche, 2000) and the extensive use of  decrees and other 
executive privileges that removed aspects of  neoliberal policy from public 
debate (Figueiredo, 2001). While social movements had lost some of  their 
national level protagonism during th e 1990s,12 they remained important 
actors at the local level, especially in jurisdictions where Left parties won 
power and needed support to advance an anti-neoliberal agenda.13
PT-led local governments opposed neoliberal adjustment and offered 
alternative patterns of  incorporation to urban and rural popular sector actors. 
The growing informal sector was more difficult to organize, but CUT and 
other labor federations continued to defend remaining benefits and social 
protections and oppose privatization, at least slowing the pace of  neoliberal 
reforms (Weyland, 1996; Kingstone, 2004: 25-28; Hunter, 2010: 61-71).14 
These social cleavages articulated through the party system into support or 
opposition to the stabilization program of  the Cardoso government. The 
table below is organized according to the relative ideological position as 
derived from surveys of  legislator self-placement and placement of  other 
parties (Power and Zucco, 2009; Power, 1998: 61-2; Hunter, 2010: 48-49). 
Parties to the left are more intensely opposed to neoliberalism and the 
numbers in each cell indicate the number of  seats won by each party. 
Table 4: Party Seats and Governing Coalition by Election
PCdoB PT PSB PDT PSDB PMDB PTB PL PFL PSD PRN Other
1990 5 35 11 46 37 109 34 15 83 42 41 55
PCdoB PT PSB PDT PMDB PSDB PTB PL PFL PP PPR Other
1994 10 49 16 34 107 63 31 13 89 35 51 15
PCdoB PT PSB PDT PMDB PSDB PTB PL PFL PPB Other
1998 7 58 19 25 83 99 31 12 105 60 14
Adapted from Power and Zucco (2009: 228), Hunter (2010), Amorim (2002: 64), 
and electoral data from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal.
12 See also Foweraker, 1995; Hochstetler, 2000. 
13 The PT self-consciously understood the practice of  mobilizing social movement allies to 
balance conservative political elites as part of  a “PT way of  governing” (Couto, 2000).
14 To the rural popular sector, the Cardoso government made some overtures, especially 
by fulfilling the Constitutional promise to include non-contributing retirees in public social 
security and extending universal health and education (Melo, 2008). Still, limited attention to 
land reform, price competition from liberalized imports, and reliance on clientelist political 
allies exacerbated rural contradictions, and the MST landless movement increased its activity 
in the form of  occupations and public protest. Brutal repression at El Dorado dos Carajás 
in 1996 sparked intensified MST mobilization and sustained a close association with the 
Workers’ Party. The close association included sharing leaders, policy agendas, and political 
strategy, though the MST continued to guard its autonomy and never formally associated as 
an organization with the PT (Gómez Bruera, 2013: 36).
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The table suggests a few observations about the character of  the party system 
with important implications for party and government strategy. During 
the 1990s, the party of  the president had consistently low representation, 
never above the 99 seats out of  513 achieved in 1998, and was as low as 41 
seats under Collor’s PRN 1990 government (Kinzo, 2004: 27). This result 
compelled the need for coalitions to secure majorities, and the shaded boxes 
indicate the parties that were at one point or another in governing coalitions.15
Some observers labeled the fragmented and volatile party system as 
“inchoate” (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995) characterized by party system 
instability and weak party institutionalization (Mainwaring, 1993; Powers, 
2000) “over-determined by both electoral and executive-legislative 
institutional incentives (Ames and Power, 2007).16 These incentives include a 
proportional representation electoral system in large, multi-member federal 
districts that create adequate room for small parties to secure representation. 
Further, with multi-round elections for executive office, politicians have 
an additional incentive to create small parties to offer as potential allies for 
second-round elections, producing a proliferation of  small parties varying 
across jurisdictions (Jones, 1994; Mainwaring, 1999).17 Governing majorities 
are further problematized by weak legislative coherence as there are few 
limits on party-switching after elections, and politicians migrate into and out 
of  parties to secure executive patronage or place themselves strategically for 
the next election (Ames, 2002; Melo, 2004; Desposato, 2006).18  In addition, 
the open-list ballot drives politicians to compete within their own party for 
votes to secure a high position on the party list.19
To deal with these issues, Cardoso managed governance through “presidential 
coalitionism” (Abranches, 1988), building legislative supermajorities that 
15 Collor’s coalition never rose above 50%, and he was eventually impeached for corruption in 
1992. Cardoso’s government mastered the coalitional presidentialism strategy of  governance, 
sustaining majorities well over the required 60% for constitutional reforms (Figuereido, 2007).
16 As well as the patrimonial and authoritarian practices of  politicians inherited from the mili-
tary regime, if  not earlier (Marks, 1993).  
17  The institutional disincentives are detailed by Power and Ames (2010); Power (2010), 
Amorim  Neto (2002); Armijo, Faucher and Dembinska, (2006); Cintra (2007); and Santos 
and Vilarouca (2008). The effective number of  parties in the Congress was 8.2 in 1994 and 7.1 
in 1998, and volatility from 1994 to 1998 was 25 percent (Kinzo, 2004: 32. 34 and data from 
the Supreme Electoral Tribunal).
18  This practice was also tightened somewhat, though politicians are still allowed to leave their 
party for a newly created party without losing their seat (Lyne, 2008).
19 This greatly increases the cost of  elections, as it prevents parties from coordinating campaigns 
and spending and encourages individual politicians to generate their own funds (Samuels, 2002). 
Individual politicians are further incentivized to distance themselves from national organizations 
as career incentives direct them to municipal level executive office (Samuels, 2003).
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could withstand occasional defections.20 A host of  interlocutors manage 
such coalitions, including single-issue caucuses,21 governors with leverage 
over state delegations,22 party leaders, and individual politicians with large 
vote-banks. To secure their support, Cardoso deployed a bevy of  resources, 
such as ministerial appointments, tens of  thousands of  federal jobs, and the 
release of  investments in the bailiwicks of  individual legislators (Figueiredo 
and Limongi, 1999). In the event of  legislative obstructionism, the president 
could also make use of  presidential decrees to temporarily impose measures, 
and renew them repeatedly, even if  a majority in the legislature could not be 
manufactured (Pereira, Power, and Rennó, 2005). Though these mechanisms 
and the horse-trading entailed diluted legislation, the Cardoso government 
managed coalitional presidentialism to pass most of  its legislative priorities, 
including 35 difficult Constitutional reforms (Meneguello, 1998; Santos, 
2003; AmorimNeto, 2003; AmorimNeto, 2006).23
As the government built supermajorities and passed much of  its agenda, 
the party system reoriented around support or opposition to the PSDB 
stabilization strategy (Power and Zucco, 2009; Lyne, 2005; Hagopian, 
Gervasoni, and Moraes, 2009). Along with a few other Left-of-Center parties, 
the Workers’ Party maintained principled opposition and experimented with 
20 This pattern is presumed to operate in parliamentary systems where coalition government 
is not uncommon, though it is also prevalent in presidential systems where governing parties 
fail to secure legislative majorities (Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh, 2004). Cardoso built 
supermajorities as large as 74% during the 1999-2002 period, when his PSDB enjoyed the sup-
port of  the PMDB, PFL, and PPB and Lula’s coalition peaked at 70% of  the Congress from 
2005-2007, when he was backed by the PL, PCdoB, PSB, PTB, PP, and PMDB (Figueiredo, 
2007: 190).
21  There are multiple single-issue caucuses, such as the rural bloc, Evangelical deputies, health 
caucus and others. 
22 Governor power over resources and appointments gives them leverage over state represen-
tatives (Samuels and Abrucio, 2000) and malapportionment in both houses of  Congress in-
creases the power of  governors of  rural states where the inheritors of  conservative, clientelist 
parties with origins in the military regime are most likely to dominate (Samuels and Snyder, 
2001).
23  “The wider view of  presidencialismo de coalizão can incorporate both extramural and in-
tramural visions of  the legislature. The framework is compatible with all of  the following 
assumptions. Open-list- PR really does cause extreme multipartism; permanent multiparty 
presidentialism generates severe collective action problems; these collective action problems 
are addressed on the executive side by impressive agenda power and on the legislative side by 
centralizing rules; president must act like prime ministers in multiparty parliamentary systems, 
cultivating the support of  other parties by sharing power with them; presidents face many 
of  the same risks as prime ministers, facing blackmail threats and the high costs of  keeping 
diverse coalition partners happy; and to the extent that presidents can neutralize some of  
these risks, they can attain legislative success by deploying some or all of  the governing tools” 
(Power, 2010: 28).
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potentially radical participatory innovations at the local level, consolidating 
its base of  support among popular sectors and social movements.
One local strategy was experimentation with participatory institutions. Such 
mechanisms had been mandated in the 1988 Constitution, but they were 
advanced only partially across the country and in narrow policy areas, yet the 
Workers’ Party committed itself  to participatory decision-making in issues 
of  local control such as housing and health. Its innovation of  participatory 
budgeting became a global reference, and these institutions further bonded 
social actors to the Workers’ Party, which preserved its reputation as the 
partisan vehicle by which popular sectors and social movements could 
channel their interests to the state (Lavalle, Acharya, and Houtzager, 2005).24
While principled opposition at the national level and local experimentation 
with participation solidified PT credentials with anti-neoliberal actors, an 
alternative strategy appeared to mimic “coalitional presidentialism” at 
the elite level. Office-oriented factions within the party, especially Lula’s 
Articulação, urged accommodation as they sought to manage governance 
challenges in the jurisdictions where their members governed and as they 
eyed national power.25 Over time, they pushed the PT rightwards, taking over 
important positions within the party and shifting the party platform set in 
bi-annual party conventions away from a commitment to socialism (Freire 
de Lacerda, 2002: 58; Mendes, 2004). Moderate candidates demonstrated 
greater capacity to win elections, pushing the average PT placement over 
time on legislative surveys from 1.51 in 1990 to 2.27 in 2001 on a 10 point 
scale scored from Left to Right (Powers, 2008 as cited in Hunter: 2010: 
77). In substantive terms, party leaders considered compromise on policies 
like privatization (Manzetti, 1999:39), and they allowed for the possibility 
of  forming alliances for elections, even with more conservative parties.26
24 There is a vast literature on participatory budgeting, noting its role in addressing patrimonial 
patterns of  policymaking to create a new political culture (Avritzer, 2002), deepening democ-
racy (Goldfrank, 2011), bringing radicals to power (Baiocchi, 2005), and institutionalizing elite 
and popular levels of  support (Wampler, 2009). 
25 A number of  these leaders either held local executive office or participated in Lula’s failed 
presidential bids, and in the process developed a particular understanding of  the strategies 
useful to navigate a fragmented party system to win elections and secure governability (Gómez 
Bruera, 2013: 47-48)
26 “Alliances forged by the PT in the municipal elections of  2000 reflect a move to include 
coalitional partners not on the Left while retaining former allies” (Hunter, 2010: 99). For the 
2000 municipal elections, the strategy demonstrated some success, as the party increased its 
number of  mayors to 27 of  the 100 largest cities and six state capitals, including Porto Alegre 
and Belém, regaining São Paulo, and earning new victories in Recife, Aracajú, and Goiânia 
governing cities with a total of  17.8 percent of  the population (Hunter, 2010: 100)
The Political Economy of  Tax: Patterns of  Incorporation 57
These efforts to moderate provoked surprisingly few defections during the 
period. The party held its disparate factions together, despite considerable 
grumbling, through a variety of  safety valves, including internal democracy 
among factions and efforts to accommodate as many factions as possible 
in government cabinets.27  Further, polarization around the neoliberal 
stabilization policy at the national level preserved the Workers’ Party leftist 
credentials, and participatory institutions at the local level created a space 
for civil society and popular allies to voice manageable dissent. When Lula 
finally won presidential power for the Workers’ Party in 2002, he would 
have to balance the necessities of  “coalitional presidentialism” and the 
desire to use the institutions of  government to expand the incorporation 
of  core social groups through the Workers’ Party.
PERIOD 3: NEODEVELOPMENTALIST CLEAVAGE 
The 2002 presidential election marked another shift in the party system as it 
allowed the eventual Lula government to institutionalize the incorporation 
of  core social actors. In part, institutionalization shifted incorporation to 
state institutions, where the interests of  political and economic elites were 
also accommodated through the practices of  coalitional presidentialism 
The fiscal room to pursue this dual strategy came from a period of  
global expansion, which the Workers’ Party did not miss, as it increased 
tax capacity in the context of  neo-developmentalist strategies to insert 
Brazilian economic actors in the global economy. These policies, and the 
institutional adaptations to deliver them, confirmed the Workers’ Party 
as the vehicle for the incorporation of  a cross-class coalition of  popular 
sectors and middle classes, but PT’s accommodation of  political and 
economic elites through coalitional presidentialism preserved elements of  
regressivity and particularism in tax.
In pursuit of  the 2002 presidency, the Workers’ Party had signaled that 
it would continue elements of  neoliberal stabilization.28 Still, the PT 
27  Until HeloinaHeloisa exited in 2004 to form the PSOL, the only major break within the PT 
had been the departure of  the PSTU in 1992 (Lacerda, 2002). 
28 Lula promised in a letter addressed to the Brazilian people (but directed to capital markets) 
that he would respect Brazilian commitments to the IMF, which he ultimately paid off  early, 
in 2005. He picked a businessman running-mate from the conservative Liberal Party (PL), and 
a slick campaign manager, DudaMendonça, orchestrated a campaign labeled “peace and love” 
in the press. On election, Lula appointed a minister of  finance from the most conservative 
wing of  the party, Antonio Palocci, and named a Central Bank president from the banking sec-
tor, Henrique Meirelles of  Bank of  Boston. The government maintained Cardoso’s inflation 
targeting regime, setting primary surplus targets even higher than required, at 4.25% of  GDP. 
To sustain this fiscal effort, among the first reforms the government pursued in 2003 was a 
cutback in benefits to public pensioners, a move that even the Cardoso government had been 
unable to impose (Bresser Pereira, 2010). 
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in government did not miss the growth occurring in the rest of  the 
international economy, benefiting in particular from high prices for 
commodities.29 These were sustained by demand in emerging markets, as 
China came to absorb 40% of  Brazilian soy exports, a third of  iron exports, 
and 10% of  meat, pulp, oil, and paper. By 2011, commodities exports were 
$162.2 billion versus $60.3 billion in manufactures (WDI, 2012).30 Finance, 
which had already benefited from high interest rates associated with the 
stabilization strategy begun under Cardoso, also continued to enjoy high 
returns and boosted the services sector.31
These sectors set patterns of  accumulation mostly enjoyed by economic 
elites, ameliorating their potential opposition, even as the government 
enacted policies and institutions to reach its core supporters. Increased 
fiscal space allowed a more aggressive macroeconomic stance beginning in 
2006, including expanded public sector employment and public investment, 
especially when the 2008 crisis gave the government room to embark on 
aggressive counter-cyclical investment. The Growth Acceleration Program 
averaged R$35 million from 2009 to 2012, 19.4% of  GDP, and aimed for 
a 2014 total of  R$955 billion (Ministry of  Finance, 2012: 26-28). 
Public sector expansion included increased salaries and pensions for 
middle sector professionals, who were further privileged by an expansion 
in consumer and housing credit, stimulated by public banking institutions 
(Barbosa, 2010). The middle class is labeled class C in Brazil, above the 
poor (A, B) and below the very rich (D), and has increased to 55% of  
the population, 105.5 million people. Lower-middle class families received 
subsidized credit to purchase homes that aimed to distribute R$200 billion 
by the end of  2014. 
29 In the context of  a strong currency and high interest rates, foreign multinationals have 
located operations in Brazil, though they do so primarily to target the increased purchas-
ing power of  Brazilian consumers. During the 1990s, the hope was that such external 
investment would upgrade Brazilian production and management, but in the presence of  
a strong currency prejudiced against exports, the entrance of  multinationals has largely 
replaced Brazilian production and ownership with foreign multinational production and 
ownership. 
30 From 1996 to 2008, the import content coefficient increased by 8.1 percentage points, and 
the increase was even higher in the most technologically advanced industries, such as com-
munications and electronics equipment (32.7 percent) and medical and hospital equipment, 
industrial automation and precision (35.1%) (Carneiro 2010). Industrial imports outpaced ex-
ports by US$92.1 billion in 2011 (Ministry of  Finance, 2012).
31 This has been especially pronounced since 2008, when industry shrank 12.3 percent and 
recovered to only 2.4 percent above previous levels while the service sector lost only 2.6 
percent of  its pre-recession peak, and is now 8.5 percent above pre-recession levels by 2011 
(Ray, 2011).
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Even more significant were the efforts to expand the incomes and 
consumption of  popular sectors. Successive increases in the monthly 
minimum wage, from R$350 in 2002 to R$560 in 2012 have improved 
conditions across the board, as many low-income jobs and pensions are 
indexed to minimum wages. Further extending the impact is the extension 
of  pensions to informal sector workers, providing 28 million Brazilians 
with old-age protection. In the rural sector, small farmer credits and 
agricultural extension reached almost 2 million small producers. 
The flagship social policy, an income transfer program called Bolsa 
Familia, has absorbed and expanded various social programs to extend 
income support, education, and health to low income families. Bolsa 
Familia currently reaches more than 40 million Brazilians, and has been 
credited with cutting poverty, improving health outcomes, and improving 
educational attainment (Castiñera, Nunes, and Rungo 2009; Hall 2006).32 
The percentage of  the population in poverty fell from 26.7 percent in 
2002 to 10.9 percent in 2012; the incomes of  the poorest three deciles 
have annual average rates of  growth of  7.2, 6.3, and 5.9 percent, as 
compared to 1.4, 2.5, and 3.3 percent for the highest deciles. This has 
produced a fall in gini coefficients from .596 in 2001 to .519 by 2012 
(Ministry of  Finance, 2012).
All of  these policies targeted working class and poor beneficiaries, and they 
institutionalized PT electoral support around a class-coalition that appeared 
in both individual levels of  support and regional patterns of  voting. During 
the 1990s, Cardoso’s mix of  inflation-beating, social spending expansion, 
and alliances with clientlist rural politicians had earned enough support from 
lower classes to muddy class-based voting patterns, and the PT continued 
to draw support from educated and middle class voters as a result of  its 
successful local governments in a number of  urban centers. Between 2002 
and 2006, however, a class cleavage consolidated in voting patterns, as the 
PT polled better among poorer voters and in poorer regions (Roman, 2012). 
The chart below shows vote intention for the PT in the last poll before 
the elections in 2002, 2006, and 2010, with voters categorized by income, 
education, and region, in which the Northeast is the poorest region of  
Brazil, and the South and the Southeast are more developed. Bolsa Familia 
and other state programs had institutionalized the association between the 
Workers’ Party, growth, and redistributive programs associated with neo-
developmentalism (Hunter 2007; Bohn 2011).33
32 BolsaFamilia distributes an impressive R$20 billion per year to 13.4 million households, but 
it should be noted that it costs only .4% of  GDP. 
33 PSDB candidate Serra attempted in 2010 to claim credit for his party initiating income trans-
fer programs, but poor voters stayed with the PT candidate Dilma.
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Table 5: PT Vote Percent by Income, Education, and Region
19981 2002	
(1st	round)
2002	
(2nd	round)
2006	
(1st	round)
2006	
(2nd	round)
2010	
(1st	round)
2010	
(2nd	round)
Income
<2	MS 46 61 53 56
<5	MS 25 45 59
2-5	MS 41 53 43 49
5-10	MS 23 48 63 29 44 37 45
>10	MS 25 50 60 27 41 31 39
Education
Primary 24 42 56 46 69 52 57
Secondary 25 47 63 38 53 45 48
Tertiary 31 52 58 27 43 31 40
Region
South 18.4 37 55 26 42 40 42
Southeast 44.5 37 58 35 50 41 48
North/
Central	West
10.6 36 60 39 55 44 50
Northeast 26.5 36 55 58 71 61 63
Source: Datafolha public opinion surveys of  various years from the last date 
before the elections. (http://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/, checked 8/15/13). 1998 
and 2002 second round data from IBOPE public opinion survey (http://www.
ibope.com.br/ checked 8/15/13).
An additional set of  state innovations institutionalized channels of  
communication and incorporation for social movements. With the arrival 
of  the Workers’ Party at the national level, public policy participatory 
councils experienced a significant expansion in funding and importance. 
Operating in 31 different policy areas, they include 1350 members, with 
slightly more civil society (55 percent) than government (45 percent) 
representation, and undertake both deliberative and advisory tasks (Lopez, 
Leão, and Grangeia, 2011; Lopez and Pires, 2010). As of  2005, there were 
over 300 thousand registered civic society organizations, and by 2009, they 
were receiving over $R14 billion in government transfers. Public policy 
participatory councils at higher levels of  regional and national government 
tend to be dominated by middle-sector professionals operating through 
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social movements, this is especially the case in policy-specific councils 
where they bear some expertise, such as health professionals and health 
NGOs operating in health councils (Houtzager and Lavalle, 2010).34
Even as the Workers’ Party adapted state institutions and policies to 
incorporate its core supporters, it managed its relationship to political elites 
by making use of  the coalitional presidentialism practices demonstrated 
under Cardoso. This included the construction of  a supermajority coalition 
in Congress, held together in part by sharing seats in the cabinet with 
coalition partners, as well as privileges and power reserved for regional 
political elites and their economic elite allies, often from natural resource 
and commodity exporting states.35
Coalitional presidentialism as practiced by the Workers’ Party operated 
through Congress and the federal system. Like the PSDB under Cardoso, 
the Workers’ Party failed to secure legislative majorities for its party in 
elections, taking 91 of  513 seats in 2002, 83 in 2006, and 88 in 2010. To 
govern, the PT at first resisted coalitional presidentialism in Congress, 
building only a minority coalition of  218 seats. Legislative paralysis and the 
crisis of  a scandal related to purchasing legislative votes, the “mensalão,” 
forced the party to revise its strategy, and it built coalitions that stretched 
across the ideological spectrum.36
The chart below displays the characteristics of  the PT coalition in Congress 
immediately after Lula’s election, after the mensalão, at the start of  Lula’s 
second term, and to start Dilma’s term. The far right column shows that 
34 For popular sectors, many of  these institutions were structured such that preferen-
tial access and redistribution were built into institutional design and practice. Participa-
tory budgeting, for example, included allocation mechanisms that targeted working class 
neighborhoods in the redistribution of  resources, “inverting priorities” that had long 
been dominated by elites (Avritzer,  Marquetti, and Navarro, 2003). Further, levels of  
participation among the poor tended to be higher than among the wealthy, both be-
cause of  institutional incentives and the efforts of  intermediary organizations such as 
unions and neighborhood associations (Goldfrank, 2011). Participatory institutions also 
responded to the demands of  social movements, occasionally providing privileged access 
to social movement representatives, such as councils with specific sectoral orientations. 
For example, in São Paulo, education councils included reserved seats for civil society 
organizations active in education policy, and similar arrangements operated in health and 
housing (Cornwall, 2008). 
35 “The PT in the national executive – Lula and his inner circle, in particular – adopted an elite-
centered strategy similar to other Brazilian parties” (Bruera, Gómez 2013: 86), “the end of  an 
anomaly” (Hunter, 2007).
36 The mensalão, or “big monthly payment,” scandal was so named for the monthly payments 
to deputies in exchange for votes, perhaps made necessary by the unwillingness to distribute 
cabinet posts to coalition partners.
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the coalition percent of  Congress was a minority at first, until the PT 
committed itself  under Lula’s leadership to the coalitional presidency 
strategy after the mensalão. Also, below the number of  seats and the 
percent of  the coalition, the chart shows the percentage of  cabinet seats 
allocated to each coalition member. The PT (different from Cardoso), 
reserved the bulk of  cabinet seats for itself, distributing fewer seats to 
partners (Goldfrank and Wampler, 2008). 
Table 6: Workers Party Governing Coalition
Lula I PT PL PCdoB PSB PTB PDT PPS PV
Coalition % 
of  Cong
Seats 91 26 12 22 26 21 15 5
42
% Coalition 42 12 6 10 12 10 7 2
% Cabinet 48 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Lula Post-Mensalão PT PL PCdoB PSB PTB PP PMDB
Seats 83 38 10 29 44 54 80
66
% Coalition 25 11 3 9 13 16 24
% Cabinet 44 4 4 9 4 4 13
Lula II PT PR PCdoB PSB PTB PDT PP PV PMDB
Seats 83 34 13 28 21 23 41 13 90
65
% Coalition 24 10 4 8 6 7 12 4 26
% Cabinet 44 4 4 9 4 0 4 4 13
Dilma PT PR PCdoB PSB PSC PDT PRB PTC PMDB  
Seats 87 40 15 34 17 26 8 1 78
59% Coalition 28 13 5 11 6 8 3 0 25
Source: From Figueiredo (2011: 190); Hunter (2010: 207) and        
http://www2.camara.leg.br/ (checked 8/15/13).
The most important change was signaled by the inclusion of  the PMDB, 
always among the top-three in seats in the legislature and an anchor of  
coalitional presidential strategies since the 1980s (Abranches, 1988). From 
its origins as a partisan umbrella for a wide range of  opponents against 
the military regime, the PMDB evolved into a catch-all vehicle. This gave a 
central role to “PMDBism” in terms of  two characteristics of  the Brazilian 
party system (Nobre, 2010). 37 The first characteristic, offering free entry 
to all interests, obscures the substantive content of  partisan polarization, 
provides a bridge across ideological cleavages, and facilitates the functioning 
of  legislative majorities. The second characteristic, veto power, limits what 
37  The PMDB “attempts, in the end, to absorb and administer all the interests and ideas of  
society. In second place, it offers to whoever enters that, in the event they can organize as a 
pressure group, they will earn the right to veto any deliberation or decision that offends their 
interests” (Nobre, 2010: 4).
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legislative majorities can do by playing into the hands of  regional economic 
elites.38 Access to government through the PMDB allows economic elites 
rooted in commodity-producing regions to retain a veto over redistributive 
efforts or changes to the extractive development model.39 Most importantly 
for the current analysis, it allows them to preserve the privileges for particular 
regional and elite interests in the tax system that produce regressivity and a 
lack of  universality.
CONCLUSION
In Brazil, key social groups clamored for access to politics and brought 
down the military regime. In the process, they legitimated themselves 
as social and political actors, and positioned themselves for the struggle 
around neoliberalism during the 1990s. In this struggle, they consolidated 
linkages to partisan actors, led by the Workers’ Party, and experimented 
with patterns of  access into the political system. When the Workers’ Party 
came to power in the 2000s, the social base transformed and consolidated 
during previous periods were institutionalized in a hegemonic bloc led by 
the Workers’ Party. This bloc implemented policies to target key social allies, 
and established mechanisms of  access and participation that transformed 
state institutions. The trajectory of  transformation, consolidation, and 
institutionalized incorporation of  key popular sector and middle class 
actors provided support for an ambitious effort to raise tax capacity. 
The increase in tax capacity was impressive, giving the Brazilian government 
sufficient revenues to address fiscal insolvency and finance necessary to 
implement social programs. However, the effort to increase tax capacity 
has not addressed ongoing problems of  inequity, which are apparent in 
the regressive character of  tax burdens that weigh more heavily on the 
poor and in a complicated pattern of  different tax rates that operate across 
38 Previously, such elites maintained their access to power through control of  state govern-
ments, especially in resource rich and commodity producing but poorer regions (Abrucio, 
1998). Cardoso’s stabilization strategy removed most of  the fiscal tools from state govern-
ments, and they no longer have the same influence on cabinet appointments or the general 
legislative process (Figueiredo, 2007).
39  “The mark of  the new rise in PMDBism was represented in 2009 by the renewal of  José 
Sarney as president of  the Senate despite a slew of  corruption accusations. Lula’s decisive 
support to Sarney’s permanence sealed the alliance of  the PMDB for the 2010 presidential 
elections, and, at the same time, marked the return of  PMDBism to the struggle for hegemony 
within Brazilian political grammar” (Nobre, 2010: 6). In 2011, a long-debated new forestry law 
passed, decentralizing control over forest management and reducing federal protections for 
indigenous and environmentally sensitive lands, reflecting especially the concerns of  regional 
economic elites and their political allies cohered in a “ruralist” caucus (Ferraz da Fonseca and 
Ana Paula Moreira da Silva, 2011).  
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jurisdictions. While incorporation of  a popular sector and middle class 
coalition can explain the increase in capacity, the stubbornness of  inequity 
is due to institutions and practices that protect the interests of  political and 
economic elites. 
The key institutions and practices are the nature of  executive-legislative 
relations and federalism. A fragmented party system forces presidents to 
operate as though they were in a parliamentary system, cobbling together 
governing coalitions that often include conservative parties and regional 
elites. Regional elites further protect their interests in the federal system 
by capturing key sites of  decision-making such as the upper house of  the 
legislature, the Senate, as well as areas of  regulation important to their 
regressive and environmentally damaging accumulation strategies of  
natural resource extraction and large-scale commodity exports.
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DEALING WITH THE POST 2015 
DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGES.
Naresh Singh*
There is growing consensus that the 2015 Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG’s) with all their limitations have been very useful 
in mobilizing attention, resources and action to addressing 
development concerns around poverty, gender, health, education 
and environment.  While significant progress has been made, 
there is also consensus that MDG’s will remain important in the 
post 2015 era. However, the loudest calls from “a million voices” 
speak to an agenda centered on the injustice people feel because 
of  growing inequalities and insecurities that exist particularly for 
poorer and marginalized people. The challenges are complex and 
interlinked, requiring a sustainable development agenda that is 
integrated, holistic and universal, applying to all countries and all 
people. The call is for a new agenda built on human rights, and 
universal values of  equality, justice and security. Better governance 
underpins many of  their calls. These calls are not new and have 
either not been addressed, or have been addressed and failed. 
Transformation will require nothing less than a rethinking of  the 
dominant narratives of  our current civilizations.
INTRODUCTION
During this second decade of  the 21st  century we have observed or will 
observe the 20th anniversaries of  the United Nations world summits on 
various dimensions of  development including Education (Jomtein,1990), 
Human Rights (Vienna,1991), Sustainable Development (Rio, 1992) 
Women (Beijing,1993), Population (Cairo, 1994), Social Development 
(Copenhagen, 1995), Human Settlements (Cities) (Istanbul, 1996), Food 
(Rome, 1999); and also the Millennium  Summit with its millennium 
development goals, (New York, 2000). The targets of  the millennium 
declaration are to be achieved halfway through the decade, in 2015. World 
leaders will then gather at the United Nations and elsewhere to reflect on 
the progress the world has made and it will be viewed mainly through the 
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lens of  sustainable development or through one of  its dimensions. They 
are likely to conclude that the results have been mixed. Although some 
progress has been made, it is not enough. They are likely to articulate a 
new vision based at least partly on the outcome of  the Rio +20 Conference 
(Brazil 2012) entitled the Future We Want and partly on the “million voices” 
process entitled the World we Want. They would seek new commitments, 
resources and strategies to accelerate progress and are likely to adopt 
existing strategies slightly modified at best, to achieve a new set of  bold 
targets which they will call for in a loud and unified voice. They will not 
notice, or may pretend not to notice the huge gap between the weakness 
of  their strategies and the ambition of  their targets. They will also commit 
to be more accountable and to deliver on their promises, but the targets 
will not be reached in the time frames they set unless the analysis of  past 
performances are rigorous and hard hitting - and above all, a new world 
view and radically different strategies flowing from it are pursued. This 
will demand political, business and spiritual leadership at a whole new 
level as the lynchpin of  failure or success. This paper, prepared on the eve 
of  the post 2015 era seeks to frame the debate in context of  capitalism 
and democracy as the dominant drivers of  world progress and failure. It 
suggests a new public policy agenda on what can be done differently to put 
the world on an equitable, just, secure and sustainable development path.
REVIEWING THE PAST TO INFORM THE FUTURE
Just after the end of  the Second World War, the ideas of  development and 
underdevelopment were significantly influenced by the Americans who 
had a dominant world position. In order to consolidate that hegemony and 
make it permanent, they conceived a political campaign under the guise 
of  a global development agenda. In the words of  President Truman at his 
inauguration in 1949 : “ We must embark on a bold new program for making the 
benefits of  scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of  underdeveloped areas...The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign profit 
- has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program of  development based on 
the concepts of  democratic fair dealing.”  Reflecting on this statement, Gustavo 
Esteva commented: “On that day (20th January, 1949), 2 billion people became 
underdeveloped. In a real sense, from that time on, they ceased being what they were in 
all their diversity, and were transmogrified into an inverted mirror of  others’ reality: 
a mirror that belittles them and sends them off  to the end of  the queue, a mirror that 
defines their identity, which is really that of  a heterogeneous and diverse majority, simply 
in terms of  a homogenizing and narrow minority.” Esteva further notes that since 
then development has connoted an escape from an undignified condition 
called underdevelopment and concludes that for someone to conceive the 
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possibility of  escaping from a particular condition it is necessary first to 
feel that one has fallen into that condition. The real tragedy of  the pursuit 
of  development since then has been the acceptance of  that view by the 
leading economists of  the developing countries and hence, development 
as the search for the way of  life of  the West begun!
It is enlightening then to take a quick look at the journey that followed so 
that we are well positioned to avoid repeating what we have done before 
and now expect different results. In the first decade of  international 
development after the Second World War, development was conceived 
purely as economic growth in average GNP per capita. Issues of  
distribution, inclusion, equity, and job creation were not considered. 
Unsurprisingly, social problems remained and in many cases increased and 
as a result the next decade focused on social development. But that only led 
to the realization that development required both economic growth and 
social development - one was not possible without the other. Thus, socio-
economic development as a more integrated approach was adopted. When 
this approach did not seem to work as well as expected, a shift from a 
focus on the development of  things to a development of  people occurred, 
and the human development paradigm was born. A decade later it was 
observed that the human development approach was not delivering as well 
as imagined, leading to the development community deciding that it would 
focus only on the basic needs and dimensions of  human development. 
That approach too did not produce the desired outcomes as was hoped 
for, but influenced a shift on how development took place. It ushered in 
participatory and endogenous approaches to counter the top-down and 
outside driven approaches. In parallel was the rise of  another approach 
to development influenced by concerns over environmental pollution 
issues. Attention turned to the sustainable development paradigm which 
sought to achieve development objectives without damaging the natural 
environment.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
The concept of  sustainable development (SD) was introduced in the 
policy making literature at the global level in 1980 as part of  the global 
conservation strategy of  the International Union for the Conservation 
of  Nature (IUCN). It is of  course considered to have been brought 
into the mainstream international policy and political debate by the 
Brundtland Commission which started its work as the World Commission 
on Environment and Development in 1982. The IUCN launched its 
landmark report, “Our Common Future”, in 1987, which provided the 
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most commonly used definition of  SD as one which meets the needs of  
current generations without compromising the ability of  future generations 
to meet theirs. It was perhaps the most brilliant political consensus ever 
achieved in the UN, between northern pre-occupations with increasing 
environmental concerns and southern concerns with increasing poverty. 
It was not that ecological degradation was not present in the countries of  
the south; but their overriding preoccupation was with addressing poverty. 
Since the achievement of  this consensus, the world has been constantly 
reminded that a political consensus is not necessarily a formula that lends 
itself  to easy public policy making either in content or in process. In terms 
of  process, SD has been subjected to more public consultations than any 
other development concept, from international and global forums through 
regional, national, sub-regional, to village and community levels. It has 
acquired the highest levels of  “ownership” becoming a household word, 
more so, than any other, to all people from all corners of  the planet in just 
about 2 decades.
In this regard, the consensus on SD must be considered to have been the 
subject of  the most successful policy consultations ever, leading to the 
widespread ownership. In order to achieve this, however, the phrase had to 
be appropriated by each vested interest group to articulate their concerns. 
And so it became common place to apply the adjective “sustainable” to 
any noun in any context, without any regard to possible policy content and 
contradictions between policies. The substantive policy content in SD was 
earlier defined in terms of  policy outcomes as economic efficacy, social 
equity, and ecological integrity achieved in an integrated and balanced 
manner. Political and cultural dimensions were soon added to this 3 pillar 
definition to give a more comprehensive, but not necessarily a more useful 
policy definition. But making public policy with these goals has remained 
as elusive as ever.
SOME PROGRESS BUT NOT ENOUGH
The question then, to what extent has the world succeeded in moving 
towards SD, during the last 2 decades is, notoriously difficult to answer. 
One set of  reasons for this difficulty is the challenge of  measuring 
progress towards SD. Fortunately, we have made considerable progress in 
this regard from the “how to” process issues which have been articulated 
in terms of  systems thinking and post normal sciences, to indicators and 
indicator sets which are now in widespread use at different unit levels of  
analysis from cities to countries and landscapes. We also now have a range 
of  global assessments such as the Millennium Ecosystems Assessment, 
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the Millennium Development Goals, the State of  the World, and several 
others. Overall these reports present a mixed picture of  progress with 
deteriorations in freshwater, agriculture, fisheries systems and little progress 
in making industrial, transportation and energy systems more ecologically 
sound. While poverty has been reduced, the most significant reductions 
have taken place in China at high ecological costs.
Even where we have been fortunate to have local level improvements; 
the overall planetary systems, especially the climate, atmosphere, oceans 
and forests linked systems are severely challenged. Every time we have a 
global economic downturn, action on SD becomes even more difficult. 
Global political leadership from the US is not likely in the near future, as 
the most promising leaders once in power (Al Gore as Vice President) and 
now Obama as the President fail to deliver in spite of  their best intentions 
because of  partisan political interest leading to gridlock in congress. The 
European Union would then seem to have this responsibility for global 
leadership on SD squarely on its shoulders, but we will have to wait and 
see how far it will be able to deliver especially as it now finds itself  in dire 
financial straits. The United Nations in the meantime has been playing 
the role it does well, that of  churning out international conferences and 
declarations with global political commitments to work towards SD.
PUBLIC POLICY CHALLENGES OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT
Why is progress on SD so intransigent? A summary of  the challenges or 
barriers to change would include lack of  a collective sense of  Agreement 
on what is to be sustained, shared Knowledge of  how to solve these 
problems, broad access to the required Technologies, the Economic ability 
to pay for the changes, the other Social priorities and cultural norms 
that need attention and finally the Political will to take action (Trudgill 
1990). In the face of  these formidable barriers, we naturally turn to our 
democratically elected governments to show leadership and take action for 
change. Overcoming these barriers however need long term commitment 
and investments, which short term five year elected governments who 
will be seeking re-election and must have results to show at the end of  
their term, will not be motivated to undertake. Fortunately, this expected 
myopic behavior has been overcome in many ways, and governments have 
established National Environmental Protection Agencies(EPA), Wildlife 
Agencies signed on to international treaties of  various kinds, established 
social safety nets and welfare programs, and when the economy is doing well 
have periodically shown the kind of  enlightened public policy leadership 
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necessary for SD. As such, a slew of  “command and control” policies 
in which pollution control or other environmental standards have been 
established, and are monitored and enforced to various levels of  efficiency.
Similarly, a wide range of  market based instruments such as tradable 
emission permits, or the more recent carbon trading mechanisms and 
markets have been established. On the other hand win-win policies that are 
both good for poverty reduction and for environmental conservation have 
been established. (UNDP, World Bank, UNEP, EU). On the side of  the 
Private Sector, many corporations have come to see the green economy as 
a new business opportunity and seeking to exploit various niches in their 
areas of  business, many are reporting on triple bottom lines going beyond 
profitability to include social and environmental accountability. The biggest 
success in SD policy making has come from heightened awareness of  people 
from across the globe and the sharp rise of  civil society activism holding 
both governments and private sectors accountable for their actions or their 
lacking in guiding the planet to a more sustainable future. So, there has been 
intense activity over the last 2 to 3 decades in the making public of  public 
policy for SD. And yet it seems to many who have been involved from 
the beginning that nothing much has changed. In the BBC world debates 
(Sunday, February 28, 2010), Nobel laureate Wangari Matthai was a member 
of  the panel when the moderator did a flashback to a speech she had given 
on BBC in 1982. She commented that the same speech is as relevant today.
The real challenge to democracies dealing with SD public policy dilemmas 
is not their short term elected office, as much as is it is the interface between 
democratic decision making and the capitalist mode of  production and 
distribution of  goods and services and the question of  which of  these is 
dominant. In all countries of  the world today the idea of  progress is still 
measured principally by the economic growth rates which are of  course 
driven mainly by increased consumption. Indeed, quality of  life and level 
of  consumption are considered by many to be synonymous. In the rich 
countries of  the world, their capacity and desire to produce and consume 
more and more have gone completely out of  control and entered a phase 
which Robert Reich calls “Super-capitalism” in his recent book by the 
same name. Gandhi had said that world had enough for everyone’s need 
but not enough for a single man’s greed. What we have today is a collective 
greed that knows no bounds. 
On the other hand, the capacity of  these countries to make collective 
decisions and public policy to achieve the things people say they value 
such as clean air and water, good education for their children, health 
care for all, more family time and less hours of  work, peace and stability 
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and reduced poverty and inequality, is way behind. In other words, while 
capitalism is excelling at its role in the blind production of  wealth which 
is increasingly concentrating in the hands of  the few, democracy is failing 
badly to keep pace. Collective decision making and public accountability 
is failing badly, both within countries (be it in North America, Western 
Europe, China, India or Sub-Saharan Africa), and among countries in 
international forums, where individual country opportunities for trade 
benefits and wealth creation drives all else. This is the harsh reality of  the 
world we live in where the trend is more of  super-capitalism and less of  
collective decision making and public accountability in the other interests 
of  society (at least in relative terms).
The relationship between democracy and development remains tenuous 
by most recent accounts, but cannot conclude that democracy is either 
helpful or necessary to development, whether defined as economic 
growth or more broadly, (Przeworski et al, 2000, Rueschemeyer  et al 
1992, Ringen, 2007). Many are prepared to say however that democracies 
have a much better chance than autocracies or dictatorships at promoting 
development. In terms of  economic growth it seems that democracies 
are stable above a per capita income of  about US $6000; (Przeworski et 
al, 2000). Can we arrive at a societal consensus that per capita incomes 
above a certain threshold, for example US $20,000 is economically 
unnecessary and maybe ecologically harmful? It is of  course important to 
note that there are different types of  democracies, including open access 
competitive democracies and closed access societies in which there is a 
rent seeking relationship between economic and political elites (North 
et al. 2009; Sorensen, 2008; Ringen , 2007) as there are different types 
of  capitalism including good and bad capitalism (Baumol et al 2007). 
In any event it seems abundantly clear that democratic governance, as 
we know it today, is by itself  neither going to help us significantly to 
generate or maintain economic growth, nor will it have a significant 
impact on moving us to a path towards SD. Indeed, many scholars 
see an incompatibility between democracy and economic growth for 
both economic and political reasons (Sorensen, 2008). On the other 
hand, it is hard to see how we will get there without some form of  
democratic governance. To resolve this conundrum, we will have to go 
below the veneer of  apparent homogenous democratic societies, down 
to a class analysis of  the rich, middle and poor segments of  society, 
and their interests and roles in possible social transformation. A lot has 
been written in the poverty and sustainable livelihoods literature on the 
importance of  poverty reduction to sustainable development. Similarly, 
there is ample literature on the importance of  a prosperous middle class 
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to poverty reduction and indeed to viable democracies (Ringen, 2007). 
Most recently the role of  the super-rich in social transformation has 
been described in ways that could be of  significant value in the pursuit 
of  SD (Nader, 2009; Rothkopf  2008).
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS
And so here we are, after six decades of  development experience - the 
last two of  which have been in wrestling with sustainable development. 
Now, we are taking stock of  the extent of  achievement of  the millennium 
development goals (MDG’s) to which world political leaders committed 
their countries in 2000. The eight MDG’s were to eradicate extreme 
hunger and poverty, achieve universal primary education, promote gender 
equality, reduce child mortality, improve maternal health, combat HIV/
AIDS, malaria and TB, ensure environmental sustainability and develop 
a global partnership. Considerable success has been achieved, although 
much remains to be done. Notable progress has been made in poverty, 
health, (water, malaria), and primary education. Much more has to be done 
in the areas of  environment, maternal deaths and HIV. To illustrate, the 
proportion of  people living in extreme poverty has been halved at the 
global level. The world reached the poverty reduction target five years 
ahead of  schedule.
Over 2 billion people gained access to improved sources of  drinking 
water. This means that the MDG of  attaining the drinking water target 
was met five years ahead of  the target date, despite significant population 
growth. Remarkable gains have been made in the fight against malaria 
and tuberculosis. Mortality rates from malaria fell by more than 25 
per cent globally between 2000 and 2010. An estimated 1.1 million 
deaths from malaria were averted over this period. Death rates from 
tuberculosis at the global level and in several regions are likely to be 
halved by 2015, compared to 1990 levels (MDG Report 2013). There 
can be reasons for optimism when one takes into account the recent star 
performers in multidimensional poverty that include Bangladesh, Nepal 
and Rwanda. However, we need to be cautious as even in countries with 
strong economic growth in recent years, the MPI analysis reveals the 
persistence of  poverty. India is a major case in particular. There are more 
MPI poor people in eight Indian states alone (421 million altogether 
in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, 
Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) than in the 26 poorest African countries 
combined (410 million) (OPHI 2010).
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POST 2015 AGENDA
While governments will meet in 2015 to determine the final shape of  the 
post 2015 agenda, a major input will be the report entitled the World We 
Want which documents the outcome of  global consultations with more 
than a million people. According to UN Secretary-General Ban ki Moon 
“The consultations have revealed the continuing indignity of  poverty, inequality, injustice 
and insecurity.”
Equality and non-discrimination also stood out as a key message: people 
are demanding justice, participation and dignity. Inequalities and social 
exclusion exist particularly for poorer people, women and girls, those in 
rural areas and urban slums, people living with disabilities, indigenous 
people, migrants and displaced people, and others who are marginalized for 
reasons related to religion, ethnicity or sexual orientation. The insecurities 
they face compound each other: for instance, the lack of  a decent job can 
leave people without access to health services and living in conditions that 
are unsafe.
In addition, people have said emphatically that the challenges – and indeed 
opportunities – they face are complex and interlinked. These point to 
the need to go beyond a silo approach and arrive at a future sustainable 
development agenda that is more integrated and holistic. The shift here, 
as described in detail in the next section in not so much in the ‘what’ as 
it is in the ‘how’, except for the new dimension of  a secular spirituality to 
underpin the traditional dimensions. People demand that this new agenda 
be built on human rights, and universal values of  equality, justice and 
security.
Better governance, of  markets and of  the environment, underpins many 
of  their calls. There is also a strong call to retain the focus on concrete, 
measurable goals, and yet improve dramatically the way we measure 
progress against them. Finally they hope that a data revolution will support 
an accountability revolution.
The cry for this kind of  world has been around forever.  It must now seem 
as though we will never get there but we can get closer for sure. So why 
has progress been so slow and what can we do to accelerate it? Our quick 
response to this question is usually, “Let’s see what is working and do more 
of  it.” For instance, if  we look for a country that is doing well at reducing 
inequality and exclusion, we find Brazil is currently being celebrated.  We 
find that what was working there includes: 1) Macro-economic stability, 
contractionary monetary policy and institutional reform; 2) A degree of  
luck in that Brazil benefited from global shifts of  commodity prices, and 
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also increased flows of  credit and FDI at just the right time, allowing for 
growth to blossom; 3) Growth was then combined with social policies 
and well-targeted programs including public education, social security, conditional 
cash transfers and a minimum wage law. This resulted in significant reduction 
in poverty and inequality. The Gini coefficient dropped 9% between 2001 
and 2009!). To continue this success Brazil has an ambitious 2011 National 
Plan to lift 16.2 million people out of  poverty.
One might conclude that what is at work here is a combination of  a 
developmental state, sound macroeconomic fundamentals, accessing 
global markets, assertive social policies and some luck! But how do we 
replicate that in India, South Africa, Pakistan or China? The challenges and 
limitations quickly become obvious. And so while we should continue our 
lesson learning we have to be conscious of  their very limited replicability. 
Going forward, a renewed public policy agenda will have to incorporate 
some radical departures from business as usual.
TOWARDS A NEW POST 2015 POLICY AGENDA
 The post 2015 agenda will have to come to grips with the challenges and 
dreams articulated in both reports: The Future We Want and The World We 
Want.
  How then can we make public policy for SD in today’s world and indeed 
that of  the foreseeable future? How can the democratic initiative seize the 
upper hand so as to put capitalism at the service of  society as a whole and 
support sustainable development without losing its unmatched efficiency 
at producing wealth in the form of  goods and services which people value? 
What kind of  transformation will be required for a world that is more 
sustainable, just, equitable and secure?  The following are some points of  
departure to consider:
a) We need to reiterate what is at stake and what we want to sustain. At stake 
are the very planetary conditions which allow the human species to be 
dominant among biological species alive today and to have the potential 
to live in unmatched freedom, peace and stability for generations to 
come. What are to be sustained are diverse and resilient options of  
livelihoods for all. The SD enterprise is not about people having the 
luxury to love and protect their environment or giving charity to the 
poor, it is about a common human endeavor to protect the essence of  
human survival as we know it and to assure its future evolution. It is 
about what we do today to identify, nurture and sustain the options for 
lasting global peace, prosperity and creativity.
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b) The need for a paradigm shift from the Newtonian clockwork universe 
in which we would, by reductionist science, be able to explain all 
phenomena around us and be able to determine and achieve desirable 
future states of  the world by the application of  resources, knowledge 
and technology; to one which is co-evolving and self-organizing in 
inherently unpredictable ways, has long been articulated. The evidence 
and urgency for this shift has increased significantly over the last two 
decades and needs to be consolidated and widely communicated so that 
the shift can be accelerated. This paradigm shift is really a worldview 
shift in which, the way people make meaning of  the world around them, 
the values they cherish, their vision of  the sacred, right through to the 
what and how we teach in schools and universities, what is rewarded 
in the workplace, what constitutes a successful individual, what are the 
most desirable social virtues, how we make public policy and what we 
demand of  our elected governments will shift dramatically. Kauffman, a 
world class evolutionary biologist and one of  the fathers of  complexity 
theory (2008) provides a comprehensive analysis of  the evidence 
defining the limitations of  the reductionist physicist’s view of  world 
and the evidence in support of  a biosphere that is a co-constructing 
emergent whole that evolves persistently. The evolution of  the universe, 
biosphere, the human economy, human culture and human agency and 
action is profoundly creative and cannot be reduced to or explained by 
the motion of  elementary particles. 
c) Kauffman (2008) offers a profound new world view of  a secular sacred 
that we can all share regardless of  religious persuasion: “Agnostic and 
atheist ‘secular humanists’ have been quietly taught that spirituality is foolish or 
at best questionable.” (ibid p 8)... “ If  we are members of  a universe in which 
emergence and ceaseless creativity abound, if  we take creativity as a sense of  God we 
can share, the resulting sense of  the sacredness of  all of  life and the planet can help 
reorient our lives beyond the consumerism and commoditization the industrialized 
world now lives, heal the split between reason and faith, heal the split between science 
and the humanities, heal the want of  spirituality, heal the wound derived from the 
false reductionist belief  that we live in a world of  fact without values and help us 
jointly to build a global ethic. These are at stake in finding a new scientific worldview 
that enables us to reinvent the sacred.”p9.
d) Some of  the consequences of  this new worldview are now being 
teased out by current research leading to insights with important policy 
implications and practical applications. This includes the recent work 
at Harvard’s Center for International Development led by Ricardo 
Hausmann (2008) on some new dimensions to economic growth theory 
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in which they reveal how the density of  product and capability spaces 
in a country explain economic performance in a manner different from 
the general equilibria models in common use and builds on Kauffman’s 
(2008) theories of  webs of  economic growth. The importance of  
this work is that it sets the stage for a better understanding of  the 
relationships between economic and ecological systems in way that 
will be useful to policy makers. Work in behavioral economics, which 
has now become mainstream, in areas such as choice architecture, in 
which the way people make choices can be socially engineered (Sunstein 
and Thaler, 2008); and in the measurement of  happiness as distinct 
from per capita incomes (Frey, 2008) are opening vistas of  tremendous 
promise especially the possibility of  conceptually delinking quality 
of  life from consumption. Other recent work by Geoffrey West and 
his colleagues at Santa Fe Institute point to a number of  similarities 
between all living complex systems where simple power laws explain 
complex connections. They are now extending this work to explain 
how cities grow and behave. Others have now gone even further to 
crafting concrete tools and guidelines for making policy in a complex, 
self-organizing uncertain system. Emery Roe (1998) in his book 
-“Making Policy in the Face of  Complexity” outlines a practical tool 
he calls “Triangulation”, in which orthogonal policy making tools such 
as cost benefit analysis, narrative policy making, local justice systems 
etc. can be used together to bring different perspectives of  a complex 
system together. Swanson and Bhadwal (2009) have produced a primer 
entitled: Creating Adaptive Policies: A guide for policy making in an 
uncertain world. They suggest for example that “Adaptive policies 
anticipate the array of  conditions that lie ahead though robust up-front 
design using (i) integrated and forward-looking analysis; (ii) multi-stakeholder 
deliberation and (iii) by monitoring key performance indicators to trigger 
automatic policy adjustments. But not all situations can be anticipated. 
Unknowns will always be a part of  policy making. Adaptive policies are 
able to navigate towards successful outcomes in settings that cannot 
be anticipated in advance. This can be done by working in concert 
with certain characteristics of  complex adaptive systems, including (i) 
enabling the self-organization and social networking capacity of  communities; (ii) 
decentralizing governance to the lowest and most effective jurisdictional level; (iii) 
promoting variation in policy responses and(4) formal policy review and continuous 
learning. Designers and implementers of  adaptive policies embrace the 
uncertainty and complexity of  policy context, and consider learning, 
continuous improvement and adaptation of  the policy a natural part of  
the policy life-cycle.”p15.
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f) While the arguments above demand a radical departure from business 
as usual, we are where we are, and must continue to build on the success 
we have achieved apart from the on-going initiatives we are currently 
undertaking at international, national and local levels. We have, over the 
years developed a formidable body of  international environmental law, 
conventions, treaties, standards, protocols, guidelines and commitments 
and these need to be enforced. To do this more effectively, a world 
environmental organization with powers similar to the WTO has 
been under discussion, should be established. In developing countries, 
national conservation strategies, poverty reduction strategies, national 
sustainable development plans, and local agenda 21, should be integrated 
in a bottom-up way and reinvigorated with adequate resources. They 
should now be shaped as part of  the social contract between citizens and 
their governments in which they undertake to be mutually accountable 
for the welfare of  the people and the environment both now and 
for the future. The most powerful tool available to countries and the 
international community in this regard is the Universal Declaration of  
Human Rights. The challenge here has been the weak attention given to 
economic, cultural and social rights. The recent work of  the Commission 
on Legal Empowerment of  the Poor has now provided a compelling 
synergy between human rights and markets. This has a great potential 
of  serving to strengthen the rule of  law for all and the application of  
human rights based approaches to development. Perhaps the greatest 
success that we have achieved in the field of  SD over the last few decades 
has been the meteoric rise in awareness of  environmental and SD issues. 
This awareness can now be combined with social media technology and 
appropriate leadership from youth groups and influential people such 
as entertainment stars, Olympic athletes, Nobel prize winners etc. to 
create a new wave of  awareness, possibility and hope to usher in the 
new world view described above.
g) To conclude, let us recognize some existing areas with the greatest 
potential for change towards SD. For convenience these are described 
at the physical, socio-economic and human levels, but it is recognized 
that they involve the ecological, cultural, political etc.
• At the physical level of  the world - is the movement to a lower energy 
consumption pathway which would include but not be limited to 
renewable and nuclear energy options; and would extend to a way of  
life and use of  technologies through which we actually use less energy 
and matter while improving the quality of  life for all, but especially the 
disadvantaged.
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• At the socio-economic level - are the movements to generate economic 
growth which has a smaller economic footprint and fair rather than 
free trade, which are more importantly in the emerging area of  social 
enterprises and social entrepreneurs, where private sector businesses 
aim only at producing profits that are required to meet the costs of  
doing business, rather than at poverty reduction and environmental 
value addition. This requires changes in tax laws which will allow 
new integrated models of  charities and businesses. Many developed 
countries such as Canada and the UK are examining options on the 
best way to do this.
• Finally, at the human level - is the movement to recognize the spiritual 
nature of  humans, the understanding that humans are spiritual beings 
having a material experience, and not the reverse. A first and perhaps 
easy and palatable step especially for secularists and atheists is the 
embrace of  a secular spirituality or sacredness in the ceaseless creativity 
of  the universe which is all around us and for which scientific evidence 
abounds. This cuts across and has nothing to do with organized 
religion.
IMPLEMENTING THE AGENDA        
Implementing this agenda will be difficult but doable. It will have to be 
embraced by both policy makers and practitioners in one camp, and, by 
academics and policy entrepreneurs including think tanks in the other. 
Policy entrepreneurs and think tanks usually build bridges between 
academic research and policy practice and will follow the action areas 
actively undertaken by practitioners and academics. Policy makers and 
practitioners are constrained by real politics, vested interest groups, 
democratic contestation over feasible options apart from time and financial 
constraints. They can therefore only be expected to make incremental 
changes and might only be able to deal with issues as outlined in point 
4 above. And so any radical departures, suffering as they would from 
all the challenges outlined by Kuhn and Hacking (2012), would require 
independent and credible inquiry; disruptive thought, teaching and research; 
cognitive shifts and bold advocacy. For all of  this, hopes are pinned on 
academia and in particular, the university. But only certain universities and 
a few academics in these institutions would be ready, and hence this call 
is made to them. It is likely that a smaller, newer university now building 
its name and pedigree will have the motivation, energy, vision, leadership 
and indeed naiveté to undertake this work. To make it more digestible the 
implementation agenda might be organized as follows:
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• For Schools of  Government and Public Policy: Inclusive Prosperity
• Inclusive Growth is more than pro-poor growth, growth with equity, 
equitable growth, microfinance or safety nets, aiming to achieve a 
new framework of  engagement between people’s capabilities and 
opportunity structures including non-alienation, legal empowerment, 
workers as owners etc.
• Inclusive Governance: New social contract between state and citizen, 
Rule of  Law, Access to Justice, property, labor, business rights, 
institutional reform. Formal and Informal sectors. This is crucial 
because more than 80% of  the population of  developing countries 
live in the informal sector unreached by formal institutions and 
without being a part of  the existing social contract.
• Making public policy in the face of  complexity: adaptive policies, beyond cost 
benefit analysis, narrative policy analysis, local justice systems etc.
• Process: Fostering the process of  self-empowerment.
• For Schools of  International Affairs: Local and Global Conflict 
and Security
• Understanding conflict as sources of  shocks and stress to livelihoods 
and vice-versa.
• Rebuilding livelihoods after disasters (slow and rapid onset) from 
humanitarian relief  to recovery and further to sustainable livelihoods.
• Use Resilience (household and institutional) as the organizing 
framework.
• Rethink the international institutional framework revealing the 
politics at work and use insights to focus efforts on prevention and 
recovery from disasters and conflicts.
• Promote more south –south and triangular cooperation.     
• For Schools of  Business: Building MSME’s in developing 
countries
• Focus on Small Economies: Why? Small is ugly but can be beautiful.
• Conceptualizing Small Economies: Where are they? Formal or 
informal?
• Standard business development services approach likely to be 
inadequate.
• Build on what they are doing well.
• Legal mechanisms to empower informal businesses to make it easier 
to do business in the formal sector (taxes, registration, services, 
protection).
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• Capital beyond traditional microcredit.
• Role of  local government in supporting MSME’s at local level.
• MBA in financing MSME’s.
• For Schools of  Law: Legal Empowerment of  the Poor
• Legal Exclusion: 4 billion people not able to use the law to improve 
their lives and livelihoods. They live in the informal or extralegal 
sector.
• Legal identity.
• Access to justice and the rule of  law.
• Property rights and security of  tenure.
• Labor and business rights.
• Making the law work for everyone.
• Enabling law to empower street vendors, rickshaw pullers, waste 
pickers, taxi drivers, and 90 % of  the Indian population who make 
their living in the informal sector.
By now the reader might be thoroughly disappointed with this business as 
usual agenda proposed above after all the rant about a radical departure. 
But this is deliberate as the strategy is to start where these traditional 
schools as are now and for the radical agenda proposed to be gradually 
infused into their curricula by a school of  humanities which would address 
issues like those below.
• For Schools of  Humanities: Fostering some Fundamental Shifts 
and Re-thinking what it is to Human.
• From linear logical frameworks based on reductionism to complex 
adaptive systems based on holism: from or to and.
• From realities which fit our theories to the reverse.
• From power as a zero sum game (win –lose) to power as a positive 
(win-win).
• From the world as it is OR the world as we wished it, to working with 
the emergent world.
• From having to being, from ego-system economy to ecosystem 
economy (equilibrium to evolution).
• From religion to secular spirituality (reinventing the sacred).
• And: Rethinking what is defined to be human
• To be a human being before being an Indian, a Canadian, a thinker 
, a practitioner , a Hindu , a Muslim, a Christian etc. : peeling off  
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layers of  imposed identities.
• Residual cosmic consciousness, that light as oneself, from which all 
else is derived.  Having to being can then happen!
• Celebrating our oneness has been neglected in the celebration of  
our diversity (we are more than 99% identical).
• Can we give academic respectability to the secular sacred, natural 
creativity, and evolutionary economics?.
• Advance the academic struggle to give respectability to behavioral 
economics and happiness studies. 
• The time has come for humanities and liberal arts to forge the 
transition to a new civilizational narrative.
CONCLUSION  
The development challenges of  the post 2015 era are not new. The fact 
that they persist require fundamentally new ways of  thinking about and 
pursuing development. Leaders will have to reassert that development is 
about political mobilization of  people for attaining their own objectives, 
that it is naive to pursue goals others have set, and yet see their challenges 
not in isolation but as shared with all of  humanity. Governments will have 
to renew the social contracts with their citizens as the fundamental frame 
for the new transformations that are necessary.  
New public policy ideas are as much the challenge as are institutional deficits, 
lack of  systems thinking, not taking connectedness and complexity seriously 
and the lack of  leadership to make these changes. A small step forward in the 
beginning to address this agenda is to train more of  our people to step out 
of  their disciplinary silo’s and begin to think and work in trans-disciplinary 
ways, going beyond familiar attempts at multi-disciplinarily. This cannot 
happen without a strong leadership from the humanities.
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POLITICAL WILL AND SUB-
NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN INDIA
REFLECTIONS ON HDRS AND 
DEVELOPMENT POLICY LOANS
Suraj Kumar*
The paper analyses the experience of  post-1995 India’s two major 
interventions that had an explicit public policy orientation on sub-
national governance reform (in contrast to more sectoral programmes) 
– the State Human Development Reports (SHDRs) supported 
by UNDP and the Development Policy Loans (DPL) supported 
by the World Bank. It describes the context, process and some of  
the results of  each of  these interventions, and also points out their 
limitations or constraints. In view of  the stated reform objectives 
and agenda of  both the interventions, the paper looks at the role of  
political will, and the challenge of  harnessing political will through 
institutions of  parliamentary democracy in India.
INTRODUCTION 
Context
India’s development trajectory since the early 1990s has been marked by two 
major policy shifts – liberalization of  the economy and decentralization of  
development responsibility. Of  course, there are contradictions between 
the two trends (with Panchayati Raj seen as a countervailing force to the 
forces of  globalization). There are constant setbacks and advances in a 
near cyclical mode. It is incontrovertible, though that both of  these have 
fundamentally re-aligned the nature and direction of  governance in India. 
The imperative of  governance reform in India is to ensure that the fruits 
of  globalization and the potential benefits of  decentralization are reaped 
to ensure growth that is “pro-poor, pro-nature, pro-women and pro-jobs”, 
to paraphrase MS Swaminathan. 
Globally, the concentration of  poverty has shifted to middle income 
countries with stable political contexts. An Oxfam study (Sumner 2010) 
*UNDP India Office, New Delhi
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points out that almost 930 million (75 per cent of  the world’s poor live 
in Middle Income Countries (MICs) and only 25 per cent (approximately 
370 million) lived in low income countries (LICs). This is in contrast to the 
situation in 1990 when LICs accounted for 93 per cent of  the world’s poor. 
It has been pointed out by Oxfam that nearly 61 per cent of  the world’s 
poor are in non-conflict MICs, and only 11 per cent live in conflict-affected 
LICs (Sumner 2010)1. The classical conflation of  poverty and civil war or 
insurgency is less true than before. The persistence of  poverty in such a 
scenario is today more due to internal inequality and poor implementation 
in these countries. The solution accordingly lies increasingly in addressing 
internal distribution and implementation capacity issues rather than reliance 
on Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and other concessional aid 
flows which are meant for filling recipient governments’ fiscal and project 
investment gaps. This implies that the focus is increasingly on governance 
reform where national governments need to be persuaded (not only through 
external triggers but mainly by internal public opinion and champions for 
reform within the government) to change or modify ways of  working and 
create an enabling environment to trigger and sustain the reforms. 
In view of  the limited and shrinking amounts of  ODA (as also poor 
levels of  ODA absorption – the global average being 15 per cent of  ODA 
pledged), the “clout” of  donor funding declines and reform processes are 
sustained more by persuasion rather than threat of  withdrawal. In other 
words, “impact in MICs is more about influence than money”.  
The Case for Sub-national Governance Reform
In the case of  South Asia, governance reform then requires influence 
governance at all levels, and in case of  federal structures (as in India and 
Pakistan), “subnational reform” - at the province/ state levels - becomes 
more salient. The rationale for this is that governance reform requires 
sensitivity to local contexts, and accordingly its instruments calibrated to 
the diversity and disparities in human development among states in the 
country. Moreover, under the Eleventh Schedule of  the Indian Constitution, 
the responsibility for key social sectors listed in the State List lies with State 
Governments, and the subjects listed under the Concurrent List are under 
the implementation domain of  the State Government, while the authority 
to make national legislation and policy is with the Union Government. 
1 More recently the 21 April 2012 issue of  the Economist noted: “In 1990 more than nine out 
of  ten of  the world’s poorest ... lived in poor countries. Now, three quarters live in middle-
income states such as China, India and Brazil. This is a problem for the World Bank because 
it mostly still lends to poor countries, not poor people”. 
	
Jindal Journal of  Public Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 190
In the context of  decentralized governance or local self-government, the 
role of  the State Governments is even more central (pun unintended), as 
the national legislation is indicative rather than imperative, as indicated 
by the usage “may” rather than “shall” in the 73rd and 74th Constitutional 
Amendments. As a result, conformity legislation and implementation 
mechanism is very much within the domain of  State Governments and their 
subordinate agencies. Additionally, State Governments are key financiers 
of  development programmes – with 57 per cent of  government capital 
expenditure undertaken by state governments; globally, India is second 
only to China in terms of  the volume of  sub-national public expenditure 
(Howes et al 2008).
In 2000, 57 per cent of  India’s total government capital expenditure was 
financed by the states, as was 97 per cent of  irrigation maintenance, 39 per 
cent of  road maintenance, 90 per cent of  public health expenditure, and 86 
per cent of  public education expenditure.2 In view of  the above contextual 
factors, governance reform at sub-national (state and below) levels becomes 
especially imperative in order for us to have an understanding of  the extent 
to which the situation on the ground is affected by national reform signals 
and public policy.
Drivers of  State level Reform
The drivers of  state level reform in India, remarkable for an otherwise 
diverse country with varying political contours, were similar not only 
across states but also consistent with the drivers of  reform at the national 
level. Just as the balance of  payments crisis in the early 1990s drove the 
wider adoption of  the economic reform agenda at the Centre, the crisis 
of  state finances (and the ballooning of  internal debt- with the decline in 
State Revenues to 10 per cent of  GDP and increase of  nearly 30 per cent 
in real wages for civil servants) drove the agenda of  state level governance 
reform. 
The imposition of  a “hard budget constraint” entailed State Governments’ 
compression of  expenditures (zero or near-zero fiscal deficit targets) 
and reliance on private capital flows and external assistance. At the same 
time, with the passage of  the 73rd and 74th Amendments, the onus of  
decentralization also fell on State Governments who had to put in place 
new institutional arrangements such as State Finance Commissions and 
2  In 2000, 57 per cent of  India’s total government capital expenditure was financed by the 
states, as was 97 per cent of  irrigation maintenance, 39 per cent of  road maintenance, 90 per 
cent of  public health expenditure, and 86 per cent of  public education expenditure.
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constitutionally mandated (and therefore permanent) Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs). 
In contrast to the pre-1990s situation where policies on these issues were 
relatively uniform across states and driven by the Centre, the new scenario 
meant each state had to play its own role to attract investment, restructure 
its finances and local governance mechanisms. This entailed a mix of  
competition and cooperation between and among State Governments. A 
study of  the World Bank’s Policy Based Lending in India has highlighted 
two significant reasons:  “… first, the big push starting in 1991 to liberalize 
the trade and investment regime led to increased competition between 
states to attract business and investment; second, the 1990s witnessed an 
acceleration in the decline of  the once nationally-dominant Congress Party 
and the emergence of  regional political parties”3.
State Governments also found increasing common ground vis-à-vis the 
Centre on issues ranging from Panchayati Raj to power sector, cooperatives, 
Value Added Tax (VAT) and availability of  external assistance for social 
sectors. Of  course, the imperative also meant greater focus on debt 
management and reform of  implementation arrangements, where there 
was increased scope for mutual learning and “sharing of  best practices”. 
The 1990s therefore required State Government in India to increasingly 
design their own state specific policy agenda and evolve public policy 
platforms to signal their commitment reform and good governance – both 
to leverage external assistance required for doing business differently and 
assure potential private sector players that the state indeed had an enabling 
environment for meaningful investment. Suffice it to say that when State 
Human Development Reports (and Development Policy Loans) arrived on 
the scene in India, it was indeed a time for “markets opening to commerce 
and minds opening to ideas4. 
Political Will: the Ghost in the Machine
With Governance Reform being increasingly predicated in MICs on more 
on influence and persuasion rather than financial muscle, it becomes 
important to assay political will and the mechanisms for gaining and then 
exerting influence/persuading change in the direction for reform. Political 
will has been defined as “…commitment of  actors to undertake actions to 
achieve a set of  objectives – and to sustain the costs of  those actions over 
time” (Brinkerhoff  2010). For students and practitioners of  public policy, 
therefore, the role of  political will in triggering and sustaining reform, as 
3 Howes et al 2008
4 Victor Hugo’s Opening Address at Paris Peace Congress August 1849
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indeed it becomes salient to look at negotiation mechanisms and processes 
for catalyzing and sustaining the political will itself. 
Within the framework of  a federal democratic structure, the role of  domestic 
politics becomes more important in triggering policy change than external 
leverage (Dollar, Devarajan & Holmgren 2001). When the state becomes 
a signaling agent for efficient markets and good governance, political 
leadership plays a key role in recognizing and then enabling the need for the 
required reforms in laws, policies and procedures. When the Government 
is increasingly required to provide the enabling environment and play 
the role of  facilitator and trouble-shooter (and provider of  externalities), 
“political will’ is needed to ensure a stable policy regime. Moreover, in 
analyses of  reform and democratic governance, the fluidity of  usage (as 
distinct from rigorous definitions) makes for increased popularity of  the 
notion. At the same time, the concept also has the suitability to provide a 
cogent clubbing together of  actions by a diverse range of  political actors, 
and its ease of  appropriation in popular discourse5.
In the context of  this paper, political will is an important underpinning to 
institutional change (“changes in the rules of  the game and its enforcement 
characteristics”). The paper looks at the significant public policy initiatives 
in India which began in the mid-1990s and focused primarily on the state 
level governance reform – State Human Development Reports (SHDRs) 
and Development Policy Loans (DPLs). It does not seek to provide a 
comprehensive narrative of  either initiative (for the latter refer Howes et 
al 2008 and Kirk 2011). It reflects on their signal accomplishments and 
salutary lessons for analysts of  public policy in post-1990 India. In addition 
to a common focus on the state level policy regimes and on key plan 
finance functions (and functionaries), the above two shared commonalities 
in terms of  national ownership, research-driven and orientation towards 
improved planning, budgeting, implementation and monitoring6.
It is true that the initiatives – the SHDRs supported since 1998 by 
UNDP and the DPL by the World Bank – had somewhat different points 
of  origin (SHDRs initiated completely by the Government of  Madhya 
Pradesh followed by Karnataka’s in-house preparation of  KHDR 1999). 
They covered very different areas – the former focusing on social sectors 
while the latter covered state budgetary support and included governance 
5 Grindle’s (2007) practical notion of  “good enough governance” becomes moot here.
6 The GOI-UN Joint Programme on Convergence and Gender Responsive Governance Pro-
gramme are among other relevant cases that work at all three levels germane for governance 
reform– Macro (Policy), Meso (Training) and Micro (grassroots intervention). However, their 
very recent vintage precludes their detailed discussion in this paper.
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reform in infrastructure sectors as well. The focus, content and scale of  
funds involved are very different. At the same time, the two taken together 
cover more ground and their juxtaposition may possibly offer insights 
that a discrete examination of  the two may miss out. Given the reliance 
of  both the initiatives on harnessing political will and “champions within 
government”, the analysis could offer an appreciation of  the “binding 
constraints” of  policy advice in India.
THE STATE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORTS 
The State Human Development Reports in India are possibly the world’s 
largest sub-national public policy initiative on social sectors – both in 
terms of  funding (combined government and UNDP funding being USD 
64 million approximately) and geographical coverage (23 states/provinces 
with a combined population of  0.8 billion people). In 1995, the Government 
of  Madhya Pradesh prepared MPHDR 1995, the world’s first sub-national 
HDR7. It was funded entirely by the State Government, and peer-reviewed 
by leading economists and development experts (including from UNDP 
and UNICEF). The idea of  having an objective assessment of  the state 
of  human development gathered further momentum with the National 
Planning Commission and UNDP coming on board, beginning with a 
National Consultation of  State HDRs hosted jointly by the Government of  
Madhya Pradesh and UNDP in 1996, and a UNDP-Planning Consultation 
on Core Indicators of  Human Development in 1998 leading to a National 
Programme on Capacity Building for State HDRs launched in 1998. 
The Guiding principles of  SHDR preparation, crystallized in 1998 were 
a) government ownership, b) editorial independence/ autonomy, and c) 
widespread Dissemination. The principal objective for a State HDR was/is 
the specification of  Human Development strategy for the State, based on 
a Desk Review of  status of  Human Development in the State (including 
computation of  HDI/ GDI at district level). The State HDRs were also 
expected to include an assessment of  functioning of  relevant sectoral 
schemes and programmes, and recommendations for “way forward”. 
While the SHDRs were state specific, the National Planning Commission 
and UNDP also laid emphasis on having a common methodology and 
core indicators to enable inter-state comparisons.
Between 1998 and 2008, twenty-three State HDRs were prepared and 
published (Manipur Report finalized in 2003 and Haryana Report finalized 
7 In 1993 Bangladesh had prepared its National HDR, being the first NHDR globally. Sofia 
prepared the first City HDR. HDRs were also prepared for Palestine (1997) and the Roma 
people. 
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in 2005 have not been published till date). The Planning Commission has 
provided additional central assistance (INR 320 crore or USD 50 million) 
and UNDP (USD 14.2 million) for preparation of  State and district HDRs, 
and follow up. All states were covered (except Goa (MOU signed 1998), 
J&K (MOU signed 2002, and Mizoram between 1998 and 2008). A follow 
up project for strengthening State Plans for Human Development was 
initiated in 2004 with Planning Commission ACA and UNDP technical 
assistance for 15 states. In view of  the imperative of  using public money 
to actually improve public welfare through research, training, outreach 
and focused grassroots initiatives, the credo followed was “From Analysis 
to Action”. This utilitarian approach also helped address cynicism about 
reports being “paper-friendly” rather than triggers for people-friendly 
pubic action.
Analysis of  human development was of  course the point d’appui for the 
State HDRs. The Madhya Pradesh HDR 1995 and then the Karnataka 
HDR 1999 computed district level HDI for their respective states and 
arrived at district income and poverty estimates. They also examined the 
factors behind the lags in human development and taken up institutional 
performance issues, not only for the functioning of  departments and 
schemes, but also the gaps in the statistical system and use of  data. The 
State HDRs and their follow up led to a sustained focus on the analysis of  
human development at the disaggregated levels (district and below), with 
the follow up including formulation of  District HDRs (pioneered by Malda 
and Bankura districts in West Bengal) and consolidation of  methodologies 
for District Income estimation (income originating approach) with India’s 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) and small area estimation for District 
Poverty estimation with Indian Statistical Institute (ISI) and National 
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). 
As the analysis of  human development had also to address issues of  state 
finance and effective approaches to reduce human deprivation, the follow 
up included systematic appraisal of  budgetary requirements for improving 
and expanding service delivery. The National Institute for Public Finance & 
Planning (NIPFP) collaborated with Finance Departments of  participating 
State Governments to undertake a series of  studies on financing of  
human development, which not only examined the trends and budgetary 
shortfalls, but also offered policy options to enhance funding and improve 
its effectiveness.
In sum, the State HDRs also triggered a program of  research and analysis 
covering fiscal policy issues and programme effectiveness and also further 
disaggregated human development assessments at the district and local 
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levels. Successive evaluations of  the State HDRs and their follow up have 
been conducted (beginning with evaluations under the Poverty Strategies 
Initiative (PSI) of  UNDP. Given the skepticism about the merits of  
government ownership, combined with national enthusiasm for the State 
HDRs, evaluations were conducted almost biannually. Subsequent sections 
take up key points of  these evaluations, what is undeniable is that these 
evaluations (notably Osmani-Gani and Tan 2000, Sisodiya 2000, Katoch 
2003, Tadjbaksh 2005a, Tadjbaksh 2005b, Saxena 2005, Riskin 2005, and 
Bhattacharya 2008) themselves are a substantive corpus of  research - 
offering analytical insights in issues of  human development for the State 
HDRs and more effective pursuit of  their recommendations.  
Advocacy and outreach have been a key platform for disseminating the 
message of  State HDRs beyond the immediate readers of  the report in 
government and international development partners. The fact that the 
early HDRs were translated in the respective official language of  the 
concerned state meant that the reports were accessible to a large audience 
within the state - legislators, media and civil society organisations. The 
critical reflections on the staus of  human development of  course provided 
grist to the mill of  political debate and media coverage – with the Madhya 
Pradesh report cited by the Leader of  the Opposiiton in the State Assembly 
during a No Confidence Motion in 1996. At the same time, the effort 
also had to include spread spectrum strategies for mass dissmeination and 
wider coverage of  the HDRs, and more importantly the issues raised in 
them. The Film & Television Institute of  India (FTII) collaborated with 
State Governments to prepare a series of  films on human development 
which were then broadcasted in the respective states so as to reach a wider 
audience. In addition to the standard metrics of  media coverage – number 
of  potential viewers, State Governments then documented specific 
instances of  impact. For instance, the issue of  Devadasi in Karnataka was 
taken up through local cable TV operators in select low HDI districts, and 
triggered debate on the women’s human rights and equity issues in the 
sites where the practice persisted. Karnataka also pioneered Interactive 
HD Classroom for sensitizing elected representatives on issues raised in 
the State HDRs, using not only the films produced, but also an educational 
package that simplified and made HD more germane to everyday issues 
confronted by elected representatives and women members of  SHGs. The 
Argentina experience of  HD road-shows was shared with the Government 
of  Maharashtra, and inspired a sustained campaign by the State Planning 
Commission to address cooperative bankers’ conventions, district official 
meetings and party workers. The outreach to an rather eclectic but very 
large set of  interlocutors was of  course subject to limitations of  enthusiasm 
Jindal Journal of  Public Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 196
and energy levels of  the State HDR champions, but undeniably the State 
HDRs did manage to cover a very large constituency across India with 
relatively limited funding and without the high profile associated with large 
volumes of  donor funding.
Action engendered by the State HDR was an impoprtant deisideratum 
if  the assessment of  the staus quo was to trigger efforts to change it. In 
view of  the fact that the report preparation and follow up were anchored 
mostly in Planning Departments and at the national level in the Planning 
Commisison, did mean that the first step in the direction would be to 
integrate human development concenrs more centrally in the state plan 
documents, gubernatorial addresses, state government budgets and training 
strategies. Human Development Research & Coordination (HDRC) units 
were set up in the State Governments, with expert teams and a network of  
resource institutions that survived the dismantling of  HDRC in the UNDP 
India office. Capacity building in India (and more generally in South Asia) 
is normally conflated with training and the follow up to State HDRs had 
a significant emphasis on training of  planning and finance department 
officials, with the Reserve Bank of  India’s external training wing, the 
College of  Agricultural Banking. With twelve very successful rounds of  
training over a three year period, and further Training of  Trainers (TOTs), 
a cadre of  human development trainers was made available to each state 
participating in the programme. Not only did this exercise expose state and 
district officials to good practices of  rural development in Ralegan Sidhi 
and Hivre Bazaar, it also generated a corpus of  training material which 
formed the basis for a TOT manual on Human Development, jointly 
prepared by the RBI and West Bengal Administrative Training Institute. 
The lacunae of  statistical systems analysed in the early State HDRs were 
addressed through a systematic engagement by the CSO on training state 
statistical cadres in computation of  District Income – building on the 
District Income Manual and Calculator evolved with Centre of  Budget 
& Policy Studies (CBPS), Bangalore and the Planning Commission. A 
technical note by NS Shastry on computing District Poverty estimates 
from central sample was prepared as a discussion paper, and further 
crystallized by Arijit Choudhuri for the West Bengal HDR and by Dipankar 
Coondoo and Amita Majumdar on behalf  of  ISI Kolkata who used small 
area estimation techniques. However, given the sophistication involved 
in these methodologies, contrasting with prior neglect of  training of  the 
statistical cadre at the state and district levels, the more successful training 
programme was on district level social development indicators, led by 
the International Institute of  Population Studies (IIPS), Mumbai.  The 
IIPS not only developed a MDG calculator for State Governments, but 
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also conducted series of  training programmes for district level statistical 
officials and demographers in the State Statistical Bureaux. The statistical 
training programme successfully segued into the initiative by UNFPA (the 
UN’s lead agency for Statistics) to train both data providers and data users 
at the state and district levels in measuring levels of  development in order 
to integrate them more effectively in state and local level plans and budgets. 
The direction in the Union Budget Statement of  2005 to engender budgets 
through Gender Responsive Budgeting was also taken further forward with 
a Gender Budgeting manual prepared in Hindi for the Government of  
Chhattisgarh by UNIFEM resource persons. The subsequent integration 
of  the manual in the Planning Commission Guidelines on Gender Sub-
plan reflects the enabling role of  national government assuming ownership 
in increased provenance in state governments of  technial tools for social 
sector planning in India. Conversely, the lead role of  State Governments 
in using State HDRs as a vehicle for further elaborating their social sector 
agendas and the diaggregated analysis of  human development at the district 
and sub-district levels have also prompted greater acceptance of  the HDR 
as a planning tool.  This is most notably reflected in the 2007 Guidelines 
for the Backward Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) and the notification by the 
Ministry of  Home Affairs (India’s Interior Ministry) for District HDRs as 
successor to the erstwhile District Gazetteers. 
The highlights of  results from the foregoing litany of  activities and their 
consequent outputs include, inter alia, the foregrounding of  human 
development concepts in public policy discourse in Indian states – not 
only with direct interlocutors in Planning, but also more broadly within 
bureaucracy, NGOs and media. Reform oriented officers have looked at 
data in the report (catalyzed also by the discussion on comparing district 
HDI with the senior bureaucracy and state level politicians), and many 
took action; there has been greater clamor for better data and data use. 
The State Economic Surveys with chapters on Human Development and 
the emphasis on human development outcomes in State Plan documents 
and Planning and Finance Commissions indicate that the first generation 
goals of  State HDRs – to specify improvement in human development as 
desideratum for planning and develop practical tools for action – are being 
realized. Ongoing measures - such as Human Development missions for 
low HDI districts (begun in Maharashtra with a TISS Strategy Paper for 
Jalna, Yavatmal and Nandurbar districts), Gujarat’s Human Development 
Plan and the District Planning Manual including the District HDR as 
baseline – now need to address second generation issues of  institutional 
development (the first generation being the specification of  the “rules of  
the game”) in terms of  sharper and more effective monitoring of  results 
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and putting in place accountability mechanisms to report and track the 
changes on the ground (or the “enforcement characteristics). 
The challenge (and the opportunity) now would be to ensure greater 
political acceptance and use of  the HDR.  An assessment of  the SHDRs’ 
continued relevance in public policy could be grounded in an assessment of: 
a) the actions triggered by the analysis in the reports and b) the discussion 
sparked off  by the indices including the competition to improve the HDI. 
Political will, chimerical as it may be, can play a central role in this. Indeed 
it has been argued that it would be effective to focus further resources on 
building the political (and public) constituency for human development, 
rather than continue to define the problem in increasing sophisticated 
ways that are more arcane and less accessible. “We make things so complicated 
that nobody but us can understand the technicalities. It keeps us in business of  course 
but not much change on the ground and that again can keep us in business till the 
funds run out and public interest lags”. Today there are many new players in 
development who can use the Report to define their own agenda and use 
it in their manner. This is not to be seen as threat to the existential purity 
of  the Human Development concept, but as an opportunity to engage 
with diverse players and help ensure quality and consistency which would 
further benefit the users of  the Report. As SHDRs can and have been used 
both by the ruling parties and by the opposition, the Reports have become 
an important document in the public domain. The task at hand now would 
be to ensure that political will is harnessed so that it stays on the agenda 
credibly by effective improvements of  the actual status. Jean Dreze puts it 
quite inimitably – “HDRs are important but human development is more 
important.”
What follows as a result of  SHDR preparation and its follow up has 
now become moot. When governments are re-elected (MP, West Bengal, 
Maharashtra) the public perception is that pro-incumbency is aided by 
investment in social sectors, decentralization and even the HDRs. There is 
greater focus on social sectors in state plans and budgets – with increased 
allocations and greater focus on targeting. Programmes are designed with 
and HDI and HD data is used for selection of  districts (taluks). Even when 
there is a change in regime, the Reports are a platform for government 
to express emerging priorities. At the very least, SHDRs and Human 
Development Updates (such as the Rajasthan Human Development 
Update 2007 prepared by Institute of  Development Studies) serve as 
“companion document” with data and analysis for the serious policy maker 
and planner. The protean nature of  human development is an advantage 
for SHDR to be a vehicle for stating priorities, not only in plan documents 
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but also in party manifestoes and coalition agenda documents.  At the same 
time, it needs to be recognized that State HDRs do not trigger political or 
bureaucratic will but are led by it. Moreover, the level of  interest and the 
effectiveness of  action taken on recommendations also vary depending 
on the career and professional trajectories of  “HDR champions” in 
government and politics. The literature on political will recognizes that 
“norm entrepreneurs,” play a critical role in the three stages of  “norm life 
cycle”: norm emergence, norm cascade, and internalization (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998). HDR champions emerged from “norm cascade” and play a key role 
in “norm internalization” and therefore for SHDRs to play a continued 
role in subnational governance reform, it is critical that the engagement 
with “champions” be intensified (including broadening the circle of  
champions beyond the reflex of  sensitizing new incumbents of  planning 
departments). 
THE WORLD BANK DPLS AND SUBNATIONAL REFORMS 
IN INDIA 
Just as the SHDRs attained eminence as a planning tool in India, the World 
Bank’s Development Policy (WPL) Lending - also referred as Policy Based 
Lending (PBL) or Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) – became a key 
policy reform instrument for state finances8. The SHDRs were status 
documents intended to trigger a greater focus on social sectors. The World 
Bank DPLs were a policy-based incentive to trigger improvement in the 
overall state budget and its effectiveness. Just as the SHDRs went beyond 
departmental boundaries, the DPLs for states were a form of  lending 
based on an agreed overall (not purely sectoral) policy framework. They 
were quick-disbursing and not earmarked for any particular sector.  With 
nine State DPLs between 1997 and 2007 (a total fund of  USD 2.1 billion), 
India becomes the World Bank’s largest initiative globally for subnational 
governance reform.  This would increase further with the inclusion of  
DPLs with Bihar (“lagging state”) and West Bengal.
As pointed out earlier, state level fiscal reforms in India were triggered 
8 Howes et al 2008 point out, “World Bank lending comes in two forms: investment lend-
ing and adjustment (also called development policy or budget support) lending. A typical 
investment loan has 5-7 year duration, and it finances goods, works, and services in sup-
port of  economic and social development sector projects. On the other hand, an adjust-
ment loan has a relatively shorter duration (1 to 3 years), and it provides quick-disbursing 
financing to support policy and institutional reforms. Over the past two decades, adjust-
ment loans have accounted for about 30 percent of  total Bank lending.”
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by increased competition (since early 1990s) for business and investment 
as also the end of  national parties’ hegemony of  rule in the states and 
the emergence of  regional / state level parties, which actually became 
significant power centres for the national level coalitions.  Similar to the 
national trend in early 1990s, states’ fiscal crisis in late 1990s triggered 
interest in state level reforms. As pointed out by Howes et al (2008): “Weak 
coalition governments limited political influence of  Centre so “focus state 
strategy led naturally to State DPLs”.
The highlights of  the State DPLs in India include better performance of  
DPL states in improving fiscal parameters - from a common baseline of  6 
per cent fiscal deficit in 1999-2000 to 2.8 per cent for DPL states and 4.5 
per cent for non-DPL states in 2005-06. The stabilization of  debt to GSDP 
ratio in DPL states since 2002-03 was in contrast to continued increase in 
non-DPL states. However, since the non-PBL states also adjusted, with a 
lag, it could be the case that the effect of  the State DPLs was to accelerate 
a fiscal correction in these states that would have happened in any case.
The signifier of  very large funding by the World Bank also elicited State 
Governments’ commitment to better governance.  The high level of  
media visibility in the states also sent signal of  being “reform-minded” 
to attract private sector investment. Just as in the case of  the SHDRs, the 
role of  reform champions in national Ministries (MoF in the case of  the 
World Bank) and state governments was critical. Indeed, it was useful for 
government interlocutors who cited the pressure of  meeting commitments 
made for World Bank loans to counter political and bureaucratic inertia or 
opposition. Conversely, the high level of  political visibility for the DPLs 
entailed criticism for “unpopular” triggers (especially in the case of  “free 
power” lobby) that were seen as externally imposed.
The World Bank DPLs and the SHDRs have several points of  intersection, 
given common interlocutors at the State level, and shared commitment to 
generate evidence for change on the ground. The World Bank triggers for 
the Karnataka DPL included preparation of  District HDRs and putting in 
place a Human Development MIS. The latter was also included in the loan 
negotiations with Tamil Nadu. Given the sensitivity to potential criticism 
for agreeing to Bank conditionalities, State Governments used SHDRs 
as their home-grown platform for taking up these obviously critical 
initiatives. At the same time, the World Bank’s analytical insights on reform 
of  state government budgets (especially addressing issues such as doctor 
absentee-ism and burden of  pension payments on the fiscal envelope) 
contributed to the content of  HD training programme by the Reserve 
Bank of  India (RBI) – with the World Bank even providing its in-house 
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experts as resource persons. At the same time, it proved difficult to enter 
into systematic collaboration between the initiatives on improving human 
development statistics and the Bank’s non-lending technical assistance on 
strengthening statistical systems. While this may have been partly due to the 
nodal ministries were different in this particular case (National Planning 
Commission for the SHDRs and Ministry of  Statistics for the Bank 
project), it is also an example of  a “coordination failure” and a missed 
opportunity for effective collaboration between two like-minded (within a 
rather collegial environment for dialogue) governance reform initiatives at 
the subnational level.   
LESSONS: PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LIMITS TO GOVER-
NANCE REFORM 
As the foregoing sections indicate, both SHDRS and DPLs had several 
significant successes and are a good example of  focused public policy 
initiatives to trigger good governance at the sub-national level. In order 
to think ahead and understand their potential for continued relevance, it 
would be important to assess their limitations, as pointed out earlier. 
The SHDRs face the challenge of  addressing skepticism about “reports”. 
Moreover, the critique of  India as a “flailing state” (Pritchett 2009) 
where the brain (viz., policy) has a declining control over the limbs (viz., 
implementation on the ground) may even lead to questions about the 
continued relevance of  public policy as a basis for governance reform. 
It becomes critical therefore for the HDR exercise in India to resist the 
perils of  routinization and “group-think”, compounded by insufficient 
capacity to further innovate. The academic focus on “quality of  analysis” 
may preclude public understanding, especially among political leadership. 
Excellence in analysis should therefore include simplicity of  explanation 
and ease of  communicability. The power of  the HDI as crude but 
simple and powerful measure needs to be further harnessed to promote 
understanding (such as the Maharashtra Human Development Backlog) 
and trigger competition to improve HDI rankings.
The State DPLs also face the challenge posed by their own success – the 
improvements in fiscal health of  states (driven also by better revenue 
collection) and favorable policy environment rendered the donor less 
effective. As in the case of  SHDRs, the technical engagement with 
policy wonks can lead to the neglect of  political engagement with elected 
representatives. Also, both the initatives need to become salient in the 
discourse of  everyday politics and debate – and for this it is important 
to address the lack of  capacity to expand the audience/ constituency for 
Jindal Journal of  Public Policy, Vol. 2, Issue 1102
reform recommendations beyond secretariats and Ministers. The stage 
setting for the dialogue may need to change or at the very least expand 
beyond the current set of  interlocutors for governance reform.
PUBLIC POLICY AND THE LIMITS TO GOVERNANCE RE-
FORM: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCAL SALIENCE
The figure below (taken from IIM-Bangalore’s training programme for 
women politicians)9, maps the divergence between technical sophistication 
and scale of  policy change. 
The “classical policy situation” is one where the problematique is carefully 
selected based on academic or policy research, is easily amenable to standard 
research tools and is triggered by a crisis (such as a major funding shortfall 
or highlighting of  serious gap in delivery of  services). Given their high 
degree of  technical content and interlocution with finance and planning 
departments (with relatively lower levels of  everyday public interface), the 
subjects taken up are ab initio not subject to large-scale political controversy, 
especially as the overall rubric is the anodyne one of  macro-level policy 
dialogue in line with existing commitments to increase public welfare. As 
large scale institutional re-ordering is not the initial point of  departure for 
these reform discussions, the effectiveness of  the interlocutors to deliver 
on the promises of  change is also not tested. As a result the actual scope 
9 IIM-Bangalore iWiL Programme July-September 2012
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and pace of  reform is incremental – characterized by a high degree of  
technical understanding and relatively narrow band or slow pace of  policy 
change. 
In contrast (and in the diagonally opposite segment), the larger scope 
and faster pace of  governance reform confronts a dynamic field situation 
where fire-fighting is the norm, required response times are very short; the 
scope for sophisticated technical analysis is very limited (either due to data 
constraints or absence of  any prior research). As governance reform has 
to impact delivery of  services and institutional arrangements, the levels of  
politicization is high as existing local power relationships and patronage 
networks are questioned. The luxury of  distant observation is less 
available and the urgency of  addressing the concerns of  a technically less 
sophisticated but politically more important constituency is high. Indeed, 
as Howes et al 2008 point out, the political implications of  the reform 
prescriptions come out starkly when governments eager to avail the State 
DPLs face electoral reversals and the blame is put on loan conditionalities 
such as reversal of  free power. Thus when an attempt is made to go 
beyond incremental policy change, the high degree of  politicization has to 
be factored in, and again that requires going beyond the technocratic mode 
and engaging systematically with political leadership to generate support. 
The grid above places the technical public policy frame of  the SHDRs 
and DPLs squarely in the box of  classical policy situations with high 
technical content and narrow band of  policy change. On the other hand, 
once the technical work is completed, both SHDRs and State DPLs share 
common binding constraints for continued sub-national governance 
reform. These consist of  their limited constituency of  interlocutors and 
evanescent “political will”. In part, this is due to the structural design flaw 
– the distance between the location of  the problem (‘the MofussiI’) and the 
expertise to solve it (located in metropolitan enclaves and institutions). 
This distance – both geographical and often intellectual – undermines 
the ability of  governance reforms to go beyond the technical papers 
and consultations and meaningfully change the situation on the ground. 
Scholars such as Pritchett (2009) have characterized the situation as one 
of  a “flailing state” (in contrast to the international typologies of  “failing”, 
“Failed states”). They argue that the failure of  reform lies in the inability of  
the cerebral segment of  the governance mechanism (viz., national policy) 
to direct the limbs of  the state (delivery mechanism at the district and local 
levels). Given this lack of  articulation between policy and implementation, 
the ability of  governance reform initiatives to translate into change on the 
ground is limited. While the above approach does diagnose the constraint, 
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it does not question the issue whether the reform prescriptions are indeed 
relevant or analyze whether their formulation process has taken into 
account the process of  generating political will. Pritchett (2009) also does 
not consider adequately the challenge of  formulating governance reform 
prescriptions within a federal framework and the need to have political will 
drive reform rather than the other way around. 
It is more fruitful to go beyond the cul de sac of  “flailing state” mode and 
instead examine how and why public policy priorities – evidence based 
or derived from large scale mobilization or public demand –  are often 
not realized due to bureaucratic neglect and political apathy, as the picture 
below indicates10.
Political will is therefore cited as the required trigger to generate the 
momentum for change in such a scenario. However, what is not highlighted 
is the mechanism for generating and sustaining political will for governance 
reform in multi-layered administrative set-up characterized often not 
only by partisan and populist politics but also by a lack of  consensus and 
convergence within government departments and interlocutors of  reform. 
In a democratic polity, political will is sometimes a “shape shifter”, which 
can be harnessed more through political engagement within and across party 
lines and not only by technical demonstrations of  the imperatives for reform. 
If  it is defined as a “commitment of  actors to undertake actions to achieve a 
set of  objectives – and to sustain the costs of  those actions over time”, then 
clearly, the political engagement needs to become endogenous to the reform 
dialogue and the very formulation of  governance reform prescriptions. 
Political will as a process is driven by generation of  “Opinion” (framing 
of  issues) plus “Intensity” (strength of  public opinion) plus “Salience” 
(relevance to public choice). As the above analysis of  State HDRs and DPLs 
in India indicates, local salience is often missing and therefore both these sub-
national governance reform initiatives have thus far faltered on “intensity” 
and therefore, face the paradox of  securing government ownership and yet 
faltering on the overall score of  sustained political will.
10  IIM-B iWiL course
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As ongoing public initiatives, it would be important for the HDRs and DPLs 
to make the link between framing of  issues and relevance to public choice, 
by focusing on a wider constituency of  interlocutors (foremost being the 
political stakeholders) and local salience. Thus far, there seems to a strong 
focus on “champions” within government – which is also a function of  
convenience as it is easier to deal with a smaller number of  political actors. 
However, the career trajectories of  “champions” can often determine the 
trajectory of  governance reform. Electoral outcomes and political imperatives 
often impact the responsiveness to reform prescriptions. Therefore it 
would be critical to focus on more “spread spectrum” approaches such as 
mass advocacy and forums of  elected representatives (national, state and 
panchayat level) to have a wider network of  champions. 
As we look at the appropriate audiences/ constituencies for policy advice, 
it is important to also appreciate that India’s governance reform challenge 
includes decline/ desuetude in routine performance of  parliamentary and 
legislative institutions.  Not only the national parliament, but also the state 
legislatures – which are more germane for governance reform in service 
delivery- meet for fewer days. As the graph below indicates, the number 
of  transaction days per year or Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha together has 
declined from 265 days in 1955 to less than 150 in 2009. 
Figure 1: Parliament Meets Even Less
At the same time the average for Lok Sabha between 2000 and 2010 is 72 
days per year, in contrast to 8 for Arunachal Pradesh, 14 for Haryana, 26 
for Assam, 42 for Karnataka and Maharashtra and 48 for West Bengal.
Even as we speak passionately about “evidence based policy”, there is an 
increase in number of  bills passed without more than a day’s debate (96 per 
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cent of  bills in Bihar and 100 per cent in Haryana in contrast to 6 per cent in 
Lok Sabha), decline in the duration of  bill passage (only 21 per cent of  bills 
took more than 3 hours of  debate and 18 per cent took less than 5 minutes). 
Figure 2: Time Taken to Pass Bills in Parliament
While the 15th Lok Sabha referred 73 out of  113 bills  to Standing 
Committee, the figure was 0 out of  74 during 2007-10 (figure 3), for 
Bihar, 5 out of  476 for Tamil Nadu during 2000-10 and 15 out of  237 
for West Bengal during 2002-08. During 2011, the Lok Sabha passed on 4 
out of  53 budget demands after discussion (49 passed through guillotine) 
and Haryana passed all budget demands through guillotine and without 
discussion.
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and Haryana passed all budget demands through guillotine and without 
discussion.
Figure 3:  Bills Introduced and Bills Referred to the Committee
In sum, the challenge of  harnessing “political will” for governance reform 
in India also includes serious engagement at the national and state levels 
to correct the decline in the regular functioning mechanisms of  legislative 
functioning. It is important to ask whether we are indeed looking in the right 
place for political will and the right forums for this. The pubic disenchantment 
with political processes makes this task especially challenging, at a time when 
the youth are becoming demographically more significant but increasingly 
alienated from mainstream parliamentary politics. The recent upsurge in 
non-traditional venues for political and public debate forums is an example 
of  this disenchantment with formal institutions of  representative democracy. 
Accordingly, the governance reform initiatives in India also need to go 
beyond continued “prayer and petition” approach to gain political leverage 
and engage with a much larger audience, including with crowds.
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ARMED CONFLICT AND WOMEN
Sukriti Chauhan
Violence against women in conflict ridden zones has a multi-
dimensional impact, not only on the woman but on her family 
and community as a whole.  Violence against women in conflict 
zones is merely dismissed as a natural consequence of  war, leading 
to impunity against the crimes, in many cases leading to gender 
based violations in the post conflict communities.  Further, the 
legal characterization of  crimes against woman in conflict zones 
as crimes of  sexual violence alone and not as an attack on her 
‘honour’ exclusively.  Defining rape as a crime against honour 
and understanding it from a male perspective shows a failure to 
recognize the violent and discriminatory nature of  the offence. 
There is a need to redefine women’s rights as human rights and 
not as ‘private’ or ‘cultural’ rights.
INTRODUCTION
As nations focus on enhancing military strength and controlling resources, 
gross violations of  human rights, especially women’s rights continue to 
occur in conflict zones.  Violence against women in conflict ridden zones 
has a multi-dimensional impact on not only women and their family and 
community as a whole. Women and girls suffer direct violations of  their 
physical integrity, for example through violation of  reproductive and 
sexual rights. Paragraph 135 of  the Beijing Platform for Action states that, 
“while entire communities suffer the consequences of  armed conflict and 
terrorism, girls and women are particularly affected because of  their status 
in society and their sex.”1
The stark reality is that violence against women in various forms in 
conflict zones is merely dismissed as a natural consequence of  war, leading 
to impunity against the crimes, in many cases leading to gender based 
violations is the post conflict communities. 
The status of  women during armed conflict may be seen as an extension 
of  their status in the pre-conflict social order.  Women who are considered 
1 UN Report of  the Fourth World Conference on Women (17 October 1995) UN Doc A/
CONF.177/20, http://www..un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--2-.en, accessed on 21 
March 2013
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as subordinate to men are discriminated both in society and law.  They 
are denied the right to equality before law and the right to freedom of  
movement; and have unequal access to education, work, and healthcare 
(Jefferson, 2013).2
“Is it possible to reconstruct a post war society when those who are relied 
on to weave the social and moral fabric of  a society, when women are 
themselves maimed?” (Antjie 2001)  History tells us stories about men and 
their victories during wars, women entering only as appendages - their 
voices unheard, contributions forgotten, and identities erased. 
This article attempts to provide a space for unheard voices of  women 
caught in conflict zones.   It aims to illustrate the apathy towards the 
suffering of  these women, in law.    It seeks to examine the strengths 
and inadequacies of  international laws, conventions and human rights 
discourses in protecting women and the impact of  the women’s identities 
and choices.  
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN COMBAT AREAS 
Armed conflict may take place at the local, national or the international 
level with consequences including involuntary displacement of  affected 
population within the country or them becoming refugees.   
Conflicts impact the entire society but there are certain gender-specific 
ramifications that require special attention. Women like men, are mentally 
and physically tortured but they also become victims of  widespread sexual 
violence, and much more so when displaced or rendered homeless. Rape, 
sexual assault, forced pregnancies and sexual slavery have often been used 
as war tactics to destroy women, families and communities. Be it the mass 
rapes and forced pregnancies by Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia Herzegovina, or 
uncountable rapes during insurgency in Kashmir  (Fitzpatrick 1994)3, sexual 
violence remains one of  the most extreme forms of  patriarchal control 
which damages lives of  women
The violence inflicted on women has wider ramifications for the community. 
Traditionally, women are perceived as being the caretakers of  the family, 
2 La Shawn R. Jefferson,  ‘In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and Women’s Status’ ,Human Rights 
and Armed Conflict, Human Rights Watch World Report, 2004, p327, <http://www.hrw.org/
wr2k4/download/wr2k4.pdf>, accessed on March 15, 2013
3  Joan Fitzpatrick, The use of  international human rights norms to combat violence against women 
in Rebecca J Cook (ed), ‘ Human rights of  women, national and international perspective’, (University of  
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1994), p 548
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especially the children and the elderly. Besides being producers of  human, 
economic and social resources, the women are also seen as carriers of  
tradition and culture in communities. Therefore the woman, besides being 
an individual member, and citizen of  a country, is also an active agent in 
protecting and strengthening human, family and social ties and in assaulting, 
raping or killing women, the combatants seek to damage all these.  
Sexual violence is not the only threat faced by women. As majority of  men 
and boys fight at frontlines, women and children are disproportionately 
affected by landmines. Besides they battle the threat of  being kidnapped. 
Women are under continuous fear of  losing family and even their own 
dignity at the hands of  enemy combatants. In the 1980s Yugoslavian 
disintegration, Croatian and Serbian women were asked to leave paid 
employment to attend to ‘natural’ duties, an example of  subordination of  
women and an absence of  choice for them across different cultures. 
Women have adopted different strategies to cope with and survive the 
tortures of  armed conflict, including joining the conflict as combatants. 
A prominent example is the case of  women members of  The Liberation 
Tigers of  Tamil Eelam (LTTE), considered to be a very well organized 
terrorist group in Sri Lanka, carrying on an armed struggle for a separate 
Tamil homeland. It is believed that nearly 4,000 women cadres have been 
killed since they actively started participating in the combat since 1985.4 
Between 1990 and 2002, girl soldiers were among fighting forces and groups 
in at least 54 countries, and fought in conflicts in 36 of  those countries.5 
Many women consider fighting on the front as a method to achieve equality 
and escape from the torture they might face at enemy hands. However, 
participation in war does not give women an equal standing. More often 
than not, their efforts as frontline combatants are undermined. They are 
perceived as playing roles contrary to societal beliefs, due to which they 
face post conflict trauma. Ex-combatant women are expected to go back 
to their prewar gender roles, as mothers and wives (Moser 2001).
SEXUAL VIOLENCE A HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE
International humanitarian law consists of  both conventional and customary 
rules, the principal conventional instruments of  relevance to the protection 
4  The Hindu said on March 10, 2002, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/terror-
istoutfits/LTTE.HTM
5  Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security 
Council resolution 1325 (2000), United Nations, accessed on 17 March 2013, p. 22 http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf
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of  victims of  armed conflict being the four Geneva Conventions of  1949 
and their two Additional Protocols of  1977, which deal with international 
armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts respectively.6 These 
protections are to be granted equally to both men and women. Though 
there are articles propagating maintenance and restoration of  family ties7 
and for women to be treated with all consideration due to their sex8, some 
of  these mainly discuss ‘protection’ and not ‘prohibition’ for example, 
Article 76 of  Protocol I to the Geneva Convention9 stipulates that women 
must be “the object of  special respect and shall be protected in particular 
against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of  indecent assault.” 
Article 27(2) of  the Fourth Geneva Convention states that “women shall 
be especially protected against any attack on their honour, in particular 
against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of  indecent assault.”10 
The language of  the law demonstrates how crimes of  sexual violence are 
mischaracterized as an attack on ‘honour’ exclusively. Defining rape as a 
crime against honour and understanding it from a male perspective shows 
a failure to recognize the violent and discriminatory nature of  the offence. 
No mention is made of  a woman’s own right to physical integrity and how 
rape and other forms of  sexual abuse are not ‘lesser’ crimes compared to 
enslavement.11 Rape needs to be understood as an act of  torture faced by 
women and not as an act undermining their ‘honour’ exclusively.
Gender based violence was recognized as late as 1993, with the UN Vienna 
Declaration12, and is still frequently considered to belong to the “private 
domain” (Moser 2001).  Sexual assault may be part of  an intentional strategy 
to suppress civilian population, or failure of  discipline in military troops; 
it can never be a private matter (Fitzpatrick 1994).13  There is a need to 
redefine women’s rights as human rights and not as ‘private’ or ‘cultural’ 
6Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Coun-
cil resolution 1325 (2000), United Nations, , p 33, <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/pub-
lic/eWPS.pdf> accessed on 17 March 201
7 Geneva IV, Article 26; Protocol I, Article 32
8 Geneva I, Article 12; Geneva II, Article 12; Geneva III, Article 14, Protocol I, Article 76
9 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of  12 Aug. 1949. and Relating to the Protection 
of  Victims of  International Armed Conflicts of  8 June 1977 (Protocol I)
10 Article 27, Geneva Convention 4
11 Congo- Human Rights Watch March 2005 Vol. 17, No. 1(A), Seeking Justice: The Prosecution of  
Sexual Violence in the Congo War, accessed on 22 March 2013  p. 22
12 UN General Assembly, ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of  Action’(12 July 1993) Un Doc 
A/CONF.157/23, accessed on 24 March 2013
13 Joan Fitzpatrick, The use of  international human rights norms to combat violence against wom-
en in Rebecca J Cook (ed), ‘ Human rights of  women, national and international perspective’ (University of  
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, USA, 1994), p 548
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rights. International Humanitarian Law has a duty to protect civilians and 
punish any perpetrator of  violence in an armed conflict. 
Rape, sexual assault and mutilation cause injury that goes much beyond 
the physical body. It may have serious long-term consequences in the form 
of  mental illness, emotional trauma, and permanent internal and external 
injury, sexually transmitted diseases like HIV/AIDS, and unwanted 
pregnancies.  These conditions may make it impossible for the women 
scarred during war to integrate in post combat societies. Thus, we find 
that while women do need the protection through laws common for both 
men and women, the need of  special legislation at the local, national and 
international levels is an essential and necessary human right of  women. 
The UN Security Council Resolution 132514 specifically deals with the 
serious damage caused to women during war. Though the resolution 
recognizes the importance of  having a gender based perspective in 
peacekeeping operations and reaffirms the need to implement international 
humanitarian and human rights law wholly, that protects the rights of  
women and girls during and after conflicts, it ignores some vital concerns 
that arise in armed conflicts. There is a lack of  explanation of  the power 
imbalance between men and women during and after armed conflicts and 
in what may be done to specifically improve gender relations.15
WOMEN’S RIGHTS: PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS AND LAW 
The preamble of  the UN Charter, 1948 assures fundamental human rights 
to men and women without distinction on a number of  grounds, including 
sex. Though the Charter aims to achieve human rights and respect for all as 
an ideal, it does not have any mention of  women specifically.16  Mainstream 
human rights approaches have for a long time believed that the norms of  
human rights are gender neutral.  
Multiple discussions about human rights overlook gender specific 
violations and in many instances, this exclusion is usually supported by 
cultural or historical factors. A case in point is the Convention on the 
Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
1979, under which the signatory states aimed to end discrimination against 
14  UNSC ‘Security Council Resolution 1325’ (31 October 2000) UN Doc S/RES/1325(2000), 
<http://www.peacewomen.org/un/sc/1325.html>, accessed 21 March 2013
15  Amani El Jack, Gender and armed conflict, Overview Report, Bridge, p 24http://www.bridge.
ids.ac.uk/reports/CEP-Conflcit-Report.pdf,accessed on 17 March 2013
16  The Universal  Declaration of  Human Rights, Article 2
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women rights in the field of  civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
spheres. Sadly, it is also one of  the most reserved conventions in the world. 
Though created with universal discussion and consensus, certain sections 
undermine these very rights the convention aims to assure to women. 
Article 2 provides enough scope for modification of  what may be perceived 
as discriminatory customs and regulations by different state parties, which 
may subscribe to the opinion that improvement in status of  women, must 
not conflict with national tradition, culture or religion.  
The issue of  armed conflict and women has drawn the attention of  
policy makers for long. The year 1995 may be seen as a watershed year 
when there were comprehensive deliberations regarding this at the 
‘Fourth World Conference on Women’ in Beijing. It led to the Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action17 which articulated the personal and 
social damage caused by armed conflict and war on women and charted 
out objectives and strategies to deal with these. It is significant that the 
conference was perceived as a forum for strengthening and reinforcing the 
policies annunciated at earlier summits18for achieving gender equity and 
for creating a world free of  conflicts. 
The section on “Women and Armed conflict”19 in the Beijing Declaration 
and Platform for Action reads, “Peace is inextricably linked with equality 
between women, men and development.” “Local, national, regional and 
global peace is attainable and is inextricably linked with the advancement 
of  women, who are a fundamental force for leadership, conflict resolution 
and the promotion of  lasting peace at all levels.”
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) made a prominent 
advance by treating ‘sexual violence as destruction’ as it believed that 
sexual violence did not remain limited to its victim but could lead to the 
destruction of  the entire community. The Chambers passed the judgment 
that, “These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of  
Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the 
destruction of  the group as a whole.” It went on to state that rape or other 
17 Beijing Platform for Action, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/ , ac-
cessed 10 March 2013
18 The series of  UN conferences starting with the women’s summit held at Nairobi in 1985,  the 
children’s issue discussed in New York summit in 1990; the human rights conference held in Vienna 
in 1993 and other conferences recognized the importance of  redressing gender inequity for poverty 
reduction and ushering in a conflict free world. 
19 United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, Platform for action, http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/platform/armed.htm, accessed10 March 2013
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acts of  sexual violence inflicted “serious bodily or mental harm” on the 
members of  the community. 20  It is in this case of  Prosecutor v Akayesu21, 
where it also held that ‘Like torture, rape is a violation of  personal dignity’.
‘Crimes against Humanity’ (Article 3) defines rape and sexual violence22 
in much wider terms stating that, “The central elements of  the crime of  
rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of  object and body 
parts … other acts of  sexual violence that do not satisfy (the) narrow 
definition may be prosecuted as other crimes against humanity … such 
as torture, prosecution, enslavement, or other inhumane acts.” While 
enlisting “Crimes Against Humanity” ICTR Statute, Article 3 includes rape 
along with crimes like murder, enslavement and torture, stating that, “The 
International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have power to prosecute persons 
responsible (for these crimes) when committed as part of  a widespread 
or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, 
ethical, racial or religious grounds.”23  
The ICTR included the crime of  rape as a crime against humanity but it 
omitted rape from other categories of  crimes.24  It is the Rome Statute which 
in Article 7(g)  recognizes “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of  sexual violence 
of  comparable gravity” in its list of  war crimes.25  Most importantly, it 
provides the Court with the authority to prosecute individuals charged of  
war crimes in national and international conflicts. Article 8(xxii) reiterates 
that committing any of  the above mentioned crimes will also constitute “a 
grave breach of  the Geneva Convention”.  
Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions provides protection to 
citizens affected by non- international armed conflicts. The article expressly 
20 Human  Rights Watch, Genocide, Article 2, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/ictr/3.
htm#_Toc62641405>accessed 12 March 2013
21 The Prosecutor v Jean- Paul-Akayesu, 2 September 1998, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/
akay001.htm, p 731 accessed on 22 March 2013
22 Human Rights Watch, ICTR Statute, Crimes Against  Humanity, Article 3, in Para 596-598, 686-
688, <  http://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/ij/ictr/4.htm>, accessed 12 March 2013   
23 Ibid, a similar reference could be made to The War Crimes Chamber (WCC) in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina established in March 2005 in response to the winding up of  the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY).
24 Amnesty International USA ‘Stop violence against women, Rape as a tool of  war: A fact sheet’ 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/rapeinwartime.html, accessed on 25 March 2013
25 International Criminal Court, ‘Rome Statute of  the International Criminal Court’ ( 17 July 
1998) Doc A/CONF.183/9,<http://www.icccpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_
Statute_120704-EN.pdf>, accessed 10 March 2013
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prohibits murder of  any kind, along with mutilation, torture, taking of  
hostages and acts against the personal dignity, like the passing of  sentences 
and the carrying out of  executions without previous judgment by a proper 
court.  In the non- international armed conflict where the application of  
International Humanitarian Law is limited, international human rights 
law in Preamble II to the Geneva Conventions becomes important in 
protecting women and girls from heinous abuses in armed conflict. 
Therefore, the Statutes and Conventions mentioned above do consider 
and reaffirm rape as a war crime and not just a violation of  ‘honour’. The 
clarity about the need to punish any sexual violations committed during 
armed combat is needed to correct the conventional acceptance of  sexual 
violations against women during armed conflict as an inevitable outcome 
about which nothing much could be done.
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONS:      
EXPERIENCE AND REASONS  
Even though International Humanitarian Law has prohibited rape during 
war and armed conflict, the impunity to the war time rapists has a long 
history (Borchelt 2005). The declarations in the various UN Summits 
discussed the impact of  armed conflict on women as merely mothers and 
caregivers, without attempting to understand many other ways in which 
armed conflict affects women differently in comparison with men.26 
Women are not considered as a separate category, except in the case of  
pregnancy and sexual abuse, which limits their capabilities to only the 
reproductive and bodily sphere.
WAY FORWARD
Systematic discrimination against women in various cultures, has excluded 
the very experiences and voices of  women from the laws created to protect 
them.27 Even when states do take steps to provide protection to non- 
combatants with women being included in this category, their experiences 
are never used as inputs during formulation of  laws.28 The experiences 
26 Women, Peace and Security, Study submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security	
Council	resolution	1325	(2000),	United	Nations,	accessed	on	17th	March	2007,	p	5	<http://www.
un.org/womenwatch/daw/public/eWPS.pdf>,	accessed	17	March,	2013
27 Christine Ainetter Brautigam, International Human Rights Law:  The Relevance of  gender in 
Wolfgang Benedek, Esther M Kissakye, Gered Oberleither (eds.), ‘Human Rights of  women- Interna-
tional instruments and African experiences’, (Zed Books Ltd., London, 2002)
28  Judith Gardam, Women and the Law of  Armed Conflict: Why the Silence? The International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, No. 1. (Jan., 1997), accessed on 21st March 2013, p69 http://links.
jstor.org/sici?sici=00205893%28199701%2946%3A1%3C55%3AWATLOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7
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of  women in combat must be treated as a valuable input while framing 
policies. A formal system to collect, classify and utilize such information 
must be created. A step in this direction can be the involvement of  women 
organizations in conflict zones in decision-making process in addition to 
conducting relief  or conflict-related interventions. This must be linked to 
the provision of  services for women who are victims of  violent abuse due 
to armed conflicts, including programmes for counseling with a focus on 
physical assault, as well as psychological trauma.
Peace and security are essential for economic growth, development and 
the empowerment of  women and women need to play an equal part in 
securing and maintaining peace. To that end, they must be empowered 
politically and economically, and be represented adequately at all levels of  
decision-making. There is an urgent requirement to implement and enforce 
existing laws and policies to ensure that women have increased political 
representation and are closely involved is not only in decision making but 
also peaceful negotiations and creation of  conflict resolution systems. 
Most importantly, it is essential to broaden the paradigm of  crime against 
women in conflict zone as a human right violation.  This would enable us 
to recognize that the overall impact of  armed conflicts, impoverishment 
and gender based violence beyond the reductionism of  such violations 
as either private or cultural concerns.  This is critical to ensure that such 
violations against women are counted as crime and not rationalized as 
natural outcomes of  conflicts. Any strategy to deal with the issue of  women 
and armed conflict must not limit itself  only to the violence perpetuated 
against women during the combat but goes beyond it to suggest ways and 
means through which women caught in war could be assisted in getting 
integrated with society. It is equally critical to make special provisions to 
protect and rehabilitate women victimized and exploited by the violence 
unleashed in armed conflict. It is extremely important to recognize and 
create a woman’s space within this framework, yet it is also essential to 
ensure that this is not completely dissociated from the need to establish 
peace and equality in the wider social sphere. The goal should not merely 
be to re establish a normal life for these women but also encourage them 
to play an active role in the process of  reconstruction of  their lives. 
CONCLUSION
Any meaningful discussion regarding women and armed conflict is possible 
only within the wider context of  the paradigm of  human rights itself. It is 
important to understand the violations of  women’s rights in situations of  
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armed conflicts as a part of  the violation of  the much larger framework 
of  fundamental principles of  international human rights and humanitarian 
law itself. 
The impact of  war on women must not be limited only to humanitarian 
responses, appeal to conventional value systems or socially gendered roles. 
The issue demands a holistic understanding and legislation at both national 
and international levels.  
Finally, one must consider the degree to which changes in gender roles 
during an armed conflict, which often result in the empowerment of  women, 
can bring about lasting changes in gender relations. If  the human rights 
of  women in a community are not recognised, empowerment in conflict 
situations could remain a special case may be replaced with traditional 
gender hierarchies as soon as the conflict is over. The establishment of  
gender equality and equal rights is a task that will require attention for 
a long time to come. To bring about sustainable social development, it 
is key that a paradigm with the understanding of  the need to rectify the 
deep-rooted social and cultural conditions that give rise to sexism, racism, 
authoritarianism, hierarchies and gender stereotypes is required. 
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